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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
 This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the concept of emergence under study, 
followed by the practical benefits that are hoped to arise out of this work. The chapter 
then briefly reviews the State of Tamil Nadu within the broader context of the country. It 
will then outline the event under study, namely the Indian Ocean tsunami that struck 
India on December 26, 2004. This chapter will then move from a broad description of the 
effects of the tsunami on India to a narrower focus on the State of Tamil Nadu. It will 
then narrow the focus even further to the effects on the District of Nagapattinam, within 
the State. This chapter will then identify the major disasters that have taken place in India 
followed by the major events that have affected the District of Nagapattinam. This 
comparison will help the reader understand the history of disasters in the area and hence 
the context under study. 
Introduction 
 Justice has not been done to the concept of emergence in the disaster literature. 
Studies have documented volunteers arising out of the need of the hour, performing life 
saving work, clearing debris, feeding the survivors and managing the processes involved 
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in caring for the injured, dying and deceased. Yet no study has documented the 
emergence of volunteers or the tasks that they perform; the conditions which persuade 
their appearance, or the consequences of their activity after a disaster in India. This thesis 
hopes to fill the lacuna in the literature. 
The purpose of this study is to examine a behavior known as emergence, 
defined as new behaviors, tasks and structures that appear to meet or manage massive 
disaster needs (Dynes, 1970).  Several kinds of emergence can occur from individuals 
who form search and rescue parties to newly-appearing organizations that manage relief 
and reconstruction.   A number of emergent search and rescue groups formed in the 
aftermath of a tsunami that hit the Indian coastline. The tsunami was generated by an 8.9 
magnitude earthquake in the Indian Ocean, on December 26, 2004, at approximately 6:33 
a.m. My research was based in the District of Nagapattinam in the State of Tamil Nadu, 
an area worst-hit in India by the tsunami.  This district appeared to witness emergence 
among the administrators at the State level, officials at the district level, and fishermen at 
the local level, all of whom were instrumental in handling the situation that day.   
The research questions for this study are: (1) why and (2) under what conditions 
did emergence take place in Tamil Nadu after the tsunami? 
Practical benefits 
Several practical benefits should arise out of this work.  First, in a nation that 
experiences repetitive and massive disasters (Gujarat earthquake for example) emergent 
behaviors represent crucial resources during response and recovery. Second, 
understanding how, where and under what circumstances emergent groups appear as well 
as what activities they perform provides valuable information to Non-Government 
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Organizations (NGOs) and disaster relief organizations. Consequently, training schemes 
can be devised to take advantage of these crucial human resources prior to the next 
disaster. An analysis of the conditions that spur emergence in India will benefit planning 
and response to disasters in the future. Thus, the main justification for this research is to 
document emergent groups in order to harness their capacities in service to fellow 
citizens. In addition, this study hopes to produce, a draft of the characteristics of 
emergence, and the conditions that spur emergence at all levels of association in India, so 
that emergency plans can account and plan for emergent behaviors.  
Tamil Nadu 
Tamil Nadu is located in the extreme south of India (see map 1, p. 4). It has an 
area of 50,215 square miles. It is bounded by the Indian Ocean to the East and South. On 
the mainland, it is bounded by the States of Kerala to the west, Karnataka to the north-
west and Andhra Pradesh to the north. The capital of the state is the city of Chennai, 
formerly known as Madras (Britannica, 2003).   
 Although Chennai is a large industrialized city, the State of Tamil Nadu is mostly 
agricultural. The state is mostly composed of alluvial soils and the climate is tropical. The 
average range, for rainfall within the state, falls between 25-75 inches (635 -1905 mms) 
per year. Due to its coastal location, the State of Tamil Nadu affords a vast fishing 
industry as well (Britannica, 2003).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
Map 1: Tamil Nadu Districts and Coastline 
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The Tsunami 
 On December 26, 2004, a massive 8.9 magnitude earthquake (aka Sumatran-
Andaman), at a convergent plate boundary, occurred in the Indian Ocean. This boundary, 
between the Indian plate and the Burma plate, moves at a rate of 5 mm per year. Stresses 
within the plates caused the Indian plate to be subducted beneath the Burma Plate (Jain, 
Agarwal & Hirani, 2005). This subduction caused a massive movement of the crustal 
plates. The energy generated from the resulting earthquake created an immense tsunami 
that killed approximately 300,000 people in 12 nations, primarily, Indonesia, Thailand, 
India and Sri Lanka.  
India and the State of Tamil Nadu 
 The earthquake struck the Indian plate at 6:33 a.m. Indian Standard Time; shaking 
was noted only on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. However, the tsunami arrived on 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the recorded time of 7:15 a.m. and hit the southeast 
coast of the States of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh at approximately 9:03 a.m. Two 
hours later it reached the State of Kerala on the south-western coast (Jain et al., 2005). 
According to official statistics, a 187 km survey of the Eastern coastline revealed 
extensive damage (Dr. J. Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005). The 
total number of fatalities in the country reached at least 10, 805 leaving approximately 5, 
640 missing (Jain et al., 2005). Within the State of Tamil Nadu, the tsunami left 8,018 
dead, of which 1,769 bodies remained unidentified, and 1,126 went missing in this State 
(Dr. J. Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005).  
 
 
 6
 
 
Photo 1: Destruction in Nagapattinam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nagapattinam District within the State of Tamil Nadu 
 The tsunami of December 26, 2004, left 6,065 dead, of which 1,733 remained 
unidentified, accounting for 76% of the death toll in the state. In addition, 791 went 
missing in the District of Nagapattinam. Photo 1 shows the destruction to concrete homes 
in Nagapattinam from the tsunami. In short, this district bore the brunt of the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami (Dr. J. Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005). Most of 
the deaths occurred among the local fishing community, particularly among the locals 
living along the coast and the tourists who had come to visit the famous Shrine at 
Velankanni. Male casualties appeared much lower than casualties among women and 
children (Jain et al., 2005). This can be understood within the context of the Indian 
culture where men usually sleep outdoors and women and children indoors. Usually rural 
homes in India are small and do not afford enough space for all family members to sleep. 
In addition, the men allow the women and children to sleep indoors to respect female 
privacy as well. Sleeping outdoors affords a faster escape for men rather than women and 
children (Maithreyi, 1997).  In another instance, fisherwomen out on the coast, waiting 
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for the fishermen to return with the catch, left themselves vulnerable to the tsunami 
waves (Oxfam, 2005). Linked to this vulnerability are the impediments posed by the 
traditional dress of India, the saree (see photo 2), that inhibits them from running fast. 
Women are also unlikely to be able to climb trees and escape. Children experience 
vulnerability to the high waves as they cannot run fast (Jain et al., 2005). 
Photo 2: Sarees prevented women from running fast 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Disasters 
India 
 Indians are very aware of the most recent tragedies in their country. Disasters 
have affected many friends and family in the past, a regularity that will be experienced 
again. The Bhopal Gas tragedy on December 3, 1984, was one such disaster which stirred 
not only the Indian community but the International Community as well. This section 
briefly reviews major disasters within India to understand the frequency of disasters, and 
the extent of damage and loss of life, in the past. This section provides a reference as well 
as a comparison to the tsunami disaster. 
 The Marathwada or Latur earthquake which occurred on September 29, 1993, 
claimed 20,000 lives (Jain, 1998; Gupta et al., 1998). The Marathwada area is prone to 
droughts and is considered aseismic. Therefore an earthquake occurring in this area took 
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the people and the administration by surprise (Jain et al., 1994). A super-cyclone 
impacted the coastal areas of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, north of Chennai, on October 
29, 1999 and took 9, 885 lives (De, Dube & Rao, 2005; De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004; 
Salagrama, 1999). The Bhuj-Gujarat Earthquake occurred two years later on January 26, 
2001, and claimed 20,000 lives, injured 167,000, left millions homeless and resulted in 
$10 billion in damages. It was by far one of the costliest disasters India had seen, until the 
tsunami of 2004 (Rastogi et al., 2001; EM-DAT, 2005; UNDP, 2005).  
 The first recorded tsunami to hit the Indian coastline dates back to April 2, 1762, 
according to a report by the National Information Center for Earthquake Engineering at 
the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur (Jain et al., 2005). An earthquake at the 
Bangladesh-Burma border triggered a tsunami in the Bay of Bengal which caused waters 
in the Hoogly River in Calcutta to rise by 2m in 1762. In 1881, an earthquake around Car 
Nicobar Islands generated tsunamis in the Bay of Bengal at a 0.8m height. The eruption 
of Krakatoa in 1883 caused tsunamis that were felt in India. In June, 1941, an earthquake 
at Andaman (Indian Islands off the East coast of India) generated a tsunami of 1m height. 
In 1945, an 8.0 earthquake at the Mekran Coast of Pakistan also generated tsunamis that 
were felt in India. Waves reached a height of approximately 12m in Kach and 2m in 
Bombay. Fifteen people reportedly died in Bombay from this tsunami (GoI, 2005; Jain et 
al., 2005).  
Nagapattinam 
 The District of Nagapattinam protrudes into the confluence of the Bay of Bengal 
and the Indian Ocean (see map 1, p. 4), leaving it vulnerable to the onslaught of cyclonic 
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disturbances and oceanic turbulence. The effect of these oceanic disturbances on 
Nagapattinam is discussed below. 
 In 1952, four hundred deaths occurred in Nagapattinam on account of a Very 
Severe Cyclonic Storm (VSCS). In 1977, the southern states were badly affected, again, 
by a cyclone which claimed 14, 204 lives and left 5,432,400 homeless. Five hundred and 
sixty of those deaths occurred in Nagapattinam alone (EM-DAT, 2005). In November 
1991 another 300 persons died due to heavy rainfall in this district (Dr. J. Radhakrishnan, 
personal communication, May 9, 2005). In October of 2004, The District of 
Nagapattinam received an extensive amount of rainfall over and above the normal 
average for the district. The most recent rainfall emanated from the south-west monsoons 
that occur regularly in India. While the State annually receives an average of 16cms of 
rainfall during each monsoon season, the District of Nagapattinam, historically 
experienced average amounts, until it received 29cms of rainfall in 24 hours in 2004 
(Ramakrishnan, 2004). Local respondents to this study, after the 2004 inundation, felt 
that the rainfall saturated the ground and suggested that the tsunami water residue could 
not be absorbed.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter enables the reader to develop an image of the area under study and 
understand the history of events in Nagapattinam. Having given an introduction to the 
area under study and the historical impact of the tsunami on Nagapattinam, within the 
larger context of the country of India as a whole, I will now proceed with a review of the 
existing literature. Following the literature review in Chapter two, is a chapter on the 
methods used to undertake this study. The disaster history of India, Chapter four provides 
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a hazard assessment of India, Tamil Nadu and Nagapattinam and examines the risks and 
vulnerabilities of each area. Chapter four thus enables the reader to gain a broader 
understanding, historically, of the risks and vulnerabilities in Nagapattinam. Chapter five 
follows with the presentation and analysis of the data. Chapter six concludes the study 
with a discussion of the findings, questions that remain unanswered, and 
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Overview 
 This chapter will begin with an introduction to the early works on emergence 
followed by a definition of emergence. The chapter then discusses the characteristics of 
emergence and provides U.S. and Non-U.S. examples of each. The chapter continues by 
discussing the conditions that generate emergence. Theoretical and empirical examples 
are offered. The empirical studies section discusses conditions of emergence based on 
U.S. and Non-U.S. examples. The chapter concludes with a summary and a discussion. 
Defining Emergence  Early works 
Perhaps the most pivotal works on emergence, and the idiosyncrasies of defining 
it, were initially undertaken by Quarantelli (1966), Dynes and Quarantelli (1968), and 
later published by Dynes (1970). A four-fold typology of old and new organizations, 
based on tasks and structures of emergence, is examined here.  
The disaster event affects different organizations in varying ways. Some 
organizations invariably become involved in it as a part of their job, but the demands of 
the event may exceed their capability to provide the necessary resources. Some other 
organizations may find that their pre-disaster tasks are no longer relevant in the post-
disaster time period. Disasters place stresses on the community and push emergency 
organizations beyond their capabilities to provide. Furthermore, the need for additional 
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Figure 1: Dynes Typology  
From: Dynes, Russell, R. 1970. Organized behavior in disasters, p. 138.  
resources changes the nature of the organizations and compels community organizations 
to adopt unusual functions during the emergency. An adoption of unusual functions 
produces the need for new methods of coordination and control among all involved 
organizations. Thus, a condition of unplanned change develops in the relationships 
between organizations (Barton & Merton, 1963; Barton, 1969. p. 38; Dynes, 1970. p. 81, 
206). Nonetheless, all responding organizations, whether old or new, are resources. 
Learning how responding organizations become involved, and adapt to the impact period, 
is important for the literature on disasters (Dynes, 1970, p. 4, 84).  
In any disaster, organizations carry out familiar tasks. Yet, sometimes 
organizations engage in new tasks generated by the disaster. Therefore, it is possible to 
differentiate old and new organizations based on their tasks (regular and non-regular), 
and structures (old and new). Dynes (1970, p. 138) laid out the following typology.  
  
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
In the above Figure 1, Type I is an established organization that carries out 
regular tasks. A simple example of an established organization is a fire department that 
Tasks 
Regular Non Regular 
Old Type I 
(Established)
Type III 
(Extending) 
St
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e 
New 
Type II 
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Type IV 
(Emergent) 
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puts out fires that are caused by short circuiting after a hurricane. Type I organizations 
tend to get involved because of public expectation to do so, their pre-disaster structure 
and tasks, and their ability to mobilize resources quickly (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1968; 
Dynes, 1970, p. 139, 150-157). Type I is a delineated type of organization with a 
definitive structure, clear lines of authority, good communication networks, and visible 
decision makers. Police and fire departments fall under this category, as well as public 
utility companies, general hospitals, and many other administrative city departments. 
Type I organizations, during impact periods, tend to revert to traditional tasks and their 
own personnel (if in fact they have made use of volunteers) as soon as possible, instead 
of dealing with new tasks or people (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1968; Dynes, 1970, p. 141-
142, 150-157). 
 An example of a Type I organization is revealed in a case study on a tornado and 
flash flood in Bunkus, in which the police and fire departments responded to the disaster. 
The police officers tasks remained limited to traditional tasks of search and rescue, 
security and patrol, and medical transportation. Firefighters tasks included search and 
rescue and fire suppression (Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989, p. 77-78).  
 Type II is an expanding organization that accommodates a new structure, but 
performs regular tasks after a disaster. An expanding organization is usually referred to as 
voluntary organizations or Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).  During pre-disaster 
time periods, only the permanent members of an expanding organization appear to be 
working. The organizations daily activities may include feeding the poor or housing the 
homeless. A disaster expands these tasks as it generates homelessness of a greater 
magnitude and pressurizes expanding organizations to assemble volunteers. The 
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organizations tasks remain the same, but the organization expands to accommodate the 
new volunteers. The new group becomes much larger than the old one and consists of 
people that are not prior members of the permanent core. Members, who generally 
enjoyed some form of supervision when the core performed its pre-disaster activities, 
may be subjected to a different line of authority during the disaster time period (Dynes & 
Quarantelli, 1968; Dynes, 1970, pp. 142-145, 157-160). A Red Cross chapter with an 
increased work load when helping victims to find shelter is a typical example of an 
expanding organization. Type II organizations undergo tremendous stress as they change 
their structure and expand their functions, their boundaries weaken, and their disaster 
time functions are vague (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1968; Dynes, 1970, pp. 142-145. 157-
160). 
 An example of a Type II organization with expanded membership was witnessed 
in the aftermath of the Flint-Beecher, Michigan (U.S.), tornado, investigated by Form and 
Nosow (1958). The Salvation Army set up aid stations and encouraged new volunteers to 
be a part of their operations. The operation of the organization was not threatened, as 
volunteers knew one another. Therefore, while the organization witnessed a new 
structure, tasks merely expanded to accommodate the volunteers (Form & Nosow, 1958, 
p. 183).  
Type III is an extending organization that performs non-routine tasks in the 
impact time period, while retaining its pre-disaster structure. Type III organizations 
assign new tasks to employees instead of regular ones (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1968; 
Dynes, 1970, pp. 145-146, 160). After the flood in Fort Wayne, Indiana (U.S.), 
businesses and restaurants provided assistance with food and supplies. Employees of 
 15
businesses continued in their usual roles only with an extension or expansion of their 
activities. Womens groups retained their structures, but witnessed a change in the type 
and magnitude of service to be provided. For example, womens groups supplied food to 
the volunteers (Phillips, 1984).  
Type IV is an emergent group that performs non-routine tasks and displays a new 
structure after impact. Type IV groups tend to emerge in two situations. In the first 
situation, people are isolated from traditional responding agencies. In the second 
situation, there is a lack of knowledge about the magnitude of the disaster and lack of 
coordination and control among responding agencies. In both these situations, emergent 
groups appear to fill the gaps not being filled by other organizations. Within this larger 
category, three distinguishable groups form to collect information about the extent of 
damage, to control the emergency activity and coordinate the activities within the 
community, and to discover the loopholes and allocate authority and responsibilities 
where it feels fit. In short, Type IV groups have no pre-disaster structure, but exhibit new 
structures and tasks after a disaster, only to dissolve soon after the response period is over 
(Dynes & Quarantelli, 1968; Dynes, 1970, pp. 146-149, 161-164; Stallings & Quarantelli, 
1985). 
The Flint-Beecher, Michigan (U.S.), tornado response phase in 1953 was marked 
by emergent groups of primarily local residents or survivors. Emergent groups performed 
most of the search and rescue activities within the first few hours of the disaster. In 
addition, the rescuers displayed an emergent structure based on sociologically defined 
age and sex roles (Form & Nosow, 1958, pp. 38, 68-72).  
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Summary 
 A summary of the classic four-fold typology reveals that Type I and II are 
community organizations with emergency resources that are either available, or have the 
potential to be available upon short notice. Since the tasks and structures of a Type I 
organization may remain the same after a disaster, emergence is not witnessed. Similarly, 
since only the structure changes in a Type II organization after a disaster, emergence is 
not witnessed here either. Type III organizations are those that become aware of the 
resources they possess and its potential to assist the community in the post-disaster 
period. However, Type III organizations experience new tasks and not new structures 
after a disaster, therefore, Type III organizations are not considered emergent. Type IV 
groups have no pre-disaster existence and lack any sort of form or structure in the pre-
disaster time period. However, a Type IV group typically appears after impact. Type IV 
groups emerge with new tasks and new structures to handle disaster-generated needs 
(Dynes, 1970). Therefore, to establish the conditions that generate emergent tasks and 
structures, a Type IV group is under study after the Indian Ocean Tsunami. In summary, 
emergence can be defined as a process that occurs in which new tasks and structures 
emerge in disasters in new or old groups that are fulfilling those needs of the 
community/event which are beyond the capacity of the pre-existing tasks or structures 
(Dynes, 1970, pp. 136-149).   
Definition of Emergence 
 The above sections have provided a description of organizational response to 
disasters. Since this study is based specifically on emergence, I will now focus on Type 
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IV organizations and issues related to it. I begin this section with a definition of 
emergence.  
Based on the literature, I define emergence as new tasks and structures that 
emerge after a disaster to meet the unfulfilled, disaster-generated needs of a community. 
Prior studies of emergence have examined it as a dependent variable. The two most 
important characteristics of emergence under study are tasks and structures of 
organizations (Dynes, 1970, pp. 136-137). Indicators of the dependent variable have been 
identified by specifying the characteristics of emergence. Characteristic indicators 
include new structures (i.e. division of labor) and tasks that may arise in established 
organizations, new structures and tasks in newly formed groups that respond to the 
emergency, composition of the emergent groups, and the longevity of the emergent 
group. A section describing these characteristics follows. Independent variables that 
foster the appearance of emergence have also been examined in prior studies. 
Independent variables are generally described as conditions that spur emergence. A 
section on the independent variables follows the section on characteristics. 
Characteristics of Emergence 
 Emergence has been studied in the U.S. for a number of years. While some 
studies have reviewed the concept as its sole purpose, other studies have documented 
cases of emergence as a subset of more comprehensive work. This section reviews the 
characteristics of emergence, namely, emergent tasks and structures (i.e. division of 
labor), composition, and duration, based on U.S. and Non-U.S. examples of each.  
U.S. Cases of Emergence  
Emergent Tasks and Structures 
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Emergent tasks and structures are key characteristics that help to define 
emergence. Emergent tasks, in the immediate post-impact phase, can range from fire 
fighting and search and rescue to body handling. Therefore, to handle emergent tasks, 
emergent structures tend to arise in departments involved in the official response during 
critical times. Forrest (1974, p. 40) describes tasks as the arrangement of work activities 
so that there is efficient use of manpower and resources in the groups pursuit of their 
goals. Tasks are any observable activity carried out by a group member. Structure, 
according to Forrest (1974, p. 35), is specific arrangement of positions, tasks, and 
relationships that are interdependent and recurrent through time. Therefore, structural 
differentiation refers to the process by which these components become identifiable. 
However, after a disaster, identifying the components of structural differentiation is not 
always easy. Therefore, position, specifically leadership position, is used as a variable to 
understand the division of labor that surrounds emergence after a disaster (Forrest, 1974, 
pp. 38-39, see also Forrest, 1978).  In most cases with emergent groups, the leaders tend 
to be familiar with structural mechanisms and have organizational ties that they apply to 
the emergent group. Also due to previous socialization, some type of formal training, or 
prior involvement in the social system in question, individuals enter into the group with 
numerous skills, knowledge, and experience. These attributes become resources for the 
group and are then used to sort individuals into specific positions (Forrest, 1974, p. 52; 
1978).   
Division of labor takes place in the emergency time period of a disaster, just as it 
does during normal times, and is based on socially defined roles. If an environmental 
change is gradual, the social system adapts to the change through normal adaptive 
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responses over time in order to restore equilibrium. On the other hand, if the 
environmental change is rapid, it creates new processes in a relatively short time and an 
emergency social system sets in to meet the change (Barton & Merton, 1963, p. 19; 
Barton, 1969, p. 65). Therefore, after a disaster, an emergent structure (i.e. division of 
labor) appears based on socially defined roles and adapts to the emergency social 
system.  
Form and Nosow (1958) studied emergent groups in responding agencies after the 
tornado that struck Flint-Beecher, Michigan. In one instance, the study described how 
agencies that arrived on the scene believed that local efforts should be integrated into the 
official response. However, the scene upon arrival was quite the opposite. The agencies 
found that they had to integrate their actions into the local response setting. This 
exemplifies the fact that local emergency organizations will face emergent tasks and, 
perhaps, an emergent structure upon arrival in the field (Form & Nosow, 1958, p. 113). 
Taylor, Zurcher, and Key (1970) studied group formation and behavior in the 
aftermath of the tornado at Topeka, Kansas, in 1966. Their study discusses ways in which 
a single work crew formed after the tornado, became a unit, and then dissolved after the 
work was done. Simultaneously, a volunteer center set up 24 hours after the tornado 
coordinated volunteer activities. Many volunteers chose the type of work they would like 
to perform, such as desk work, counseling, or kitchen tasks and some others chose 
manual labor. One group formed a work crew and removed fallen trees and limbs from 
damaged houses. The group consisted of a heavy equipment operator, a civil defense 
employee, an undergraduate student, and one of the authors of this book, Dr. Zurcher 
(Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970, pp. 80-83). The emergent groups coordination and 
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volunteer behavior after the Topeka, Kansas, tornado bears testimony to the emergence 
witnessed after disasters. 
Emergent structures appear as soon as emergent tasks become visible. 
Organizations interact with the community from the pre-impact phase, and the interaction 
is heightened in the immediate post-impact phase. After impact, hierarchical relationships 
appear in organizations. In large scale disasters, structuring is based on authority. 
Emergent leadership in the emergency period is generally based on the possession of 
relevant disaster skills and knowledge (Wenger, 1978, pp. 34-37). Similarly, Neal and 
Phillips (1995) study on effective emergency management principles accounts for 
dimensions of emergent structures. Dimensions include a new division of labor, a new 
hierarchy, and a new set of relationships (Neal & Phillips, 1995). 
Structurally, emergent local groups appear to have no relative differentiation. 
Their hierarchy is flat, with little distance between the top and the bottom, but a division 
of labor exists. In emergent groups, roles are not highly specialized, and no clearly 
designated leaders exist. The structure of emergent groups is closely related to the tasks 
they may undertake. Emergent groups have no formal element of organization, no clear 
lines of authority, and their members are primarily volunteers. Hence, emergent groups 
appear to have new structures and tasks after a disaster (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985).  
Some studies have established that tasks and structures of public officials may 
change after a disaster. Police departments, during normal times, are concerned primarily 
with patrol, traffic, and detective work. However, during post-disaster time periods, 
protection of life and property, and search and rescue become important tasks for them as 
well (Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989, p.17). In addition, officers deployed to the 
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field may exercise some amount of personal discretion. But sometimes they may receive 
directives from local emergency managers. Therefore, not only do police officers witness 
emergent tasks in the field, but they have to accommodate emergent structures (i.e. 
division of labor) as well (Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989, pp. 17-29). Also, public 
officials (police officers) already engaged in search and rescue continue to help the local 
citizens until formal response arrives. Thus, they abandon their routine tasks under their 
rigid structures (Kennedy, 1970; Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989, pp. 22-23).  
Fire departments tend to exclude themselves from any tasks not related to fire 
suppression, but they do take on assistive roles in the emergency phase and withdraw as 
soon as possible. The involvement of fire departments takes place due to the availability 
of resources. Emergence, however, takes place in the form of structures in fire 
departments as they coordinate with emergent citizen efforts. Police and fire departments 
face emergent structures in terms of decision making, communication channels, and 
logistics (Warheit, 1970; Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989, pp. 48-49).  
In addition to this study, multiple studies conducted after the 1983 flood in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, describes how a number of normal operating procedures changed and 
how officials undertook tasks quite different from their job descriptions. For example, at 
the pre-planned command center, an informal group of experts from different levels of 
authority provided technical advice. In another example, the public works department 
directed police personnel and emergent groups to sandbag and channelize the river. 
Communication lines also changed considerably (Ireland, 1984; Neal, 1985; Quarantelli, 
1983, 1994). Therefore, due to the disaster-generated needs of the moment, official 
response patterns and behaviors change to accommodate new patterns of behavior, and 
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emergent tasks and structures appear (Ireland, 1984; Neal, 1985; Quarantelli, 1983, 
1994). 
Search and rescue activities, as documented by the study on emergence done by 
Drabek (1981), calls upon all emergency managers to recognize the fact that responding 
to disasters in the United States is multi-organizational and emergent. Emergent multi-
organizational networks are loosely coupled systems. Managing such networks must be 
viewed as a legitimate problem for which existing theories may be inapplicable (Drabek, 
1981, p. 243). Citizens and local agencies are bound to respond, and this unofficial 
response needs to be planned and prepared for and incorporated into the entire response 
scenario. 
Composition 
Composition of emergent group/s is another characteristic of emergence that 
throws light on the concept. Most of the residents of Flint-Beecher, Michigan, were either 
volunteers with the local Red Cross or the civil defense authorities. Hence, volunteer 
activity was easily born after the tornado because they functioned by virtue of being 
individuals and not as members of their respective organizations (Form & Nosow, 1958, 
p. 114). After the tornado in Topeka, Kansas, in 1966, groups and individuals volunteered 
from the community, and yet others were strangers. A manual labor group that formed 
comprised of strangers, those that had not been affected by the tornado, and those that 
had no relatives or friends who were in need of help (Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970, p. 
80). Therefore, volunteer groups do not necessarily include members from the 
community, but may be complete strangers (Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970, p. 80). 
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Forrest (1974) studied groups in terms of core and associate participants. Core 
participants typically form the nucleus and seldom exceed 30 people. Associate 
participants, on the other hand, could range anywhere up to 100 members who perform 
the necessary tasks and then withdraw their services (Forrest, 1974, p. 47).  
Studies have established that groups may be comprised of public officials or 
private citizens (Mileti, Drabek & Haas, 1975, p. 72). Some studies have intentionally left 
out the role of public officials in disaster time periods as they are believed to perform 
their regular roles (Quarantelli, 1983, p. 3, 1984). The role of public officials is 
intentionally included in this study to display the differences that exist between a Western 
and Eastern cultural context and, hence, the handling of the situation. The role of public 
officials is also included to document what public officials in other nations do in these 
disaster events and how their tasks and structures may change in the emergency time 
period.  
 In short, emergent groups may comprise complete strangers to the area who are 
willing to assist the search and rescue effort. The number of members of the groups may 
also vary depending on how the group formed and who the leaders are. Likewise, the 
composition differs in terms of the type of people that form the members, i.e. public 
officials or ordinary citizens. 
Duration 
The existential duration of emergent groups is under-studied. Researchers have 
noted that emergent citizen groups during the impact period deal specifically with saving 
lives and coordinating community response. Citizen groups appear to be short lived, exist 
only during and after the immediate post-impact period, and very seldom become 
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institutionalized (Dynes, 1970, p. 46; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Mileti, 
Drabek & Haas, 1975, p. 75; Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Tierney, 2001).  
A manual labor group discussed in the study by Taylor, Zurcher, and Key (1970), 
stayed together for three days. In the first day the group grew to 6 members, by the next 
day it had 14, and on the third day it was reduced to 9 members. The group, however, 
stayed together for at least the first two days, on account of the 10 core members. When 
the volunteers were asked what motivated them to form the group and do the work, their 
answers bordered on the need to do something, to be active, to counter the sense of 
frustration, and their innate concerns for the problems within the low income area. This 
crew dissolved after the third day, but assisted with the psychological recovery of the 
individual and the social recovery of the community after the disaster (Taylor, Zurcher & 
Key, 1970, pp. 80-84).  
Core members that form the nucleus of the group stay together for a much 
longer duration than associate members. Associate members generally dissolve or 
withdraw services from the emergent group after the tasks are accomplished or goals 
achieved (Forrest, 1974, p. 47). Also, emergent groups show marked variations in their 
timing of arrival and the tasks they perform. Some emergent groups appear in the post-
impact period, some in the pre-impact, and yet others in the post-recovery time period 
(Quarantelli, 1984). What makes some groups dissolve and others institutionalize is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Non U.S. Cases of Emergence  
 After examining the U.S. cases of emergence, it is also necessary to discuss 
emergence in other countries as well, in order to identify the similarities and differences 
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that may exist between countries. Disasters can be handled very differently from one 
country to another depending on the political structure of the country. Hence, it is 
necessary to review the existing literature in order to achieve a broader understanding of 
emergence that occurred in India. The Non-U.S. characteristics of emergence are 
discussed below. 
Emergent Tasks and Structures 
After a disaster, new tasks and structures in emergent groups are equally apparent 
outside the United States as they are within the U.S. Structural changes appear in terms of 
division of labor. After the explosion at Halifax, Canada, Prince (1920) observed that 
refugees preferred plural leadership and decision-making. Initially, work started hastily 
and haphazardly until the responders realized that they required coordination. Groups 
formed, went in different directions to scourge the area, and kept a record of the searched 
area (Prince, 1920, p. 60). Disaster Research Center field workers noticed emergent 
groups after the earthquake in Chile in 1965. However, officials controlled the influence 
of emergent groups (Kennedy, 1971; Quarantelli, 1984). Likewise, after the earthquake in 
Italy in 1968, visitors handled emergent tasks of search and rescue and body handling 
(McLuckie, 1977). 
Similarly, after the Mexico City Earthquake in 1985 at the local level, emergent 
groups handled disaster-generated tasks of search and rescue, debris clearance, and the 
provision of supplies. Some volunteers also assisted emergency relief organizations with 
translations. Other volunteers provided medical help and assistance. Although studies 
indicate that only 9.8% of the population volunteered, considering the overall population 
of Mexico, the percentage amounts to 2,000,000 volunteers. Volunteers organized 
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themselves based on their capabilities. When someone made a suggestion about the type 
of task to be undertaken, volunteers organized themselves with those people who had 
practical knowledge of that particular task (Dynes, Quarantelli & Wenger, 1988, p. 68). 
The government, on the other hand, created ad hoc committees in the immediate post-
impact period to deal with disaster-generated tasks that involved search and rescue and 
the provision of aid (Dynes, Quarantelli & Wenger, 1988, pp. 48-49). Therefore, 
emergence occurred after the Mexico City earthquake in the form of emergent tasks and 
emergent structures at the government and public levels (Dynes, Quarantelli & Wenger, 
1988). 
After the Guadalajara, Mexico, gasoline explosion, studied by Aguirre, Wenger, 
Glass, Murillo and Vigo (1995), the division of labor among emergent groups proved 
extremely important. Local people allocated searchable areas because they had the 
knowledge of potential victims.  This appeared to be a very important form of division of 
labor in Mexico (Aguirre et al., 1995). Aguirre et al. (1995) documents that neighbors 
and kinfolk performed rescue work in the first hour of the post-disaster response phase. 
Search and rescue activities began immediately after impact. Rescuers used knowledge 
interchangeably. When formal organizations arrived, they used the local information to 
reach victims, while local search and rescue groups used the formal organizations 
knowledge to extricate and transport victims (Aguirre et al., 1995). Therefore, local 
rescuers handled emergent tasks of search and rescue and body handling in the first few 
crucial hours after impact. Later, when formal rescue crews arrived, they integrated their 
action into the local response, thus generating an emergent structural change. 
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Composition 
Researchers frequently observe that outsiders and strangers assist with the relief 
and rescue efforts. People with no family ties and visitors to the area handled the first 
phase of the work in Halifax, Canada. The others first went home to check on families, 
but soon joined the rescue activities. Prince (1920, p. 60) describes that people responded 
voluntarily to the disaster. Likewise, in Sicily, Italy, in 1968, volunteers handled the dead 
and the initial search and rescue. However, for the most part, visitors from other parts of 
Italy or from other countries volunteered, rather than people from the local area 
(McLuckie, 1977, p. 58).  
Duration 
 Studies conducted after the Mexico City earthquake indicate that nearly half the 
amount of all the volunteers worked for more than 4 days. Many volunteers spent more 
than 10 days handling disaster-related tasks. On average, volunteers claimed to work 9 
hours a day, while some claimed a 17 hour work day that involved disaster-generated 
tasks (Dynes, Quarantelli & Wenger, 1988, p. 21; Wenger & James, 1994). Emergent 
groups performed critical life saving tasks in the first two hours after the gasoline 
explosion in Guadalajara, Mexico, as well. Rescuers, after the explosion, performed a 
considerable amount of search and rescue tasks within the first 2 days before dissolving 
(Aguirre et al., 1995). 
Summary of Characteristics 
To summarize the key characteristics of emergence in the U.S., it can be stated 
with empirical evidence that structures and tasks change during the response phase. Rigid 
bureaucratic organizations, such as police and fire departments may experience a change 
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in their tasks and structures due to a disaster. After a disaster, police and fire officials 
engage in search and rescue and body handling. They receive orders from authorities 
already in the field. Local emergency managers may guide the search and rescue 
operations in the field and police and fire officers are compelled to take instructions from 
them. Therefore, emergent tasks and structures appear in the field. Sometimes local 
people, who possess local knowledge of the whereabouts of victims, guide the search and 
rescue activities. In these instances, police and fire officers integrate their response into 
the local one. Thus, emergent tasks generated by the disaster are handled through 
emergent structures. In the U.S. and abroad, divisions of labor follow socially defined 
roles after a disaster. Socio-structural factors that pre-existed the disaster are responsible 
for a new division of labor in the response phase. First responders are not necessarily 
local residents, but may be complete outsiders to the community with the desire to do 
something. At the same time, first responders may not be local people, but may also be 
local officials who initiate search and rescue in their communities until formal response 
arrives. Thereby, local officials set aside their regular tasks. 
In studies outside the U.S., the community dominates ones lifestyle during 
normal times. When disaster strikes, the communitys cohesive force leads to emergent 
behavior. Emergent tasks of search and rescue and body handling emerge after a disaster. 
Emergent tasks are handled by volunteers who may be complete strangers to the affected 
community. Structural changes emerge through a division of labor based on 
sociologically defined roles. Emergent groups outside the U.S. are similar to emergent 
groups within the U.S., in that their presence is ephemeral. Given this summary of key 
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characteristics of emergence, I will now discuss the conditions that foster emergence 
within and outside the United States. 
Emergence in India 
 To understand emergence in India it is necessary to comprehend the cultural 
context of the country. In most cases, it is this cultural setting which provides a protective 
network in the first few critical days after a disaster (Shrivastava, 1987). It is also typical 
in the Indian context and culture to exhibit a remarkable display of altruism on a daily 
basis even in small-time crises. For instance, injured people are generally transported to 
hospitals by volunteers or the general public using non-medical vehicles such as bullock 
carts in India (Sethi & Tyagi, 1999).  
 Roth (1970) noted that in developing countries, the National Government assumes 
all responsibility for the disaster because it possesses extensive personnel and resources. 
In a developing country like India, therefore, one may assume that the National 
Governments responsibility and involvement begins with the first alert and terminates 
only after restoration. After the Industrial crisis at Bhopal in 1984, the victims initially 
expected the government to fulfill all their relief needs. However, when government aid 
was shortcoming, the victims resorted to demonstrations and used dominant groups and 
discourse to express their discontent. Immediately after the disaster, citizen groups 
organized and provided relief to victims even before the government mobilized aid. 
Citizens groups collected and distributed food from door-to-door. Citizens also welcomed 
strangers into their homes and provided them with shelter and medical relief (Shristava, 
1987).  
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After the Gujarat earthquake in 2001, newspapers reported that volunteers cut 
across communal lines to assist with the relief efforts. After the disaster, volunteers 
handled the dead and appeared actively involved in mass cremations in Gujarat 
(Venkatesan & Swami, 2001). IBM also requested volunteers to assist with database 
management as they needed people who spoke the local language in Gujarat. 
Approximately 50 people volunteered their time and effort (Comfort, 2003). Indian 
newspaper reports have cited a number of instances where church volunteers and other 
locals provided valuable assistance after the tsunami (Venkatesh, 2004). 
Conditions of emergence 
Theoretical Works 
 
 Researchers have examined emergence from a theoretical standpoint and 
empirical studies have simultaneously supported theories on emergence. In this section, I 
will review the theoretical works offered by researchers, on conditions that foster 
emergence. In addition, I will support these theories with empirical works from within 
and outside the United States. 
Unmet needs 
 Disasters generate stresses within a community. A collective stress is said to 
occur when members of a social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from 
the system (Barton, 1969, p. 38). Therefore, unmet needs occur. Sudden climatic and 
environmental changes, for instance any type of disaster, may cause collective stress. 
Research on collective stress situations show that when the onset of stress is sudden and 
preparation and planning is low, unmet needs are generated and self-help may be 
expected (Barton & Merton, 1963, pp. 5, 125; Dynes, 1970, p. 53). In addition, emergent 
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groups form in situations where people are isolated from traditional responding agencies. 
When these agencies are not available, emergent groups tend to fill the gaps (Dynes, 
1970, p. 146; Stallings, 1978; Drabek, 1986, pp. 157-172).  
 When the needs of the members of the social system exceed the capability of the 
same system, then organizational capabilities are compromised and questioned (Barton & 
Merton, 1963, p. 3; Barton, 1969; Dynes, 1970, p. 81). A breakdown in organizational 
ability to respond and meet disaster-generated needs is a condition that spurs emergence. 
Therefore, new forms of a social system emerge. Organizational breakdown occurs when 
there is a lack of any form of pre-planning (Parr, 1970; Drabek, 1968; 1981, p. 17; 1986; 
Mileti, 1999, p. 222), lack of authority (Parr, 1970; Drabek, 1968; 1981, p. 17; 1986; 
Stallings, 1978; Drabek & McEntire, 2002), collapse of authority (Parr, 1970; Drabek, 
1968; 1981, p. 17; 1986; Drabek & McEntire, 2002), and challenging tasks (Parr, 1970; 
Mileti, 1999, p. 222). In addition, a lack of prior experience and unclear definitive 
information also leads to emergence (Drabek, 1986). Therefore, conditions are generated 
where needs are left unmet and administrative shortcomings are apparent, thus emergence 
is facilitated (Dynes, 1970, p. 81; Mileti, Drabek & Haas, 1975, p. 72).   
Magnitude and Proximity 
Collective stress situations are studied by sociologists to understand behaviors of 
individuals and groups after a disaster. Collective stress is studied in terms of speed of 
onset and scope, in order to understand why self-help or emergent behavior occurs after a 
disaster. When the magnitude of the stress is large, communities adapt accordingly and 
make use of their own resources to cope with the collective stress situation (Barton & 
Merton, 1963, p. 5, 125; Dynes, 1970, pp. 81-82). When the magnitude of impact exceeds 
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the response capacities of formal organizations, then informal mass action plays an 
important role in minimizing loss and suffering (Barton & Merton, 1963, p. 123, 168; 
Dynes, 1970, pp. 81-82; Kreps, 1978; Drabek, 1981, p. 17) The sudden occurrence of a 
disaster coupled with the magnitude of the event could give rise to emergent behavior 
among affected individuals. Emergent behavior occurs as a form of adaptation to the 
altered social setting (Barton & Merton, 1963, p. 148).  
Theory indicates that distance from the impacted area, magnitude of the impact, 
and the availability of resources may demand that local citizens, NGOs, and caring 
organizations get involved in the response (Wenger & Parr, 1969; Roth, 1970; Forrest, 
1974, 1978). They get involved because they have resources and manpower available, or 
they are able to procure it in a short duration of time (Roth, 1970; Forrest 1974, pp. 54-
58, 1978; Mileti, 1999, p. 222). Also, populations in the impact area are involuntarily 
involved in the disaster. However, populations in the fringe areas of impact are the 
primary suppliers of volunteers and materials after a disaster as they have suffered lesser 
damage and destruction (Dynes, 1970, p. 58). Proximity to the impact area, therefore, is a 
condition that spurs emergence. 
When the geographic scope and number of affected people are large, established 
organizations are unable to routinely meet disaster demands. Therefore, the social system 
generates adaptive social structures because the deaths and damage are extensive in such 
situations (Kreps, 1978, p. 78). Kreps (1978) hypothesizes, the greater the intensity and 
scope of impact, the greater the disparity between demands and capabilities for 
responding groups and organizations; thus, the greater the non-routine organized disaster 
response (p. 80). Also, the greater the size, density, and proximity of community 
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populations to the impact area, the more complex the milling processes and the greater 
the development of emergent groups which perform disaster-relevant activities (Kreps, 
1978, pp. 80-81). Therefore, with a large magnitude disaster and greater proximity to the 
impact area, emergence is more likely to be observed. 
Pre-existing networks 
Pre-existing social networks are a primary condition that facilitates emergence 
within and outside the United States. Emergent or adaptive behavior is expected in close 
knit communities where pre-established social networks exist (Barton & Merton, 1963, p. 
148). In communities dominated by personalized relationships and strong pre-existing 
social networks, formal response organizations are ignored and considered irrelevant 
(Dynes, 1970, p. 103). Community members tend to cope with the disaster with their pre-
existing structures (Dynes, 1970, p. 103; Forrest, 1974, p. 84; Tierney, 2001, pp. 113-
114, 174-177).  
Roth (1970) conducted a cross comparative study on emergent groups within and 
outside the U.S. His study noted that emergent groups formed outside the United States in 
countries where kinship and community involvement have a high value. Community and 
kinship values tend to dominate ones lifestyle and social standing. Hence, these values 
dictate individual involvement in myriad activities. Activities include search and rescue, 
helping victims, and handling and burying the dead (Roth, 1970).  
Prior social networks and community interaction provide the stimulus for 
emergent group participation. In a crisis situation, individuals seek out those who they are 
familiar with to determine a course of action. These individuals in turn recruit others to 
join the collective emergent group effort that confronts them (Forrest, 1974, p. 98, 1978). 
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Due to pre-existing social networks, local people have prior knowledge about the 
probable locations of victims. Therefore, this local knowledge may serve to reduce time 
and energy during the emergency period.  
Also, pre-existing social networks have inherent leaders within the community 
who continue to maintain their leadership roles during the disaster time period as well 
(Forrest, 1974, p. 27, 1978). Fire departments that consist primarily of volunteers attest to 
the fact that pre-existing connections and broader familiarity with one another make the 
tasks at hand easier to perform with less controversy (Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 
1989). 
Pre-existing networks also facilitate the exchange of information and resources. 
Pre-disaster occupational contacts lead to easier procurement of resources required for 
disaster operations. Similarly, individuals who represent two or more organizations help 
to bring about coordination between the organizations. Coordination is achieved because 
the individuals possess knowledge of procedures and personnel in both organizations. 
Likewise, people who have lived in the community for a long time and have friendship 
networks, assist with communication between organizations (Dynes, 1978). Therefore, 
pre-existing networks help to facilitate emergence in the emergency time period 
following disasters. 
Quarantelli (1983) also hypothesized that while a perceived need for action is a 
necessary condition; the sufficient condition for emergence is a facilitating social 
context (p. 23). Individuals will engage in new behaviors if their pre-disaster social 
setting warrants the means for new action; thus, pre-existing social networks facilitate 
emergence (Quarantelli, 1983). 
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Drabek (1986, pp. 132-197) identifies pre-existing social networks, among others, 
as a key condition that spurs emergence. Individuals that are embedded in social groups 
feel a responsibility toward the well being of others and, therefore, engage in adaptive 
responses that may be emergent. Following large-scale natural disasters, emergent 
friendship patterns, kin relationships, and new interaction patterns are common among 
neighbors and friends. Social networks that pre-exist the disaster are primary causes of 
emergent behavior after disasters and emergency planners must be aware of this strong 
social bond (Drabek, 1968, 1986, pp. 115, 153, 1987).  
Neal and Phillips (1995) study on effective emergency management procedures, 
supports the notion that pre-existing networks facilitate emergence. Their study suggests 
that emergence, facilitated by prior social networks, provides innovative solutions to 
assist victims of a disaster (Neal & Phillips, 1995). Mileti (1999, p. 222) purports that a 
strong supportive social climate generates group emergence after a disaster. A recent 
study, on community as social capital, by Dynes (2005), also supports the existing 
theoretical literature that pre-existing social ties spur emergent behavior.  
Summary of Theoretical Works 
In summary, conditions that generate emergence are unmet needs, pre-existing 
social networks, magnitude of the disaster, and proximity to the impact area. 
Communities also experience a heightened sense of solidarity and altruism after a 
disaster. A summary of findings on human systems response to disasters by Mileti, 
Drabek, and Haas (1975) suggests, all other things being equal, following impact there 
will be a heightened sense of morale and organizational solidarity (p. 84). A theoretical 
study of emergent functions and structures by Wenger (1978) concurs with the altruistic 
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behavior of individuals after a disaster. After impact, high priority is placed on support 
and helping behavior. Altruism and cooperative behavior are common and competition 
is condemned (Wenger, 1978). I will now support the theoretical premises above with 
empirical examples from within and outside the United States. 
Empirical Works  
 
 The following section discusses the key conditions that facilitate emergence. 
These conditions include unmet needs, magnitude of the disaster, proximity to the impact 
area, and pre-existing networks. 
U.S. Cases 
Unmet needs 
Researchers have listed unmet needs as an important condition that must be 
present for emergence to take place. Disasters create stress situations which in turn push 
responding agencies beyond their response capacities. As a result the community is left 
with needs that remain unmet and, hence, emergent behavior serves to fill the gaps.  
Form and Nosows (1958) empirical work after the 1953 tornado which struck 
Flint-Beecher, Michigan, identifies unmet needs as the condition which may perpetuate 
disasters, and trigger emergence. Unmet needs are community needs which are not being 
met by responding organizations and individuals. The situation will continue to persist if 
the responding individuals and the organizations do not cooperate with each other or 
complement each others tasks. This situation will lead to further emergence as outside 
agencies respond to fulfill the unmet need (Form & Nosow, 1958, p. 18-39).  
Another instance of emergence is observed after the 1964 floods in Great Falls, 
Montana. Official response failed due to a lack of authority, responsibility, and overall 
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coordination issues. Radio units of the police and fire departments proved insufficient for 
coordination. Therefore, citizens band radio units supplemented the response effort. Thus, 
emergence was spurred because of unmet needs (Yutzy, 1964).  
A study on the Indiana Coliseum Explosion, Indiana, by Drabek (1968) reports on 
operational problems that occurred. The Indianapolis police department faced leadership 
issues, communication failures, and problems related to the lack of prior planning in the 
immediate post-impact period. Communication lines overflowed and officers appeared 
ill-equipped to handle the situation. Convergence of individuals and materials added to 
the shortcomings of the administration. The civil defense authorities in Indiana, faced 
problems in terms of overlapping functions with other departments, and employees 
lacked clarity of purpose and intent (Drabek, 1968, p. 31-70). Therefore, to handle the 
above unmet needs (coordination deficiencies), organizations resorted to emergent 
processes of interaction to handle the response. The above examples lead to the 
conclusion that unmet needs are apparent, therefore, emergence occurs. 
Forrest (1974) studied emergent groups after the California bush fires and 
concluded to further fortify theoretical works that unmet needs serve to generate 
emergence. Administrative shortcomings stem when there are discrepancies about who is 
overall in-charge of operations, lack of communication, lack of pre-planning, and 
wrongly allocated resources (Parr, 1970; Drabek, 1986; Drabek & McEntire, 2002).  
Studies on police and fire departments in the U.S. concurs that lack of 
coordination, lack of knowledge of the impact, and the lack of information about the 
needs of the community may lead to the emergence of groups in the affected area. Group 
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emergence takes place to fulfill unmet needs of the community (Wenger, Quarantelli & 
Dynes, 1989). 
Magnitude of the disaster 
Emergence is linked to the severity of the disaster. The greater the devastation to 
a community in the aftermath of a disaster, the greater is the likelihood that emergent 
groups will form to help during the response. The scope of the impact determines if the 
responding organizations can handle the disaster without emergent groups. If only a small 
part of the social system is affected, organizations can concentrate their services to meet 
disaster generated needs of the system. If a large portion of the social system is affected 
by the disaster, it will exceed the capacity of the formal organization to respond and, thus, 
necessitate small group help (Barton & Merton, 1963; Barton, 1969, p. 127). A study 
conducted on the World Trade Center, New York, attacks in 2001, is testimony that the 
magnitude of the disaster proved far more than what New York response officials had 
ever planned for. Thus, emergent groups formed and assisted with the response (Tierney, 
2003).  
Proximity to impact area 
The closer an individual is to the area of impact; the more likely he is to have 
direct contact with the victims (Barton, 1969, p. 218). An analysis of quantitative data 
from the Arkansas tornado, led Barton and Merton (1963) to the conclusion that residents 
from the impact area provided considerably more aid in terms of search and rescue, rather 
than residents from non-impact areas (Barton & Merton, 1963, pp. 80, 127). 
The proximity to the impact area also facilitated emergence at Flint-Beecher, 
Michigan. First responders appeared to be the ones closest to the impact area. They 
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initiated rescue operations of others as soon as they rescued or confirmed the 
whereabouts of specific family members (Form & Nosow, 1958, pp. 72-76).  
Pre-existing networks 
 Form and Nosows (1958) study after the tornado in Flint-Beecher, Michigan, 
perpetuates the notion that pre-existing networks tend to save a great number of lives. 
The local residents knowledge of the whereabouts of victims enabled them to find all 
potential victims (Form & Nosow, 1958, p. 18-39). Similarly, after the tornado in 
Topeka, Kansas, a group of local people formed the first response group, which also 
involved the author of the book, Taylor (Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970). 
 After the Coliseum Explosion at the Indiana State Fairgrounds, Indiana, in 1963, 
pre-existing friendship networks and personal relationships appeared significant for 
organizations handling the response. Personal relations between officials built up over the 
years in public service facilitated emergent coordination between organizations. 
Therefore, due to pre-disaster relationships, civil defense authorities coordinated their 
actions with other groups. Similarly, since the Executive Director of the Red Cross, 
sought advice from the telephone company, he called an employee of the company who 
appeared to be an ex-member of the Red Cross. Thus, inter-personal relationships 
facilitated emergence after the Coliseum Explosion. Pre-disaster relationships and 
friendship networks, therefore, had an effect on how public officials performed their roles 
during the response (Drabek, 1968, pp. 72, 174-175). 
At the local level, after the 1983 flood in Salt Lake City, Utah, a number of 
emergent groups appeared. Emergence is believed to have taken place due to the strong 
socio-structural factors that pre-existed the flood. Pre-existing complex religious 
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networks allowed easier mobilization of a large number of volunteers. For instance, a 
number of volunteers helped to channelize a river and prevent the inundation of the 
central parts of the city (Ireland, 1984; Neal, 1985; Quarantelli, 1994). 
After a bomb exploded in the World Trade Center, New York, in 1993, 
employees and tenants from the twin towers displayed emergent evacuation behavior 
consistent with the literature. Their evacuation from the towers was orderly, cooperative, 
and due to pre-existing social networks, evacuees concerned themselves with the safe exit 
of others before themselves. Therefore, pre-existing social ties play a role in emergent 
behavior following a disaster (Aguirre, Wenger & Vigo, 1998). 
Non-U.S. Cases 
Unmet needs 
 After the Mexico City earthquake on September 19, 1985, a number of emergent 
groups appeared to meet and manage massive disaster needs. A study conducted by 
Dynes, Quarantelli, and Wenger (1988) of the Disaster Research Center reinforced the 
idea that unmet needs generated emergent behavior. The initial image of the 
organizational response after the earthquake was characterized by lack of pre-planning, 
lack of coordination, duplication of efforts, organizational conflict, and in general a state 
of chaos. A duplication of efforts occurred because one organization did not know what 
action another organization was taking. The response, nonetheless, appeared to be a 
highly complex, yet massive assault by the Mexican public and private sectors. The 
problem of military control in the central civilian parts of the city created the need for 
two ad hoc emergent civilian multi-departmental commissions. Furthermore, unmet 
needs in terms of needed resources and the sheer magnitude of the event facilitated the 
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creation of these emergent civilian commissions. The President created another two ad 
hoc committees to manage the governmental response in areas outside Mexico City 
(Dynes, Quarantelli & Wenger, 1988; Wenger & James, 1994). Emergence, therefore, 
took place due to the lack of pre-planning by the federal and metropolitan agencies. The 
government created an emergent structure to handle emergent tasks generated by the 
disaster. 
 In the time it took for the government to organize themselves and establish the 
above mentioned ad hoc commissions, the public and other organizations initiated search 
and rescue. The public engaged in disaster-generated emergent tasks of search and 
rescue, delivery of medical aid, provision of shelter, and handling the dead. A lack of 
prior planning provoked the locals to initiate their own search and rescue and body 
handling tasks based on what appeared to be the priorities at the moment (Dynes, 
Quarantelli & Wenger, 1988). 
Magnitude and Proximity of Impact 
 In theory, magnitude of the disaster and proximity to the impact area are 
conditions that spur emergence. However, after the Earthquake in Mexico City in 1985, 
emergent behavior occurred more from individuals residing moderate and distances far 
from the impact area, rather than from the immediate impact area (Dynes, Quarantelli & 
Wenger, 1988; Wenger & James, 1994). On the other hand, after the Guadalajara, 
Mexico, gasoline explosion, more emergent behavior was noted from individuals in the 
immediate impact area. The local people initiated search and rescue in the immediate 
impact area and later moved outward toward the fringes of impact (Aguirre et al., 1995). 
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The severity of the earthquake in Kobe, Japan, also spurred emergent behavior 
among community residents. Volunteering is not widespread in Japan due to the cultural 
history of the country. Yet, due to the magnitude of the impact volunteer activity 
appeared greatly heightened and emergence took place after the earthquake (Tierney & 
Goltz, 1997). 
Since the evidence for proximity as a condition of emergence is contradictory 
outside the U.S., further research is required internationally to provide conclusive 
evidence for proximity. 
Pre-existing networks 
Pre-existing networks played a role insofar as helping neighbors after the 
bombing in Hiroshima in 1945. Rescuers primarily helped family members and nearby 
neighbors (Barton, 1969, p. 28). After the Mexico City earthquake in 1985, emergent 
groups handled disaster-generated tasks of search and rescue, provision of medical aid, 
and body handling. Networks that pre-existed the impact facilitated the emergence of 
collective behavior immediately after impact (Dynes, Quarantelli & Wenger, 1988; 
Wenger & James, 1994). 
The Guadalajara, Mexico, gasoline explosion further fortifies theory as a Non- 
U.S. case of emergence. Family, friends, and relatives initiated initial search and rescue 
based on pre-existing social networks and the transfer of knowledge to formal 
organizations. Search and rescue parties formed in accordance with the need of the hour. 
Local citizens who knew where to locate victims acted as a catalyst in terms of division 
of labor. This knowledge allowed the integration of additional volunteers into the search 
and rescue activities and facilitated the efficient allocation of new responders who 
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entered the field. The survival of victims was connected to the information that locals 
provided of their whereabouts, and appeared grounded in pre-established networks. These 
pre-established networks consisted of people who were either family or neighbors, people 
who worked together in the same establishment, or people that had religious relationships 
with the victims (Aguirre et al., 1995). Aguirre et al.s (1995) study on emergence 
documents how the initial search and rescue took place in the immediate impact area. 
Rescuers later moved outward to the periphery of the disaster area. This movement 
toward the periphery of impact depicts cohesiveness as people moved out from the 
regular, normal time areas of interaction (Aguirre et al., 1995). 
Summary of Empirical Works 
 In summary, it is possible to infer that unmet needs, pre-existing social networks, 
magnitude of the disaster, and proximity to the impacted area are key conditions that 
foster emergence. In addition, community altruism is also observed within and outside 
the United States after most disasters. Within the U.S., after the tornado at Flint-Beecher, 
Michigan, and Topeka, Kansas, community altruism facilitated emergence (Form & 
Nosow, 1958; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970). Also, following the blizzard in Ohio in 
1978 (Perry, Hawkins & Neal, 1983) and the Northridge, California, earthquake in 1994 
(Tierney, 1995), altruistic tendencies spurred emergent behavior. Likewise, outside the 
U.S., after the explosion in Halifax, Canada (Prince, 1920), community altruism 
generated emergent behavior. In addition, after the earthquake in Chile in 1965 (Dynes & 
Quarantelli, 1968; Kennedy, 1971), Mexico City in 1985 (Dynes, Quarantelli & Wenger, 
1988), and Kobe, Japan, in 1995 (Barton, 1969, p. 29; Tierney & Goltz, 1997), altruism 
at the community level spurred emergence. 
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Summary of Conditions 
 To summarize the key conditions of emergence, it can be stated that emergence 
occurs due to the peoples perception that their needs are not being met by responding 
agencies. The term perception can be used to fully understand the scope of why 
emergence takes place, because formal response may not be seen as serving local needs. 
Serving local needs, therefore, is the primary element which fosters emergence and 
failure to do so can be referred to as an administrative shortcoming. Pre-existing social 
networks are a key condition that fosters emergence. Social ties and bonds, local leaders 
and technical experts pre-exist the disaster. While social ties tend to dominate the 
formation of groups, local leaders and technical experts provide the division of labor 
during the response phase. Lastly, the magnitude of impact fosters emergence as not only 
local citizens emerge as first responders, but outsiders to the community as well. 
Outsiders arrive at the impacted area with the inherent need to help.  
Summary and Conclusion 
 The study of this topic is, therefore, important because disasters and emergence 
seem to go together. The need of the hour and the need to do something, calls upon all 
individuals to respond to the urgency of the situation. They selflessly devote their 
energies to the rescue and relief operations. The social breakdown of a community does 
not occur as it is apprehended. Instead, social norms and values are held in place, but may 
experience new demands upon them as the disaster situation may provide. 
 Based on the literature, I define emergence as new attributes that appear in 
completely new or historically old organizations to handle disaster-generated issues of 
the moment. Therefore, the key characteristics of emergence generated by a disaster are 
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emergent tasks and structures (i.e. division of labor based either on sociologically defined 
roles or pre-disaster leadership potential) that deal with disaster-generated priorities, the 
composition of emergent group/s (consisting of private individuals or public officials), 
and the duration of the emergent group/s. 
 The key conditions that trigger emergence are: unmet needs (inadequate 
fulfillment of community needs on the part of responding agencies); the magnitude of 
impact (the enormity of the disaster); proximity to the impact area (the relative distance 
from the impact area); pre-existing social networks, which displays not only a U.S. trend, 
but an international trend as well; and community altruism. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Overview 
This chapter describes the methods used in gathering and analyzing the data. The 
chapter begins with a justification of the site selection for data gathering. The chapter will 
then provide a description of the State of Tamil Nadu and the District of Nagapattinam 
followed by justification of the research methodology. Next, I will describe the main 
data-gathering procedures followed by the fieldwork process, the sampling technique, 
efforts to protect the rights of human subjects, and ways in which the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the data were assessed.  Finally, I describe the data analysis 
procedures. 
Site Selection 
 The tsunami impacted a 1,076 km stretch of the eastern Indian coastline from the 
southern tip of the nation to Chennai along the coastline of the State of Tamil Nadu (see 
map 1, p. 4). Approximately 376 villages in 13 districts and 900,000 people were directly 
or indirectly affected.  Consequently, site selection for this study proved both promising 
and challenging.  According to the literature, emergence takes place after a disaster due to 
the magnitude of impact (Barton & Merton, 1963; Barton, 1969; Dynes, 
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1970; Roth, 1970), proximity to the impacted area (Barton & Merton, 1963; Dynes, 1970; 
Roth, 1970; Forrest, 1974, 1978; Kreps, 1978; Drabek, 1981), pre-existing social 
networks (Barton & Merton, 1963; Dynes, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Drabek, 1968, 1981, 
1986; Mileti, 1999), community altruism (Prince, 1920; Barton, 1969; Dynes & 
Quarantelli, 1968; Roth, 1970; Kennedy, 1971; Aguirre et al., 1995) and unmet needs 
(Barton & Merton, 1963; Parr, 1970; Dynes, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Drabek, 1986; Mileti, 
1999; Drabek & McEntire, 2002). The research question being - why and under what 
conditions did emergence take place in Tamil Nadu after the tsunami, potential sites were 
evaluated by examining these criteria:  magnitude of impact, known involvement of the 
local people, and geographical distance from the impact area.  
 Magnitude of impact can be defined in various ways.  For example, Babbie 
(2004) suggests that being hard hit is relatively subjective.  For the purposes of this 
study, I included areas that experienced a disproportionate impact in terms of loss of 
habitation and loss of life.  According to news reports, the State of Tamil Nadu was 
considered the hardest hit area in India (Toll reaches 2500 in TN, 2004; Tsunami toll 
in TN, Pondy touches 7000, 2004; 9749 confirmed dead in India, 2005). Within this 
state two districts, Cuddalore and Nagapattinam, fit the hard hit criteria mentioned 
because they absorbed more than two thirds of the entire death toll of the region.  In 
addition, both districts within the Tamil Nadu State have a large number of fishing 
villages. The fishing industry was particularly hard hit given that most of the boats were 
destroyed. Considering that the tsunami occurred within the fisherfolks industrial and 
dwelling sectors it was likely that the local fisherfolk would become involved in the 
response. In addition, due to the high incidence of community altruism in India even in 
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small time crises, it was likely (and subsequently confirmed through analysis of news 
documents) that the fisherfolk and many other locals did become involved in a variety of 
ways.  
 Finally, the geographical distance criteria was used in that the Cuddalore and 
Nagapattinam districts were 334 km away from the state capitol suggesting that 
emergence would occur (as based on the review of relevant literature in chapter two, see 
Form & Nosow, 1958; Barton & Merton, 1963; Barton, 1969; Dynes, 1970; Roth, 1970; 
Forrest, 1974; Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1988 and Wenger & James, 1994). This 
distance from the state capitol suggested that it was highly unlikely that the 
administration could enter the field immediately, thus generating unmet social needs at 
the community level and spurring emergent behavior among the locals. In addition, the 
tsunami destroyed a key bridge and thereby disabled access to Nagapattinam. This 
inaccessibility, theoretically, produces more cases of emergence because unmet 
community needs are generated by the disaster.  
 Therefore, since the research question states: why and under what conditions did 
emergence take place, the magnitude of impact, involvement of the local people, and 
geographical distance criteria, made Nagapattinam emerge as the most appropriate locale 
for this study. In addition, the availability of funding and time increased the 
appropriateness of Nagapattinam. Therefore, it appeared as a site suitable for rich data 
collection, available to the researcher, and appropriate to the research problem (Spradley, 
1980). 
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Description of Tamil Nadu and Nagapattinam 
 The State of Tamil Nadu is made up of 30 districts and is located along the south-
eastern coastline of India. This state, formerly known as Madras, extends as far south as 
Kanyakumari which is the southern most point of India where the Bay of Bengal, Indian 
Ocean and Arabian Sea converge (see map 1, p. 4). Nagapattinam is a district within this 
state and occupies its south-eastern tip which protrudes into the Bay of Bengal 
(Government of Tamil Nadu). 
 The District of Nagapattinam appeared the worst affected with 73 habitations 
inundated, 6,065 persons dead and 1,922 injured. Therefore, it emerged as a promising 
field site to study emergence. This district has a total coastline of 187.90 km with a 
population of 1.48 million (100,000). Out of this population, 196,000 persons along a 10 
km stretch of the coastline were severely affected and faced the highest death toll. The 
main industries in this area are fishing and agriculture. Trade and commerce are also 
prominent in some parts of the district and are facilitated by the presence of the Basilica 
of the Virgin Mary located on the coast in the southern part of this district. It is also 
relevant to mention here that this village suffered one of the highest death tolls in the 
district.  
Selection and Justification of Research Methodology 
 Although some literature exists on the behavioral phenomenon of emergence, 
many questions remain.  In addition, emergence has not been studied within the context 
of developing nations and has never been examined within the Indian context or specific 
to a tsunami event.  However, given that India is a developing country with high 
incidences of altruism and community solidarity exhibited on a daily basis, I 
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hypothesized that pre-existing social networks and community altruism were likely to be 
key conditions spurring emergence in Nagapattinam. At the same time, given the fact that 
a tsunami has rarely occurred in this region in the recent past, I also hypothesized that 
this case study may reveal situations and behaviors that are rare or exceptional.  
Accordingly, the study was shaped as one that was primarily descriptive and 
exploratory although influenced by the literature on emergence.  Qualitative research, a 
tradition within the field of disaster studies (Phillips, 1997), was selected as a 
methodological strategy consistent with the goals of descriptive and exploratory research.  
Qualitative methods offer rich, deep insights into a given location or event and provide 
the contextual and cultural content necessary to interpret statements, documents and 
observations gathered during the study. Thus, this study aims to identify, document and 
describe the role of the local people as potential resources in crucial life-saving activities 
immediately following the tsunami.  To further bound the study, I concentrated on the 
behavioral activities of the locals during the first week after the tsunami. Behavioral 
activities included search and rescue, burial and cremation, emergency housing, first aid, 
distribution of relief supplies, and other activities. These activities are important when 
studying emergence as they reflect the primary forms of emergent tasks that are apparent 
after a disaster. The initial behavior of the locals appeared to be their own initiative, but 
at times they appeared to join their efforts with others.  These behavioral phenomena will 
be analyzed as a form of emergence, defined as new behaviors, tasks and structures that 
appear to meet or manage massive disaster needs (Dynes, 1970). 
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I will now discuss the data gathering methods used in the field and sampling 
techniques that I employed. This section of the chapter will be followed by a segment that 
discusses how the credibility and trustworthiness of the data is maintained. 
Data-Gathering Procedures 
 Four data-gathering procedures typical of qualitative research were used:  open-
ended, semi-structured interviews, document collection, visual data collection, and 
observations.    
Interviewing 
 Interviews constituted the primary procedure for gathering the bulk of the data.  In 
qualitative interviewing, the researcher attempts to construct a guided conversation 
with the respondent (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  Interviews are relatively open-ended in 
order to allow the respondent to contribute fully to the research topic (see Appendix I for 
interview instrument).  In all, I conducted a total of 29 interviews with key government 
officials and local people over a period of four weeks in the field. 
 For this study, I constructed a semi-structured interview guide that initially 
focused primarily on search and rescue activities as illustrative of emergent behavior.  As 
the research began, it became clear that search and rescue activities appeared relatively 
minimal in that the tsunami tragically killed most that it touched.  In short, one either 
lived with relatively few injuries or died.  Consequently, the interview guide expanded 
beyond simply search and rescue to consider the full range of emergent behaviors 
engaged in by the administration, voluntary organizations and the locals.   
 Initially I used the interview guide much like a checklist, (as suggested by 
Richardson, 1985). The checklist method allowed me to check off relevant questions as 
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the participant provided answers. However, it soon became easy to move from a semi-
structured checklist to a more conversational style.  The interviews took place in English, 
Hindi and Tamil with assistance provided by native Tamil speaker and Oklahoma State 
University student Aswin Subanthore.  The conversational style, informal interactive 
approach, and use of native languages facilitated a rich sense of rapport between the 
researchers and the participants as expected within a qualitative strategy.   
 In addition, local participants appeared eager to share their story and offered 
information freely and voluntarily.  Thus, although I anticipated including only formal 
participants, the fact that a number of locals approached me casually on the street meant 
that literally dozens of persons acted as voluntary informants. Since I was in the villages 
which experienced great damage, it appeared that most of the inhabitants of the village, 
suffered some loss in some way or the other. In addition, the inhabitants of the village 
were present there at the time of the event. The day of the tragedy being a Sunday, most 
citizens were at home or around the area. Therefore, informants being close to the zone of 
impact became involved (Stallings, 2002). 
 Interviewing continued until the point of saturation occurred, defined as the point 
at which one can predict the next individuals response (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Richardson, 1985).  As one illustration, this occurred first when interviewing Tamil Nadu 
government officials.  Eleven Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers led resource 
teams into the affected areas.  By the time I had interviewed the fourth IAS officer, I 
realized that I was hearing the same thing and could predict the next response.  After 
considering this, I moved on to more local officials in order to diversify and enrich the 
interview data.  I tape-recorded nearly all interviews, which did not prove to be a problem 
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with participants. In a few cases where individuals seemed a little nervous, I chose not to 
record but took careful notes and immediately wrote up the interview summary so as to 
not lose crucial information.  
Document Collection 
 As described in this chapter, triangulation is used to build credibility and 
trustworthiness within a qualitative study.  Triangulation is the process by which 
statements of respondents are checked against observed behavior, records, and 
documents. Different sources of information provide information about the same event or 
relationships (Erlandson et al., 1993). Thus, to supplement the interviewing and to 
examine the responses from alternative perspectives, I gathered relevant documents.  For 
example, news accounts and web sites provided descriptive information. The Tamil Nadu 
web site (www.tn.gov.in) posted Situation Reports on the tsunami including injuries, 
deaths, relief efforts, links to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), locations of 
relief camps and other information.  Respondents frequently offered copies of reports, 
PowerPoint® presentations, maps and other data at the conclusion of the interview (see 
Appendix II for a complete listing of relevant documents). Finally, I was able to collect 
several books and publicly-issued reports while conducting this research within India.  
These items included government reports on the tsunami as well as the first books and 
articles on the event.  
 Documents are a form of unobtrusive or non-reactive measure (Webb et al., 1981) 
meaning that they do not directly impact upon a human subject.  They are items that are 
left behind or created either intentionally or not.  Documents must be assessed for a 
number of potential biases including the reason for their origin.  For example, news 
 54
accounts may have been generated sensationally to spur purchases (Gans, 1979). 
Organizational reports may have been issued to place that agency within a favorable 
light.  Because of these potential biases, it is important to identify the source and its 
potential limitations, a procedure that will be done in the coming chapters.  
 I also gathered other potential unobtrusive measures while in the field. I 
purchased items made by local fisherfolk in a relief camp, and made available for sale 
within a government office.  In addition, I took photographs of documents in various 
offices (always with permission) and of public displays (for example, of relief efforts). 
Visual Data Collection 
 Although visual data can prove quite useful, such a data gathering procedure 
remains underused in field research (for exceptions see Collier, 1986; Curry & Clarke, 
1977). Several visual data collection strategies can be used within a qualitative field 
context.  I considered photo-saturation and photo-documentation as the most appropriate 
here (Blinn & Harrist, 1991).  Photo-saturation occurs when the researcher photographs 
frequently, intensively and without prior criteria.  I used this strategy during the first part 
of May for an initial exploratory trip to Nagapattinam.  I photographed everything that 
seemed relevant to the tsunami: damage to the boats, portions of the shoreline, damaged 
buildings, vacated villages, relief camps, churches, government buildings, and grave 
sites.  Out of concern for human impact, I did not photograph individuals and carefully 
excluded any identifying features or marks that might compromise human dignity. 
 On a second trip to Nagapattinam I used the photo-documentation procedure.  
This strategy is used when the researcher begins to identify themes emerging from the 
data and tries to record them visually.  For example, although I had photographed a 
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heavily damaged bridge during the earlier visit, I returned to photograph this bridge 
again.  I did so because I realized that the bridge had compromised access to the tsunami-
stricken area by outsiders. This inaccessibility to the impacted area may have created a 
condition that potentially could facilitate emergence.  Interview participants commented 
on this bridge access problem thus confirming the presence of a theme that could be 
visually documented (for a complete list of visual documents see Appendix III). 
 Several final sources of visual evidence became available as well from news 
accounts, web sites and PowerPoint® presentations provided by participants.  Because 
these items represent documents as well, they are mentioned here only briefly.   It is 
worthwhile to mention that the PowerPoint® visuals provided by participants were 
presented during the interview process and thus carry narrative descriptions by the creator 
and/or user of that visual image. 
Observational Data Gathering 
 Observation can be used to gather data on non-verbal behavior, interactions, 
relationships, and culture (Spradley, 1980).   For the purposes of this study, I observed 
the response of the participant to the interview questions for several reasons.  Primarily, I 
wanted to insure that the participant felt comfortable with the interview questions and 
that the study did not produce additional trauma in a community already devastated by 
the loss of thousands of citizens. As another form of observation, I visited the temporary 
relief centers and villages erected to house those affected by the tsunami.  I also 
wandered the commercial sectors of several villages in order to see the extent of the 
water line and the influence of various relief organizations (NGOs in particular) on the 
affected area. 
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I also walked down the beaches of Nagapattinam. I observed a once thriving 
fishing economy now barely had a few boats sent out to sea. Consequently, the daily fish 
selling business was also sparse to non-existent in some places which is consistent with 
the locals informing me that there were no fish and that they were afraid to go back to the 
sea. 
The NGOs appeared active in their offices with district maps displayed on the 
walls and temporary shelters demarcated. They also displayed every government official 
or IAS officers contact details on their office walls.  
Interestingly, I also noted the sense of cohesiveness and solidarity in the 
community that existed despite the disaster. I observed locals still sitting together and 
talking in groups. This suggests a pre-existing social network. According to the literature, 
pre-existing social networks are a key condition spurring emergence. Therefore, 
community solidarity and cohesiveness suggested that pre-existing social networks are 
apparent in Nagapattinam. In this way neighbors and friends joined hands in their 
community recovery and reconstruction efforts.  
Fieldwork Procedures 
I identified possible respondents prior to contact and cleared the respondents by a 
faculty member before initiating contact. This clearance was a part of the fieldwork 
protocol that I adhered to in the field. I used IRB (Institutional Review Board) protocol 
for contact (see Appendix IV for IRB forms). 
I presented and explained IRB informed consent procedures to participants. In 
addition, I obtained their written consent before asking any questions or conducting any 
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interviews among government officials.  I made the possible risks and benefits of the 
study clear to all respondents before and after they signed the consent forms. 
To safeguard their rights and minimize risks I offered (in the Tamil language 
where necessary): a) voluntary participation, b) informed consent forms, c) the right to 
refuse questions, d) the right to stop at any time, e) a list of NGOs offering counseling. If 
any participant felt uncomfortable I repeated their options and reminded them that they 
could stop the interview or continue at another time. 
Since I have discussed fieldwork procedures, I will now discuss the historical 
significance of disaster field research and the methods and problems associated with it. In 
this section I will describe the processes used to gain entreé and establish rapport with the 
respondents. 
Disaster Field Research 
 Going to the field is a time-honored tradition in disaster studies, dating back to the 
time of the 1917 Halifax, Canada, explosion (Prince, 1920; Scanlon, 1988, 2001).  
Qualitative disaster field research was institutionalized by the Disaster Research Center 
(formerly of The Ohio State University, now at the University of Delaware) and the work 
of E.L. Quarantelli and Russell Dynes.  Such studies range from the firehouse research 
where one goes to the field immediately upon impact, to studies that extend 
longitudinally (though rare in existence).  Because funding for international work can be 
difficult to secure, it is not unusual to go to the field months after an event, which 
occurred in this case. 
 Qualitative fieldwork requires that the researcher attend to the circumstances, 
needs and context of the participants (Stebbins et al., 1991).  In this case, I was quite 
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concerned that the tsunami being a catastrophic event deeply influenced the lives, futures, 
livelihoods, and viability of not only individuals but entire families.  Foremost in my 
mind was the impact that my research could have on the potential participants. I found 
that, consistent with what other disaster researchers have found, participants and 
informants appeared eager to share their story.   
 The process of entering the field began Indian style (in India, a source is 
needed to gain entrée to government officials) by which I mean that I contacted a fellow 
OSU student from Chennai, Atith Kotcherlakota, and asked him for suggestions.  He put 
me into contact with his father, Mr. Suresh Kotcherlakota, who directs a tea company in 
Chennai.  His considerable connections to the Tamil Nadu state government proved 
invaluable in that one of his contacts provided entrée and even set up appointments for 
the interviews in Chennai.  His act of sponsorship, described in the literature as one who 
opens doors and vouches for the individual (Burgess, 1982) made this study possible.  
Other cultural factors also proved useful. For example, Indians are very supportive of 
students and are typically enthusiastic in providing data for a students masters thesis.  
Other OSU faculty and a student accompanied me on several of the field trips, which 
provided a further level of legitimacy.  To solidify legitimacy, I offered each participant a 
letter of introduction on OSU letterhead.  When I completed each Chennai interview, I 
asked for referrals to the Nagapattinam area, snowballing (described later) into the 
area.  The Chennai interviews in terms of entrée and access could only be described as 
exceptional and rare. The rare and exceptional description is appropriate because in India 
gaining access to the bureaucracy, in the manner in which I accomplished, is unusual. It 
is not a common occurrence for students to be able to conduct so many interviews, with 
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key government officials directly involved in the entire response efforts in Nagapattinam, 
in a period of two weeks. 
 Initially, I had been given an open door to return to Nagapattinam by a key 
government official, normally a person that might prevent a researcher from further study 
(Burgess, 1982). However, upon my return I discovered that he was out of town. So, I 
contacted the key government officials second-in-charge (also an important government 
official involved in the response at Nagapattinam) and continued the snowball process 
from there. 
Qualitative researchers try to establish rapport or a sense of a connectedness with 
their interviewee.  This can be done by trying to find common ground with the 
participant, or by motivating the interviewee to join the study.  Possible methods to 
motivate bureaucrats include providing them with a letter of introduction which 
persuades them to lend academic respectability to the researcher by granting approval 
(Erlandson et al., 1993). Rapport evolved in several ways. I gained rapport with 
Government officials due to the fact that I had a source on the inside, as it is called in 
Indian terminology, which allowed me to gain entrée in the first place. I also provided 
government officials with a letter of introduction on OSU letterhead to gain their respect 
and facilitate rapport. These small steps assisted my snowballing process as I was able to 
prove my purpose for being there and asking those questions made one official 
recommend me on to the other and so forth. 
Sampling 
Emergent behavior in disasters offers tremendous theoretical and practical 
significance for disaster research. However, identifying the sample population is 
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problematic. Sampling in this case involved using the snow ball technique, a type of non-
probability sampling. Snow ball sampling is a process in which the researcher collects 
data on the sample population that the researcher has been able to locate, then asks the 
same respondents to provide information to locate other members of the sample 
population (Babbie, 2004). Therefore, I identified key individuals through secondary 
sources of data and used these individuals to provide additional sources of information or 
additional informants. Using the snow ball form of sampling, almost all leads for the 
emergent groups that may have appeared after the tsunami, were covered if not exhausted 
(Stallings, 2002). Interviews were of a personal nature and open-ended offering far more 
practicalities in the disaster field setting as it allowed the respondents to arrive at exactly 
what information he/she tried to convey (Stallings, 2002). 
As stated earlier I gained entrée into the field through a source and continued to 
use this source, who in turn used another, to get me an appointment with officials at the 
higher end of the Indian bureaucratic hierarchy. Using the snowball technique of referrals 
I continued my interviews until I began hearing the same story repeated. Thus, I realized 
my data gathering had reached saturation among Government officials, who were mostly 
IAS officers and part of the IAS teams deployed to the devastated area. 
My next quest began with a referral to the District Collectors office in the 
Nagapattinam area.  The District Collector was unfortunately out of the country at the 
time and I had to interview his second-in-charge, the Additional District Collector. 
Once again I snowballed down to the locals from this office beginning with the local 
Panchayat leaders and village elders. I used the referral technique at this stage as well 
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until once again my data gathering reached saturation and I began hearing the same story 
over (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).    
Credibility and Trustworthiness of the Data 
 While quantitative research demands reliability and validity, qualitative 
researchers prefer to focus on truth-value, trustworthiness and potential transferability of 
the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Erlandson et al., 1993).  For example, persistent 
observation and prolonged engagement are used when the researcher focuses intently on 
the research problem while remaining in or returning to the field for as long as possible.  I 
began gathering documents on December 26, 2004, the day the tsunami hit the Indian 
coastline and continued that process while securing grant funds and arranging to go to the 
field.  The first field trip took place in the early part of May 2005, during which I was 
accompanied by a thesis committee member, Dr. David Neal.  Our interviews took place 
within the state government capitol city of Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India.  During the first 
two weeks of June, I returned to Chennai and then went on to Nagapattinam with fellow 
student Aswin Subanthore and thesis supervisor Dr. Brenda Phillips.  After Dr. Phillips 
and Mr. Subanthore departed for the U.S., I continued to gather documents, to analyze 
photographs, and to conduct telephone follow-up interviews with selected respondents.  
Thus, it can be suggested that persistent observation and prolonged engagement in the 
field occurred to some extent. 
 As discussed previously, triangulation is another credibility-building strategy.  In 
short, I used interviewing, documents, observation, and visual data to support efforts to 
examine the phenomena from various perspectives.  Triangulation is a commonly used 
field research method for disaster studies (Stallings, 2002). 
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 Peer debriefing is a fourth recommended strategy. Peer debriefing is the process 
in which the researcher steps out of the context under study and reviews perceptions, 
insights, and analyses with professionals who have a general understanding of the nature 
of the study and who can provide feedback that will consequently assist the researcher in 
redirecting the process of inquiry (Erlandson et al., 1993). I benefited from peer 
debriefing due to having thesis committee members and a fellow student in the field with 
me.  We met several times during the day to share notes and discuss issues, followed by a 
nightly debriefing session where we jointly planned the next few days activities.  While 
in Chennai, I was able to participate in a series of virtual debriefings using Blackboards 
chat room features.  We archived these virtual debriefings for later use.  Peer debriefings 
are considered key to helping the researcher stay focused on the research problem and to 
generate data that are considered thorough and precise (Erlandson et al., 1993). 
 While conducting data analysis, a strategy that can be used is negative case 
analysis.  This occurs when the researcher deliberately looks for anomalies in the data, 
specifically cases that do not fit or that contradict the emerging interpretation of the data.  
The researcher then assesses, with the help of peer debriefers, whether that anomaly 
amounts to just thator is in fact an indicator of a problem with the interpretation.  The 
general goal of negative case analysis is to insure that the majority of the data are 
explained in a parsimonious fashion and that any evidence to the contrary is accounted 
for or explained.  Negative cases may also indicate a need for further data collection.  In 
short, anything inconsistent with saturated findings is acted upon.  To summarize, I used 
a variety of efforts to insure that the data emerged sound and that the interpretations 
could hold up under scrutiny by the more general scientific community. 
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Data Analysis 
 Qualitative data analysis begins while the researcher is in the field (Erlandson et 
al., 1993; Lofland, Snow, Anderson & Lofland, 2006).  Initially, the researcher begins by 
gathering data through interviewing and writing summaries of the participants 
comments.  While doing so, I used the memo-writing technique by identifying the types 
and forms of emergence that I heard participants describe.  Identifying types of 
behavior is a common technique that jump-starts the analytical process (Lofland et al., 
2006) and allows the researcher to compare preliminary findings with that found in 
existing research literature.  Thus, when I left the field, I had an extensive set of 
participant and informant summaries supplemented by a field journal that recorded 
methodological choices taken in the field. For example, I recorded my methodological 
choice to continue the snow ball process uninterrupted, by interviewing the second-in-
charge to the key government official who was out of town. I generated approximately a 
dozen memos.   
 Upon return to the university, I immediately created full and complete 
transcriptions from key interviews using procedures recommended by Yow (1994).  I 
paid particular attention to how participants phrased their comments, and solicited the 
support of Mr. Subanthore in matters of word interpretation or problems with accents (or, 
in the case of a few interviews, where sounds obscured the clarity of the tape recording).  
 Qualitative data can be assessed through a number of analytical styles.  Bogdan 
and Biklen (1992) recommend the use of coding schemes that focus on activities, tasks, 
or structures to name a few. Conversely, grounded theorists prefer to read the data 
extensively and allow themes to emerge from the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967; for a more 
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detailed approach, see Strauss and Corbin 1990).  In yet another approach, one can 
identify domain, componential and taxonomic analyses from the data (Spradley 1980).  
Finally, Lofland, Snow, Anderson and Lofland (2006) recommend the use of a question 
series that require the researcher to look for types etc. within the data.  The primary 
differences between these approaches are the terms and the ways in which they are 
presented.  For example, the typologizing suggested by Lofland and Lofland (2006) is 
similar to the strict inclusion semantic relationship domain analysis offered by 
Spradley (1980).    
 What is important in qualitative data analysis is the process of spending time 
immersed in the data:  reading and re-reading interviews, comparing with documents, 
visual and observational data, looking for patterns and anomalies and comparing bits of 
data to each other.  Thus, in reality I used a number of these approaches in order to 
explore fully the data.  I began with the more structured approaches of Lofland and 
Lofland (2006) as well as Spradley (1980) while in the field, and then moved to more 
theoretical analyses as guided by Glaser and Strauss (1967). 
 To do so, I started by comparing participant summaries with each other and 
identifying the types of emergent behavior. I used Spradleys (1980) developmental 
research sequence and conducted domain analyses on the transcripted interview data. I 
used primarily Strict Inclusion and Sequential analyses to establish recurring emergent 
themes in the data at the State, District, Local and NGO levels. The data are easily 
focused when domain and taxonomic analyses are done. Based on the developmental 
research sequence I identified a primary emergent task as the single cover term and 
related all subsequent tasks, required to achieve the primary task, as subsets to the cover 
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term. This enabled me to establish the process/es used in achieving the means to an end. 
The cover term acts as the primary task to be accomplished while the other tasks, 
required to achieve the primary task, are listed as a function of the cover term.  
Summary and Conclusion 
 The process of data gathering appeared relatively easy due to the access to 
internal sources that generally prevent entrée. In India it is usually difficult to gain access 
to government officials on a daily basis. But due to the connections I had, I gained the 
necessary access required to meet with government officials. Visual and observational 
data gathering are also extremely useful and I realized their importance when I analyzed 
the data and triangulated transcripted interviews with photographs and observational 
notes taken in the field. Credibility and trustworthiness of the data is also achieved by 
staying in the field for a long period of time and persisting with follow-up telephone 
interviews. Peer debriefing sessions, held online at appointed times with my thesis 
committee members and a fellow student, helped me to maintain credibility and 
trustworthiness of the data. 
Finally, Spradleys (1980) developmental research sequences further helped me to 
identify easily the recurring themes at different levels of analysis and draw conclusions 
about emergence from the data gathered. I used primarily strict inclusion and sequential 
domain analyses to identify and analyze the data. Strict inclusion methods enabled me to 
identify the type or kind of a specific emergent task or structure. Sequential domain 
analyses enabled me to identify a sequence or pattern in emergent tasks at different levels 
of the analysis. In this way, themes emerged from the data and allowed me to provide 
taxonomies of emergent tasks and structures as necessary. Using these methods, I found 
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it easier to analyze emergent structures and tasks and hence draw conclusions about why 
and under what conditions emergence took place in Tamil Nadu. 
After discussing the methods used to gather and analyze data I will now proceed 
to discuss the disaster history of India. This discussion will set the stage for the Indian 
Ocean tsunami that occurred and will help the reader understand the vulnerabilities of the 
Indian subcontinent. The following chapter will provide the reader with a description of 
the risks and vulnerabilities of India. The chapter will also include a hazard analysis of 
India, the State of Tamil Nadu, and the District of Nagapattinam. Therefore, the chapter 
will lay out a contextual framework to understand, in greater depth, the peculiarities of 
the perception of risks and vulnerabilities in a developing nation.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DISASTER HISTORY: INDIA 
Overview 
 This chapter identifies potential hazards within India and provides a hazard 
analysis of India, the State of Tamil Nadu, and the District of Nagapattinam. A hazard 
analysis provides information on the location and extent of possible risk and 
vulnerabilities to a specific area. Risk is the probability of hazard occurrence (Drabek & 
Hoetmer, 1991). Vulnerable people, according to Bolin (1998), are those with the fewest 
choices, the ones who are discriminated against through politics, the physically 
challenged, those that lack education and employment, those who are in some way ill, or 
those who have been marginalized due to historical patterns of domination or 
subordination.  
Identifying the risk and vulnerability of an area is essential to mitigate against and 
protect citizens from potential hazards (Drabek & Hoetmer, 1991). This chapter does not 
provide a comprehensive list of risks and vulnerabilities of the areas under study, but 
delivers a cursory overview of them. Therefore, this chapter allows the reader to develop 
an understanding of the perception of risk and vulnerability within India related to 
disasters. 
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Introduction  
Natural or technological disasters are not uncommon to anyone in this world, least 
of all to anyone from India. Every day the newspapers carry accounts of a landslide in the 
Himalayas, a flood in the deltas, or a storm along the coast. We keep hearing accounts of 
famines, epidemics, extremes of temperature, or drought in some corner of our country. 
India is a country teeming with more than one billion people; it is the second largest 
populated country in the world (Census of India, 2001; CIA World Fact Book, 2005). 
With a huge industrial and technological base, it is prone to human mishap. Coupled with 
the active setting for technological problems, it has approximately 7000 km of coastline, 
the worlds highest mountain range, The Himalayas, a few active faults, and an active 
monsoon season. As a result, monsoons, floods, cyclones, and storms are embedded in 
our world we call India (CIA World Fact Book, 2005).  
 Historically, India has witnessed destruction by storms and floods that constitute 
the majority of its natural calamities. Earthquakes, which are far less common, are 
nevertheless devastating and take many lives in towns located in tectonically unstable 
parts of the country. A slip along a fault line may lead to fears of dam ruptures on the 
Ganges River and other major rivers. In addition to the natural calamities that plague the 
country are calamities caused by human failure. Rail, road, and other transport related 
incidents are not uncommon at all to the layman and account for a significant number of 
deaths, per year, in the Indian subcontinent (Sinha, 1998).  
Some of the major disasters that have taken place in the country are as follows. 
The Bhopal Gas Tragedy occurred on Monday, December 3, 1984 (Shrivastava, 1987a, 
1987b). The Latur Earthquake shook the state of Maharashtra and killed approximately 
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9,000 people on September 29, 1993 (Jain, 1998; Gupta et al., 1998). A few years later, 
the Orissa Cyclone on October 29, 1999, killed 9,885 people (De, Dube & Rao, 2005; 
De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004; Salagrama, 1999). Two years after the Orissa cyclone, the 
Gujarat earthquake occurred on Indias Republic day, January 26, 2001, and killed 
20,000 people. On December 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami event left 10,872 
killed, 6,898 injured and is by far the worst tsunami disaster in world history (Rastogi et 
al., 2001; EM-DAT, 2005; UNDP, 2005; WHO, 2005). 
A Hazards Assessment of India 
 This section identifies potential hazards within India. Hazard identification 
provides an overview of potential hazards faced by a particular community (Drabek & 
Hoetmer, 1991, p. 139). In this section, I review the different types of disasters that have 
occurred within India. I have grouped hazards according to their characteristics and 
impacts.  In this section, I have also provided a hazard analysis of India, which discusses 
potential risks and vulnerabilities of India. 
Hazard Identification: Types of Hazards 
Natural Hazards 
Earthquakes 
  One of the most destructive earthquakes in the 20th century occurred on April 5, 
1905, in the State of Himachal Pradesh (north India) in Kangra, an event that killed 
approximately 20,000 people (Bilham & Ambrayses, 2000; Bilham, 2001; EM-DAT, 
2005). On September 30, 1993, a 6.4 magnitude earthquake shook the State of 
Maharashtra (west India) in the Latur and Osmandabad districts and killed 9,000 people, 
making it one of the deadliest earthquakes in the continental region (Jain, 1998; Gupta et 
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al., 1998). In 2001, Indias foundation shook once again with a devastating earthquake 
that rocked the town of Bhuj in the State of Gujarat (north-western India). This 
earthquake occurred on January 26, 2001, left 20,000 dead, approximately 167,000 
injured, and totaled $10 billion in damages (Rastogi et al., 2001; EM-DAT, 2005; United 
Nations Development Program, 2005). Map 2 represents the earthquake zones in India. It 
is very noticeable that many parts of India lie in a high to moderate risk zone. 
                                Map 2: Earthquake zones in India (Source: undp.org.in) 
Landslides/Dam collapse 
 The collapse of the Machhu dam in 1979, in the State of Gujarat, killed 
approximately 10,000 people (Dhar, 2003). Landslides occur in mountainous regions due 
to stresses within tectonic plates and the constant collision of the Indian Plate with the 
Eurasian plate. The debris carried by rivers and the rainfall from the monsoons also 
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produce landslides, which result in a significant number of deaths within the Indian 
subcontinent (Sinha, 1998).  
Extreme Climate 
 Disparities in weather, with extremes of heat and cold, have a tendency to occur 
quite frequently in India and are related to a substantial number of deaths annually. Cold 
waves become a nation-wide concern when the numbers of deaths increase due to 
deterioration in air quality. In the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (east India), cold 
waves accounted for 957 deaths in 1978, and 2,307 deaths in 1999 (De, Dube & Rao, 
2005). The maximum number of heat waves occurs in June (De, Dube & Rao, 2005). For 
example, a heat wave in 1998 killed approximately 1,300 Indians (De, Khole & 
Dandekar, 2004). In April 2002, abnormally high temperatures led to 1,000 deaths in 
India (De, Dube & Rao, 2005). 
Floods 
Almost 40 million hectares of land in India are flood prone, while yearly, 8 
million hectares are affected by floods (De, Dube, Rao, 2005; Government of India 
[GoI], 2004). In the year 1924, due to flooding in the Ganga and Yamuna rivers (north 
India), 1,100 people drowned and 242,400 houses washed away. In July 1943, the cities 
of Ajmer and Merwara experienced more than 50 inches of rainfall in a single day at a 
cost of 5,000 lives. In October 1955, floods in the Yamuna River claimed 1,500 people 
and flooded 7,000 villages.  In October 1968, due to flooding in the Trista-Brahmaputra 
river basins, 2,700 people lost their lives in the Darjeeling area (north-east India). In the 
year 2000, floods in the Godavari and Tungabhadra rivers (south India) caused a loss of 
131 lives in Andhra Pradesh and left 98,000 people homeless (De, 2005). Map 3 
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represents areas in India that are flood prone. Areas along the Ganges, Brahamaputra and 
Yamuna rivers appear more likely at risk. 
Map 3: Flood zones in India (Source: undp.org.in) 
Cyclones/Storms 
Indias disaster history reveals that storms and cyclones killed approximately 
20,000 people in 1942, in the States of Orissa and West Bengal (east India). The tropical 
cyclone of 1970 killed about 200,000 people, with storm surges of 1317ft (De, 2005).  
In 1971, one year later, a cyclone hit the State of Orissa again and killed approximately 
10,000 people (De, Dube & Rao, 2005; Indian Meterological Department, 2005; 
Salagrama, 1999).  In 1998, due to cyclones once again, 10,000 deaths occurred, with 
half of these deaths concentrated in the State of Orissa (De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004). In 
1999, a cyclone with wind speeds up to 250 km/hr once again affected Orissa. The 
cyclone killed 9,885 people, injured 3, 312 people, and affected another 12,625,000 
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people (De, Dube & Rao, 2005; De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004; EM-DAT, 2005; UNDP, 
2005). This area is especially prone to such severe weather due to its location near the 
Bay of Bengal, and because cyclonic disturbances originate in the Indian Ocean (see map 
4). Death due to cyclones appears to be decreasing due to advances in forecasting and 
warnings (De, Dube & Rao, 2005; De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004). For example, the 
cyclone in 1977 had fatalities pegged at 10,000, while the cyclone of 1996 showed a 
marked decline, with deaths approximated at 978 (De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tsunamis 
On December 26, 2004, a tsunami devastated 14 nations in South Asia, caused 
billions of dollars in damage, and left approximately 300,000 dead or missing. The 
tsunami slammed into the eastern coast of India leaving 10,872 killed, 6,898 injured, 3 
Map 4: Wind and cyclone zones in India (Source: undp.org.in) 
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million people affected, and caused damage worth $ 1.56 billion (WHO, 2005). Other 
tsunamis within India are detailed on pages 84-106 in chapter six. 
Technological Hazards 
Transport Accidents/Human Failure/Technological Disasters  
 Technological hazards include power plant failures and incidents involving 
hazardous materials. One of the worst technological disasters of the 20th century was a 
gas leak at the Union Carbide Plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, on December 3, 1984. 
The gas leak killed approximately 3,000 people, injured 300,000, and claimed 2,000 
animals (Shrivastava, 1987a).  
In the year 2001, road accidents killed 80,000 and injured 382,700 people. 
Between the years 1970 and 2001, the number of fatalities from road accidents increased 
from 114,000 to 394,000 (Valli, 2005). 
Slow onset hazards 
Drought 
Droughts have always plagued India and have been responsible for an 
uncontrollable amount of deaths due to various socio-economic factors that are prevalent 
in developing countries. In 1987, India experienced a 19% deficit in average rainfall. In 
addition, it was an El-Niño year and the monsoons arrived late, which set the stage for 
one of the worst drought conditions the country had faced. The drought affected 58.6 
million hectares of land (De, Dube & Rao, 2005; De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004). The first 
all-India drought since 1987 occurred in 2002. In this year again, India experienced a 
19% deficit in average rainfall rates and record lows of rainfall in July, at 51% below 
normal (De, Dube & Rao, 2005). 
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Epidemics/Diseases 
Epidemics like dengue, malaria, cholera, encephalitis, bubonic plague and other 
enteric diseases contribute to a number of deaths annually and have the capacity to spread 
extremely fast. The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs recorded 488,619 medically 
certified deaths, representing 15.4% of the registered number of deaths in the country. 
Hazard Analysis 
Risk and Vulnerability 
  Risk is the probability of hazard occurrence (Drabek & Hoetmer, 1991). In India, 
60% of the landmass is prone to earthquakes (see map 2, p. 70), 8% to cyclones (see map 
4, p. 73), 68% to drought, and 40 million hectares of land is susceptible to floods (see 
map 3, p. 72). Statistically, this makes India a country with a high risk of natural 
disasters.  On average, every year between the years 1990 and 2000, disasters killed 
approximately 4,344 people and affected 30 million (De, Khole & Dandekar, 2004; GoI, 
2004). Studies conducted by the Center for Hazards and Risk Research at Columbia 
University revealed that floods and droughts are prominent in the northern and north-
eastern parts of India. The north of India is also prone to earthquakes, and death rates are 
high when they do occur. Cyclones impact a much smaller area compared to floods, 
droughts, and earthquakes, but tend to be responsible for a greater number of deaths. The 
Center came to the conclusion that the entire country was at risk from at least one type of 
hazard, and mortality rates appeared higher in the north and north- eastern parts of the 
country (Center for Hazards and Risk Research, 2005).   
 Shanties and slums tend to crowd in and around hazardous industrial areas 
because this is the land that no one wants to live on, and land that the poor can afford. As 
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advanced technology for these industries becomes increasingly hazardous, and the 
number of people living in these areas steadily increases, the stage is set for people at 
risk. The Bhopal incident should be used as an example (Kapoor, 1992).  
 Following the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World in 1994, the Government of 
India created an expert group to assess the vulnerability of housing and infrastructure in 
India. The assessment was based on vulnerability to earthquakes, floods, and cyclones 
and the risk to housing associated with these natural hazards. This report used the 
Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik (MSK) scale of seismic intensity and revealed that 12% of 
the land is at risk from severe earthquakes (Jain, 1998). Eighteen percent of the land is 
liable to MSK VIII, which is damaging, and 25% to MSK VII, which is defined as Very 
Strong (Building Material and Technology Promotion Council [BMTPC], 1997).  
 In 100 years, between 1891 and 1990, India witnessed 262 cyclones, of which 93 
of the severe ones affected a 50 km strip on the east coast (BMTPC, 1997).  With a 7,600 
km coastline, India is vulnerable to cyclones. The countrys vulnerability results from its 
low-lying coastal areas, a high frequency of cyclones and storms, density of population, 
and high rates of coastal erosion. Out of the 80 tropical storms in the world, 6.5% of them 
originate in the Indian Ocean. The rate of occurrence of the tropical storms is 5 or 6 times 
higher in the Bay of Bengal than in the Arabian Sea. In short, the East Coast experiences 
a relatively high level of vulnerability (Aggarwal & Lal, n.d.) 
 The tsunami risk in India is relatively low, and tsunamis have rarely been reported 
or documented. During earthquakes in 1819 and 1845, near the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat, 
rapid movement of water in the sea was reported, but no tsunamis were generated. The 
1945 Mekran earthquake, however, generated tsunami waves in the Gulf of Cambay, near 
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Gujarat, at a height of 15m and at 2m in Mumbai. In Mumbai, boats were unmoored and 
casualties were recorded. Therefore, the vulnerable areas to tsunamis are the Gujarat 
Coast and the Andaman-Sumatra region where the December 26 tsunami occurred (GoI, 
2005). 
A Hazards Assessment of the State of Tamil Nadu 
 The State of Tamil Nadu is located in the southern half of India and 
accommodates 1,076 km of Indias coastline. Tamil Nadus coastline covers 
approximately 12% of the total coastline of the country, and 50-75 million people dwell 
in this state (Dr. J. Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005).  Tamil 
Nadus economy is primarily based on agriculture and fishing, with some parts reliant on 
domestic tourism.  
Earthquakes are quite unusual in the State of Tamil Nadu, although side effects or 
remote earthquakes may damage the vulnerable coast, as witnessed by the recent tsunami. 
The Government of Indias Statistical Handbook (2004a) lists 9,012 accidents in the year 
2002, which account for 9,939 deaths. In the year 2003, 8,393 accidents accounted for 
9,275 deaths. Industrial accidents also claim a number of lives per year. The State of 
Tamil Nadu suffers a number of deaths due to illnesses alone, standing at 369,065 in the 
year 1999 (Statistical Handbook, 2004b).  
Tamil Nadu has also been seriously affected in terms of drought and extremes of 
temperatures, especially heat waves, which kill hundreds and affect thousands as a 
consequence. Due to its location, this state has also been harassed by the monsoon winds, 
cyclones, and floods, which lead to a number of deaths per year. In 1964, a severe 
cyclone killed approximately 900 people in the state. In 1977, a cyclone that affected the 
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southern states, claimed approximately 10,000 lives, and left 1 million people homeless. 
Tamil Nadu was severely affected as the cyclone crossed the coast 10 km south of 
Nagapattinam, left 560 people dead and caused damage worth 1.55 billion. Once again, 
in November 1984, a cyclone passed close to Nagapattinam, affected 35,000 people and 
inundated 50,000 acres. In 1991, a cyclone in the Bay of Bengal left 185 people dead. In 
1992, yet another cyclone event in Tamil Nadu left 175 people dead and 160 people 
reportedly missing (IMD, 2005). 
In this State, even though the number of deaths may not be reported because the 
numbers are insignificant, nonetheless, a substantial amount of deaths occur due to 
floods, heavy rainfall, and cyclones. Tamil Nadu is vulnerable to the onslaught of the 
monsoons due to its close proximity to the confluence of the Bay of Bengal and the 
Indian Ocean.  
Hazard Analysis 
Risk and Vulnerability 
 An assessment done by the United Nations Development Program revealed that 
Tamil Nadu is not an area prone to floods, but 5 places, namely, Chennai, 
Kancheepuram, Kanniyakumari, The Nilgiris, and Thiruvallur, lie in earthquake zone III, 
which is a moderate damage risk zone. Cuddalore lies in zone II, which is a low damage 
risk zone (see map 5).  
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Map 5: Tamil Nadu earthquake zones 
(Source: Dr. J. Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005) 
Map 6: Tamil Nadu wind and cyclone zones 
(Source: Dr. J. Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005) 
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On the other hand, in terms of cyclones and winds, Chennai, Cuddalore, 
Kancheepuram, and Thiruvallur lie in a very high damage risk zone, whereas 
Kanniyakumari and The Nilgiris lie in a moderate damage risk zone (see map 6 above) 
(Arya, 2005; GoI, 2001; GoI-UNDP, 2005).  
In this State, 480 people live per sq. km, which is 25% of the population 
(Statistical Handbook, 2004c). Therefore, a significant loss of lives may take place in the 
event of an earthquake or cyclone. In addition to the geographical position of the state 
and its physical location on the coast, the high density of population along the coast 
makes it a high-risk area for considerable damage and loss of life in the event of a 
disaster.  
This State also houses 1,642,497 disabled people, of which 945,019 are from rural 
areas (Statistical Handbook, 2004d), which in all probability are rural areas around the 
coastal regions. In addition, 26% of the population of Tamil Nadu is below the age of 14 
years, and 8.52 % is above the age of 60 years (Statistical Handbook, 2004e). These 
populations are vulnerable during a disaster due to their inability to move away from 
areas of danger.  
A Hazard Assessment of Nagapattinam 
The following analysis will reveal the high degree of risk to people and the 
vulnerability of the District of Nagapattinam. In 1952, 400 deaths occurred in 
Nagapattinam on account of a VSCS (Very Severe Cyclonic Storm). In 1977, a cyclone 
left 1 million homeless and accounted for 560 deaths in Nagapattinam (IMD, 2005; EM-
DAT, 2005). Heavy rainfall in November 1991 left 300 persons dead (Dr. J. 
Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005). The District of Nagapattinam 
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recorded 996 accidents with 115 deaths for the year 2004 (Statistical Handbook, 2004f). 
The tsunami of December 26, 2004, left at least 6,065 dead, 791 missing, and 1,733 
injured in this district, accounting for 76% of the death toll in the state. In short, the 
District of Nagapattinam bore the brunt of the Indian Ocean Tsunami within India (Dr. J. 
Radhakrishnan, personal communication, May 9, 2005). 
Hazard Analysis 
Risk and Vulnerability 
 The District of Nagapattinam lies in earthquake zone II, which is a low risk zone, 
but it lies in a zone VI in terms of intensity. According to the MSK intensity scale, this 
means that the force would be strong and may induce fright into individuals (Jain, 1998). 
It would also be strong enough to damage masonry and cause cracks in soft ground. This 
district lies in a moderate damage risk zone in terms of winds and cyclones, as well 
(Arya, 2005; GoI-UNDP, 2005). It is considered at low risk for earthquakes, but lies in a 
moderate damage risk zone in terms of cyclones due to its position on the Eastern Coast 
of India and its susceptibility to the onslaught of the monsoons (Arya, 2005; GoI-UNDP, 
2005). This district has an area of 2,715 sq. km and 1-2 million people live here 
(Government of Tamil Nadu, 2005). With a low to moderate risk of a natural disaster 
taking place, people are extremely vulnerable.  
  When a total population of 1,487,055 persons is compared to the total number of 
beds in the hospitals in the district, the ratio of persons to the number of beds is 1,533. 
The ratio of people in the area to the doctors is more than 29,000 (Statistical Handbook, 
2004g). This ratio places people at high risk in the event of a disaster, because it means 
that medical attention may be insufficient. In addition, close to 51,000 people in this 
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district are disabled (bind, deaf, orthopedically handicapped and/or mentally challenged) 
(Statistical Handbook, 2004d).  
 The pilgrim town of Velankanni in Nagapattinam attracted 333,645 tourists from 
within India and 7,372 tourists from abroad during the year 2004 (Statistical Handbook, 
2004h). Tourists are considered vulnerable populations during a disaster because of their 
limited knowledge of the local availability of resources and their inability to speak the 
local language (Drabek, 1996). Another group of populations that lie in the vulnerable 
zones of disasters are the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. This district has a 
population of 44,123 scheduled castes and 3,420 scheduled tribes (Statistical Handbook, 
2004c). Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are the historically disadvantaged sections 
of society in India. They are commonly called dalits or adivasis within the Hindu 
Caste System and are relegated to menial labor. Their limited knowledge of available 
resources, primitive ways of living, and lack of education leads to their vulnerability. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 Populations at risk from natural hazards are disproportionately vulnerable based 
on socio-economic levels of subsistence and the areas in which they reside. Flood plains 
and deltas offer cheaper housing facilities and lower land values and represent places 
which the poor can afford. Inhabiting these areas leaves them vulnerable to the forces of 
nature and hence at a higher risk during a natural disaster. Vulnerable populations also 
include children and women who cannot escape fast enough, and the disabled and 
elderly, who experience difficulties moving to places of safety. India is a country where 
the pressure of population on land, coupled with significant disaster risks, places large 
numbers of people at considerable risk.  
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 We now turn to a specific event, the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. The 
following analysis of the tsunami will reveal instances of emergent behavior that 
appeared to meet and manage massive disaster needs. Emergence is analyzed at the State, 
District, Municipal, Local and Non-Government Organization levels in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I have used Spradleys Developmental Research Sequence (DRS) 
to identify the process of emergence. The DRS requires the researcher to develop domain 
and taxonomic analyses as a way to focus the data. In order to focus the data, I examined 
the transcripted interviews, documents, and other materials gathered during the field 
research. The developmental research sequence directs the researcher to examine the data 
for domains that may exist relevant to the research topic.  For instance, I searched for 
strict inclusion domains within the data.  Strict Inclusion domains reflect categories of 
similar items, described by Spradley as kinds or types of activities or behaviors.  For 
example, I searched the data to look for kinds of tasks.  Similarly, a rationale domain 
analysis seeks to understand the reasons why a particular action was taken.  In short, 
domain analysis is a way to search for patterns and regularities in the data under certain 
rubrics.  Taxonomic analysis shows how the domains relate to each other.  A taxonomic 
analysis may collate several related domains into a form, not unlike an outline organized 
topically.  
This chapter examines emergence in terms of new structures and tasks at the 
State, District, Municipal, Local, and Non-Government Organization (NGO) levels. The 
process of emergence is illustrated through examples related to search and rescue and
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mass fatality management. A number of examples will look specifically at body handling 
due to the magnitude of this effort and because body handling was designated as the top 
priority in the first seven days after the tsunami. 
State Level Emergence 
Introduction to the IAS 
 Emergence at the State level can only be understood once a clear understanding 
of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is achieved. The IAS officers are the finest 
members of the Indian Civil Services with advanced knowledge in all fields from 
literature to medicine. They are highly qualified individuals with advanced degrees and 
outstanding managerial skills. Due to their capacity to make informed and independent 
decisions, IAS officers are a powerful arm of the executive government. Their daily 
routine is primarily concerned with supervision. They hold high ranking positions as 
policy makers within the bureaucracy. IAS officers are routinely transferred from one 
department to another based on their seniority in the services. They hold positions from 
District Collectors to Cabinet level Secretaries within the Indian bureaucratic system. A 
disaster with the magnitude of the tsunami had never occurred in the State of Tamil 
Nadu. Therefore, the role of IAS officers in disasters was not defined prior to the 
tsunami. Disaster management activities in terms of cyclones, droughts, and floods in 
Tamil Nadu, are generally handled by the Joint Revenue Commissioner of the State and 
not IAS officers.  
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Emergent Structure 
Overview 
 The Indian Ocean Tsunami brought about an unprecedented need to rearrange the 
structure of the IAS officers and place them in charge of officials from the District and 
Municipal levels. The State placed IAS officers in charge of these officials to tackle the 
sheer size of the problem, even though the IAS officers may never have had prior 
relationships with them. 
 In the State level of analysis I will discuss the new structure of IAS teams 
introduced three days after the tsunami. I will discuss the steps taken (a sequential 
domain analysis) and the rationales for (a rationale domain analysis) the new structure. In 
this section I will describe emergent tasks and the division of labor that emerged among 
team members. Next, I will describe the priorities of IAS teams. Then, I will identify the 
emergent relationships and communication network due to the new structure and tasks. 
Finally, I will conclude this section with an analysis of the process of emergence at the 
State level. Thereby, I will provide significant evidence for emergent phenomena at the 
State level after the Indian Ocean Tsunami. 
Developing a New Structure 
 
Cover 
Term 
Emergent 
IAS Team Normal Tasks Emergent Tasks 
Included 
Terms 
Project Officer 
District Rural 
Development 
Agency 
Implements the various schemes of the 
government for rural welfare in the district 
 
Assisted Team 
Leaders and 
ministers 
Deputy 
Collector 
Assists the Collector with revenue 
distribution 
Logistics functions 
Figure 2: Emergent IAS Teams 
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Electricity 
Board 
Officials 
 
Deals primarily with supervision of 
electrification issues of villages and towns 
In charge of 
Electrical special 
task force in the 
field 
Water and 
Drainage 
Board 
Deals with supervision of water and drainage 
issues of villages and towns 
In charge of Water 
task force in the 
field 
Public Work 
Department 
water 
resources 
Maintenance, Repair and Preservation of 
public assets like roads, highways etc 
Brought in earth 
movers for body 
recovery and debris 
clearance 
Block 
Development 
Officer 
Deals with development issues related to 
blocks within the districts 
In charge of 
restoration of 
villages 
Municipal 
Commissioner 
 
In charge of maintenance of all public access 
roads and highways, registers births and 
deaths, water and sanitation issues 
Dead body disposal 
and sanitation  
Highways 
Officials 
In charge of maintenance and repair of roads 
and bridges 
Assisted with 
debris clearance 
Doctor from 
Public Health 
department 
Works in government hospitals Lead a medical task 
force for triaging in 
the field 
Fisheries 
Inspector 
 
In charge of fishing related activities Dealt with issues 
relating to damaged 
boats and nets 
Deputy 
Superintendent 
of Police and 
Fire and rescue 
official. 
Responsible for maintaining law and order In charge of police 
strike teams; to 
photograph bodies 
  
 Figure 2 provides a descriptive analysis of the new structure that formed three 
days after the tsunami. The new structure appeared emergent in nature because it 
emerged without prior planning and dissolved after the crisis ended. In order to 
understand why this structure emerged, who formed team members, and why they were 
chosen, it is now necessary to explain the steps (a sequential domain analysis) taken prior 
to the formation of IAS teams. Following the sequential domain analysis is a description 
of the tasks of each team member as outlined in Figure 2.  
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Step 1  Recognizing the problem 
 On the day of the impact, senior IAS officers conducted air reconnaissance to 
visualize the extent of the devastation. Initially, the State Administration identified the 
areas of Cuddalore and Kalpakkam (which houses a nuclear power plant) as the worst 
affected. As one interviewee put it, we thought Cuddalore was the worst affected 
because I think thats the first place where the news started coming in But when the 
State Administration received reports of bodies numbering in the thousands in 
Nagapattinam, they realized that Nagapattinam suffered greater damage than Cuddalore.  
Three days into the disaster, the State continued to receive reports that huge boats 
weighing 10-15 tons blocked all access to villages through the main roads and bridges. In 
addition, the District Administration reported to the State government that the enormity 
of the problem exceeded the capacity of the District Administration to handle alone. As 
one interviewee stated, 
Then after 3rd day it was found that all though disposal of bodies was going on 
all this was not being done satisfactorily because it was such a huge place 1-2kms 
across, So that was the scale of the tragedy and with it  solely upon the District 
Administration, it was very difficult to ensure each and every place. 
  
The District Administration called upon the State governments resources because 
a) the district hospital (General Hospital) lacked the capacity to accommodate the bodies, 
b) the district lacked earth movers to clear the debris, c) they lacked a sufficient amount 
of fire fighters and police forces to handle the disaster, and d) they lacked authority to 
make quick and independent decisions. Finally, by December 29, when the State 
government identified the full scale of the disaster, they decided to send in high level 
teams that consisted of senior officers to deal with the relief activities.  
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 Therefore, by conducting a sequential domain analysis it can be stated that air 
reconnaissance, damage assessments, reports from the district, and death reports received 
by the State government spurred the need to form teams to enter the field. Thus, in 
accordance with the literature, emergence initially took place due to the severity of the 
disaster, the magnitude of impact, and the inaccessibility to the area most badly affected. 
Step 2- Centralizing authority 
After the State government received wireless reports from the District 
Administration (cell phone services were restored in 2-3 hours), they authorized a senior 
level IAS officer as the overall Incident Commander. As a Team Leader said, 
the way in which the organization of the Incident Command took place was 
 quite interesting in the sense that the Nagapattinam Collectorate had a senior 
 officer sitting there and she was the Incident Commander. 
 
Then the State assembled 11 teams with an IAS officer as Team Leader. The State 
appeared to select IAS officers as Team Leaders due to their ability to make spontaneous 
and independent decisions. As one interviewee said,  
Then it was decided that to reach each and every village, we need senior 
 officers at each and every place to coordinate relief, who can take on the spot 
 decisions instead of taking instructions from the district headquarters. 
  
A rationale domain analysis reveals that Team Leader selection at the State level 
also occurred because these IAS officers previously held District Collector positions in 
the Nagapattinam district. Hence, they knew the local domain, geography, and people. As 
interviewees said, 
People who have been collectors in the past in those areas were picked up to go 
in these areas and work because of their prior familiarity of the domain and the 
terrain. 
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I was asked to proceed to Nagapattinam district since I know the geography 
and the people and the schemes of the Government and also lets say the strength 
and weaknesses of the system 
   
Step 3- Mobilizing personnel 
A number of officials/experts from various other departments formed team 
members. A Minister or Board chairman supervised the teams sent to various locations 
across the state (see figure 2, p. 86). Team Leaders had complete freedom to choose the 
people to work with in their teams. They chose members in accordance with the tasks at 
hand. As one official said, we then in terms of choosing the organization, selecting 
people to work with us, mobilizing resources, we had absolute freedom. 
Step 4  Decentralizing authority 
 The Incident Commander divided the affected 73 villages between the 11 IAS 
teams and placed each team in charge of approximately 7 villages. The Incident 
Commander gave each team Rs 500,000, and the power to use the money as needed, but 
reminded the teams to keep the objectives in mind. The Incident Commander then placed 
the complete restoration of services and relief activities, in the assigned 7 villages, to the 
IAS team. As interviewees said, 
government did a superb job in decentralizing authority it was brilliant, 
authority, people, budget, everything at the district level so the people on the spot 
could make the decisions. 
 
 11 teams were made about 7 villages per team and they were taking decisions 
pertaining to those 7 villages without going up the ladder trying to get 
clearances. 
  
 So I was sent to Nagapattinam along with a batch of about 12 officers and I was 
 an area supervisor and I was given about 5-6 villages and ask to be completely in 
 charge of the relief and restoration of those areas. 
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Step 5- Division of Labor 
 
Division of labor and supervision followed the formation of teams. Ministers and 
Team Leaders supervised the teams in the field. Project officers of the Rural 
Development Agency assisted Team Leaders and Ministers in all field operations of the 
entire team. Team Leaders placed team members in charge of special task forces specific 
to their line of work (discussed further in emergent tasks section). For instance, water and 
drainage board officials led a water task force, and a doctor from the public health 
department led a medical task force. As one interviewee described the teams, 
We had an interdisciplinary team; that means each area officer had a team 
 working with us and it was interdisciplinary. We had a medical team; we had 
 dead body disposal and sanitation team under the charge of our municipal 
 commissioner and his team of sanitary officers. Then we had our block 
 development officer who was in charge of the restoration activities so they 
 adopted rural development and building roads. Then of course the Public Works 
 department and highways department were good at earth moving. 
 
Step 6 - Feedback 
 At 5:00 p.m. every evening, the Incident Commander held a debriefing session at 
the Collectorate. During this time, Team Leaders or Ministers reported the needs of their 
teams to the Incident Commander. The Incident Commander related the team needs to the 
NGOs and the Press. The Press then related the needs to the rest of the country or the 
world, and the NGOs related the needs to their donors for sponsorship. The Incident 
Commander also worked closely with the District Collector. In this way the feedback 
process led to the establishment of an emergent communication network in Nagapattinam 
(see figure 3 below).   
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Figure 3: Channel of Communication - Nagapattinam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In summary, the formation of IAS teams took place due to the officers power to 
make quick and independent decisions, their prior experience with the local geography 
and people, the enormity of the problem beyond what the district could handle alone, and 
unmet needs in the field. I will now discuss the emergent tasks of each team. 
Emergent Tasks 
 An explanation of new tasks and/or structures (listed in figure 2, p. 86) for each 
team member will now be discussed. Daily tasks, familiar structures, and routines of all 
IAS officers involved changed as they took on new roles and assignments. Authority 
appeared centralized initially but decentralized in the field. As stated earlier, IAS officers 
generally set policy and supervise tasks, but in this situation they acquired a new form of 
supervision through direct field experience. As one interviewee said,  
 We are a State level Office who set policy and supervision not direct 
 actionthat was an interesting piece of work, wherever we got direct field 
 experience and opportunity to work in the field, directly. 
District Collector 
Minister/11 IAS 
Team Leaders 
NGOs Press 
Incident 
Commander (IAS) 
Private 
Firms 
Rest of 
the 
country
Rest of 
the 
World
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Even though tasks of body disposal, debris clearance, and handling a catastrophic 
disaster the magnitude of the tsunami, appeared new to the IAS officers, they felt that 
their knowledge and managerial skills enabled them to deal with the situation. As one 
interviewee said, .these were non-routine tasks outside the job, but training equips us 
to handle the tasks; we should be able to deliver the goods  
 Routinely, Project officers are in charge of implementing the schemes of the 
government in rural welfare issues. However, in this context they primarily assisted the 
Team Leaders.  The Deputy Collector at the District level usually assists the District 
Collector with revenue distribution. But he received logistics tasks after the new structure 
emerged. Experts from individual departments supervised special task forces. For 
example, electricity, water and drainage board officials led task forces into the affected 
area to deal with emergent electrification, water and drainage tasks generated by the 
tsunami. On a daily basis these officials perform supervisory functions from their offices, 
but in this case they supervised their respective task forces in the field. With the new 
structure and task arrangement, Team Leaders placed a Public Works Department (PWD) 
officer in charge of procuring earth movers for body recovery and debris clearance. The 
PWD is usually responsible for maintenance, repair, and preservation of public access 
roads and highways. Team Leaders placed the Municipal Commissioner, and his team of 
sanitary workers, in charge of dead body disposal and sanitation issues. On a daily basis a 
Municipal Commissioner is concerned with all issues that pertain to the public, e.g. roads 
and highways, births and deaths.  
Highways Department officials experienced emergent unplanned tasks in terms of 
debris clearance. Highways department officials are usually involved with maintenance 
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and repair of roads and bridges. A doctor from the health department led medical task 
forces to deal with on-the-spot triaging of patients. The task appeared emergent because 
the doctor, instead of tending to patients, actually supervised the medical task force in its 
operations. Team Leaders placed a Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge of 
overseeing the operations of police strike teams. Police strike teams photographed the 
body upon recovery, an emergent disaster-generated task for these teams. 
The above description summarizes the emergent tasks of team members in the 
IAS teams. Now I will discuss emergent processes used to deal with the emergent tasks 
generated by the disaster. 
Emergent Processes 
As an example of new tasks consider how the IAS officers handled the body 
disposal process. As soon as they found a body, sequential domain analysis reveals that a) 
the police member photographed the body, b) a doctor conducted the post mortem (post 
mortems were stopped by the hospital during the first two days, but began again after the 
third day), c) a revenue official handled the compensation, and d) sanitation workers 
buried the body and recorded the location.  As one interviewee said, 
Wherever they see the body, the doctor will identify, police will take the 
photograph and revenue people they do the compensation, the municipal; they dig 
the graves and bury 
 
IAS teams established priority tasks in the field in addition to the emergent 
processes to deal with bodies. Next, I will discuss the tasks of IAS teams, in what 
appeared to be their priority during the first few days after impact. 
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Priorities of IAS Teams 
 The Incident Commander and Team Leaders formulated the priorities of each 
team in the field. They considered disposal of bodies as the primary task, followed by 
debris clearance as a second priority, and NGO coordination as the third priority. Debris 
clearance appeared to be a necessary step to dispose of bodies. NGO coordination 
appeared paramount because NGOs provided the necessary resources for teams in the 
field. I will now discuss emergent tasks in what appeared to be their order of priority. 
Disposal of Bodies 
 The primary task of all teams was to dispose of the dead. As one interviewee 
stated, our first priority was in terms of the deadhow do we dispose of those dead 
bodies? 
 
Cover Term IAS Team Emergent Body Handling 
Included Terms 
Identify the dead 
• Photograph the identified 
• Record the identified in a database 
 
Photograph the unidentified 
• Record the unidentified in a 
database 
• Trace the unidentified 
• Display photographs in 
kiosks 
• Display photographs on 
police websites 
Body disposal 
• Mass graves 
• Cremations 
 
 The above taxonomic classification of body handling in figure 4 is important for 
purposes of compensation. The taxonomy outlines a newly prioritized emergent task, 
Figure 4: IAS Team Emergent Body Handling 
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within an emergent structure at the State level. As one interviewee said, The government 
was very keen on maintaining a database as every person who dies has to be given 
compensation.  
 In order to accomplish the primary emergent task of body disposal, IAS officers 
developed a procedure to identify and record the recovered bodies. This procedure is 
outlined below. 
Procedures for Body Identification 
1) Kiosks (usually set up with colored cloth and bamboos into a tent-like 
structure) set up by the State Administration, displayed photographs of the unidentified 
so that people from out of town could identify their loved ones.  
2) The State Administration created a specific web address, located on the 
Nagapattinam Police website. The web address served to trace the dead, missing, and 
injured people. 
3)  Anna University assisted the governments Information Technology 
Department and set up a database to record the dead and unidentified. Unidentified 
bodies suffered intense putrification and turned black, placing them beyond recognition. 
But software offered by Anna University, matched any photograph to the dead person 
with a 99% success rate. This technology greatly assisted the body identification process 
for all teams in the field. It facilitated the efficiency of the relief operations as bodies 
could be identified immediately and handed over to relatives. As an interviewee said, A 
very large percentage of people we were able to identify by the help of this technology   
Therefore, while the Police website facilitated body identification of people from 
out of town, the software of Anna University facilitated body identification in the field. A 
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marked division of labor is visible in terms of body identification and handling by the 
State Administration.  I will now discuss the emergent task of debris clearance, identified 
by the IAS teams as their second priority. 
Debris Clearance 
 In order to accomplish the primary task of body disposal, the State Administration 
had to clear debris because access roads and bridges into the villages remained blocked. 
Boats weighing ten or fifteen tons had lodged on primary roads and bridges and blocked 
all access into the villages. As one interviewee said, boats were packed like sardines 
on access roads and there was no way you could go in  Therefore, the State 
Administration mobilized resources from NGOs and requested earthmoving equipment in 
the field. Finally, the State Administration engaged 30 Poclains, 69 JCBs (a type of 
excavator), 64 lorries, 14 bulldozers, and 13 cranes in the entire operation, primarily for 
the extrication of mangled bodies from the debris. As one interviewee said,  
 Some of these areas were so jam packed, like, a whole lot of boats crushed 
 together. And we knew that there are like, 7-8 dead bodies there because we could 
 see a little bit but there was no way you could go there, I mean even if you  went 
 there, there was no way to put the boats apart. 
 
 Following debris clearance, IAS teams identified coordination of NGOs as 
another priority. Next, I will discuss the third priority of IAS teams, NGO coordination. 
NGO Coordination  
 The District Administration established an NGO coordination center at the 
Collectorate from the day of impact. Once the IAS teams arrived in the field on the third 
day, they coordinated their efforts with NGOs. They made the NGOs responsible to 
procure the necessary relief materials from around the country and abroad. As one 
interviewee discussed some of the field requests that NGOs received,  
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 in the very early stages there was the need for earth movers, ours was the first 
 one there to help with the removal of bodies and the other thing was the 
 requests for white cloth to wrap the bodies. 
  
 In the same week, NGOs that worked in Gujarat after the earthquake assisted the 
response effort and the IAS teams too. They brought their experience and knowledge to 
the field. For example, NGOs brought chemicals called Cellrich to Tamil Nadu to speed 
body decomposition in mass graves because it proved helpful in Gujarat. As another 
interviewee said, 
 We got this component called cellrich, its a chemical which helped them 
 decompose the bodies at a faster rate we learned from Gujarat. 
 
 NGOs also maintained databases of the relief supplies received and dispatched to 
various areas for logistical purposes. The databases helped to avoid the duplication of 
relief materials and effort. As another interviewee described the process,  
we created a web based inventory here, so as and when material was coming 
in, we were sorting it out and updating inventories, collectors were able to see it 
in the districts and what they wanted they could just take  
  
 The new structure and tasks that appeared at the State level spurred new forms of 
communication between officials and, therefore, new relationships developed as well. 
Next, I describe the emergent relationships and new communication network. 
Emergent Relationships 
New and emergent relationships formed at the State level between and among 
officers due to the formation of the IAS teams. An attributional domain analysis revealed 
the following relational characteristics of the emergent IAS teams, outlined in figure 5. It 
is worth noting that these were unprecedented types of work relationships in a magnitude 
and type of event not seen before in this setting. 
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Figure 5: Emergent Relationships in IAS Teams  
New Forms of Communication 
 Information flowed freely up and down the channel of communication (see figure 
3, p. 92) between IAS teams, team members, and the Incident Commander. Each team 
assembled each night for a debriefing session and related their needs to the Incident 
Commander in charge of all 11 teams. As one interviewee stated, 
daily there used to be review meetings where we used to come back and report 
back on what were the needs for the day, resources, manpower, money which 
required intervention  
 
The Incident Commander communicated these needs to the Press and to NGOs 
who procured the material required in the field. Therefore, the Incident Commander, 
through the emergent channel of communication, handled the emergent tasks and 
structures. The Incident Commander, by virtue of seniority and experience as well as 
number of years in the services, received the anticipated respect from junior level 
officers. Respect for seniority allowed the smooth flow of information and an emergent 
authority structure.  
Cover Term Emergent Relationships in IAS Teams 
Included Terms Incident Commander and IAS Team Leaders 
IAS Team Leaders and Team members 
IAS Team Leaders and District Officials 
• District Level Task Forces 
IAS Team Leaders and Municipal Officials 
• Municipal Level Task Forces 
IAS Team Leaders and Police Officials 
• Police Task Forces 
IAS Team Leaders and NGOs 
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Recognition 
Centralization 
Mobilization 
Decentralization 
Feedback 
Figure 6: Process of Emergence 
Next, I will discuss what appeared to be the process of emergence. I have used 
sequential domain analyses to delineate the process below. 
The Process of Emergence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recognition 
 In figure 6, sequential domain analysis reveals that the process of emergence 
seemed to involve a series of steps or stages. In the first stage, the State Administration 
recognized the extent of the situation. The State assessed the situation through air 
reconnaissance, damage assessments, district reports, and death reports. The District 
Administration facilitated air reconnaissance and damage assessments, conducted by 
senior IAS officers on the same day as the disaster, by identifying the worst hit areas in 
the district.  
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Centralization 
 In the second stage, the State Administration centralized authority. The State 
government placed the response effort under a senior level State Secretary named the 
Incident Commander (discussed in Step 2, p. 89). The Incident Commander doubled up 
as operations chief and planning chief and provided for a single management system for 
all multi-jurisdictional efforts. The State then divided the affected 73 villages into 11 
zones with approximately 7 villages in each zone. Then the State government created 11 
IAS teams, comprising of senior IAS officers as Team Leaders, to handle each zone 
under the Incident Commander.  
Mobilization 
The third stage involved the mobilization of resources and personnel for each of 
the self-contained IAS teams. The Incident Commander mobilized resources before the 
teams could enter the field and even along the road into the affected areas. The 
mobilization of resources occurred from various sectors. The State provided equipment 
and materials. NGOs mobilized resources through their external connections. 
Neighboring districts supplied earth moving equipment, and private firms also supplied 
materials. IAS teams mobilized resources, such as earth movers, excavators, cranes, and 
bulldozers in order to clear debris and recover bodies.  
Team members brought in their experience and capacity along with manpower 
and resources under their control. The Incident Commander mobilized funds to each 
team. Each team received Rs 500,000 in cash to make necessary monetary decisions in 
the field. Team Leaders also had flexibility and freedom while mobilizing their team 
members. As an interviewee stated, 
 102
So we had absolute freedom, we then in terms of choosing the organization, 
selecting people to work with us, mobilizing resources with the financial resource 
around to play around with. We had absolute freedom and if at all anything had 
to be faulted it was only us. 
 
Decentralization 
 The fourth stage involved decentralizing authority to each Team Leader to ensure 
that on-the-spot decisions could be made. As one interviewee said,  
government did a superb job in decentralizing authority it was brilliant, 
authority, people, budget, everything at the district level so the people on the spot 
could make the decisions. 
 
In order to accomplish on-the-spot decision making, the Incident Commander 
empowered each team with Rs 500,000 in cash and autonomy of utilization. During 
normal times, the Indian Bureaucracy must ensure transparency of all monetary issues. In 
this context, however, transparency was not the issue. The Incident Commander 
instructed Team Leaders to spend the allocated money freely and bring the situation back 
to normal as soon as possible. As another interviewee said, 
normally when you spend public money you ought to follow some procedures 
 about you know transparency and you know you have to get an allocation, you 
 have to protect the project, this being a natural disaster, funds were just given to 
 spend it, make sure things get back to normal. 
 
Generally, policy, decision-making, and delegation are difficult in a bureaucracy 
because paperwork absorbs an enormous amount of time. In addition, rules and 
regulations hinder effective and efficient government. However, in Nagapattinam each 
Team Leader possessed the authority to make independent decisions pertaining to their 
team and assigned villages. I interviewed mostly Team Leaders and they remarked that 
they had never seen the government work as efficiently as they had seen in 
Nagapattinam. As one interviewee said,  
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the bureaucratic response was enormous, generally in government, delegation 
is slightly difficult, you are stuck in rules and regulations but this didnt happen 
this time, we were given a free hand like each team was given Rs 500,000 cash 
and said do whatever you want to do but keep the objectives in mind then go 
ahead. 
 
Feedback 
 The fifth stage involved feedback at the end of every day to the Incident 
Commander, who in turn procured the necessary goods and services through various 
channels of communication (see figure 3, p. 92). For example, the daily debriefing every 
night allowed Team Leaders to return their field requests to the Incident Commander. 
The Incident Commander then, facilitated by NGOs and the Press, procured the items 
requested for body disposal and debris clearance. 
 I will now discuss emergence at the District level. In this level of analysis I will 
first provide an overview. Next, I will discuss the emergent structure and tasks that 
appeared at the District level. 
District Level Emergence 
 This section of the analysis deals with emergence that occurred at the District 
level. I analyzed data gathered at the General Hospital, police and fire stations. This 
section begins with an introduction and recognition of the problem. Next, I discuss the 
emergent structure that appeared when the District Collector took charge of the overall 
response and directed the actions of all responding organizations. Under normal 
circumstances the Municipal authorities report to the District authorities and the District 
authorities report to the State government. The local General Hospital reports directly to 
the Director of Medical Services in the Capital city of Chennai. Police and fire officials in 
Nagapattinam report to the District Administration for supervisory advice. 
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 This section also identifies emergent tasks handled by the General Hospital and 
police and fire personnel. It also identifies emergent processes that occurred at the 
General Hospital to deal with the emergent tasks. This section will lead into emergence at 
the Municipal level. 
Introduction 
 The Municipal Commissioner declared to the District Collector that the tsunami 
had struck. Initially district officials thought that mainly animals had died. But after 30 to 
40 minutes, they received reports about the numerous bodies delivered to the General 
Hospital. In addition, district officials realized that boats weighing ten to fifteen tons had 
lodged on roads and bridges and cut of all access to villages. Therefore, the District 
Administration realized that due to the extent of the damage and the lack of accessibility 
to the badly affected areas, the initial response was left up to them for the first few days. 
The State government could not gain immediate access to the area because a primary 
bridge that links the north of the area to the south, had collapsed.  In addition, the State 
governments head offices are located at the Capital city of Chennai, 334 km away from 
the District of Nagapattinam. As one interviewee remarked, 
 there is bridge which connects this part of Nagapattinam to the northern part 
 of the district, that bridge also got washed away in tsunami. 
 
The present District Collector of Nagapattinam then traveled from Thanjavur 
district (a neighboring district to the west of Nagapattinam) to Nagapattinam and reached 
the affected area by 12 p.m. on December 26. The District Collector immediately took 
over all District level coordination. As District level officials said,  
 District Collector from Thanjavur who is now the present collector, he also 
 rushed by 12 oclock it seems immediately after hearing this news and joined with 
 our Collector they took over the whole District Administration and was effectively 
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 coordinating in between departments like if there is the transport corporation, fire 
 service and local public started coming for help. 
 
 Collectors basically acted as the nodal, relief and rescue operations 
 coordinating with the police, the fire and rescue services, medical and health 
 services and other departments. 
 
After providing an overview, I will now discuss the emergent structure that 
appeared to develop at the District level in Nagapattinam. 
Emergent Structure 
 
  
  
Figure 7 illustrates the overall coordination procedure adopted by the District 
Collector from Thanjavur once he reached the affected area. Generally, the responding 
departments, such as police, fire, rescue, health and other departments, function 
independently and the District Collector coordinates them. However, in this instance the 
newly-arriving District Collector did not only coordinate the responding departments, but 
directed their actions. The District Collector provided direction to the responding 
departments in search and rescue work, and body recovery during the first few days after 
District 
Collector 
Fire 
Police 
Rescue 
Services 
Medical and 
Health 
Services 
Other 
Departments
Figure 7: District Collector Coordination
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impact and before the IAS teams arrived in Nagapattinam. Thus, along with a new 
structure, new relationships also developed on the day of impact between the responding 
departments and the newly arrived District Collector. 
 Nonetheless, the District Administration soon realized that the magnitude of the 
disaster exceeded the scope of the emergent structure discussed above, because the 
district lacked resources.  Furthermore, because fire, police, and search and rescue 
officials  received instructions from the district headquarters, the rescue effort slowed 
down. Therefore, since IAS officers possessed the capability to make on-the-spot 
decisions, their presence in the field became imperative. As another interviewee said, 
 So that was the scale of the tragedy and with solely upon the district 
 administration, it was very difficult to ensure each and every place. Then here it 
 was decided, that to reach each and every village, we need senior officers at each 
 and every place to coordinate relief, who can take on the spot decisions instead of 
 taking instructions from the district headquarters. 
 
Once IAS teams arrived in the field, three days after the tsunami on December 29, 
Superintendents from the fire and police departments joined the IAS teams. Team 
Leaders made Superintendents of these departments members, while police officers, 
constables and fire fighters constituted strike teams under their Superintendent. 
Therefore, a structural change emerged as Superintendents reported to the Incident 
Commander at each daily debriefing session, and to the Team Leader while in the field. 
Figure 2 (p. 86) illustrates the emergent structure that appeared when IAS teams entered 
Nagapattinam and took over all District and Municipal level response. I will now discuss 
emergent tasks at the General Hospital, and police and fire departments. I will also 
discuss emergent processes used at the General Hospital to handle the magnitude of the 
event. 
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Photo 3: Nagapattinam Hospital sustained extensive damage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emergent Tasks 
The General Hospital 
 The Nagapattinam General Hospital sustained damages due to its nearness to the 
coast, but continued functioning in its available capacity (see photo 3). Within hours from 
the impact, police, fire, revenue officials, and locals brought bodies into the hospital. The 
doctors initiated post mortems, but when bodies numbered in the hundreds, post mortems 
became difficult and doctors stopped them. As another official said, 
 Nagapattinam General Hospital was also badly hit, lot of water has come inside 
 and it has suffered very heavy damage in spite of that a part of it was functioning 
 and people were coming in with bodies and then post mortem was done and it was 
 being handed over to relatives. Then it was found that there are so many bodies 
 that post mortem is not an option, its better not to be done 
 
 
 
Cover Term Hospital Level Emergent Body Handling 
Included Terms Receive bodies in large numbers 
 
Find space to lay out bodies 
 
Post mortem if body appears injured 
 
Declare Dead 
 
Figure 8: Hospital Level Emergent Body Handling 
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Hand over to relatives or municipal 
authorities 
 
 
 Figure 8 describes the emergent body handling tasks faced by the Hospital 
Administration. Their primary tasks included: a) receive bodies, in numbers far beyond 
the capacity of the hospital to accommodate; b) find space to lay out the bodies, because 
the morgue proved insufficient; c) conduct post mortem if the body appeared injured; d) 
declare the body dead; and e) hand it over to the relatives or the municipality. 
 Next, I discuss emergent tasks of the police and fire departments. This section is 
followed by a section on the emergent processes developed by the General Hospital to 
deal with the large numbers of bodies. 
Police and Fire Departments 
 
Immediately after impact, police personnel arrived with bodies at the 
Nagapattinam General Hospital. When bodies numbered in the hundreds, it became 
virtually impossible for the 7 doctors on duty to handle the numbers. So police personnel, 
using police jeeps, went to the neighboring districts to each doctors house and brought 
the doctors in to the hospital. Therefore, they experienced a non-regular task. Fire 
personnel removed slush from inside the hospital wards because they possessed the 
necessary equipment for the task.   
When IAS teams arrived in the field on December 29, they absorbed police and 
fire personnel into strike teams under their respective Superintendents on the team (see 
figure 2, p. 86). The priorities for police and fire personnel then became handling and 
burying hundreds of dead people. Therefore, police and fire personnel experienced 
another non-regular task. 
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Emergent Processes 
 
 A number of new processes emerged to deal with the unprecedented scale of the 
disaster. The following is a sequential domain analysis of the emergent triage system, 
post mortem system, temporary morgue development, and handing over of body systems 
utilized. 
Triage System 
 The hospital had 3 teams, 1 spot (field) team, 1 mobile (transportation) team and 1 
static (fixed) team. Each team consisted of a surgeon, an anesthetist, a physician, a 
gynecologist, staff nurses, and male and female nursing assistants in charge of triaging 
victims. The spot teams triaged bodies on-the-spot with black for dead and red for serious 
conditions. If the body looked black and bloated, doctors declared the person dead due to 
the tsunami. But if the body had head injuries or other bodily injuries, the doctors carried 
out post mortems. Once the doctors declared the person dead or completed post mortems, 
the hospital staff handed over the body to relatives or the municipality.  
 While hospital teams triaged persons in the field, rescuers continuously brought 
bodies into the General Hospital. I will now discuss the emergent post mortem system 
that appeared to handle the bodies delivered to the General Hospital. 
Post Mortem System 
 Due to the magnitude of the disaster, 750 bodies arrived at the hospital on the first 
day. The Hospital Administration consulted their superiors because it became physically 
impossible to conduct normal post mortem procedures on every single body. After 
consultation, officials decided to stop post mortems unless the body appeared injured or if 
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doctors suspected foul play. Doctors declared the bodies dead through emergent post 
mortem procedures. Emergent post mortem procedures are discussed below.  
Normal post mortem procedures changed in terms of identification of the cause of 
death. Generally, post mortems involve medical techniques of identification. However, 
because bodies numbered in the hundreds, the color, the structure, and the shape of the 
body emerged as the new post mortem method. As one respondent said, so post 
mortem was met like this handling the bodies, color of the bodies, structure of the bodies 
and from the shape of the bodies 
Along with emergent post mortem procedures, the General Hospital also initiated 
the development of a temporary morgue system. This system, while emergent, enabled 
the storage of bodies for later identification and burial. I will now discuss the emergent 
temporary morgue development process. 
Temporary Morgue Development 
 The Nagapattinam General Hospital is located approximately 1 km from the sea 
shore. The tsunami destroyed 50 out of its 55 buildings, leaving only 5 buildings standing 
to accommodate patients and bodies. In addition, the hospital has a carrying capacity of 
approximately 350 patients, but on the day of impact the hospital received 750 bodies. 
Therefore, the Hospital Administration converted the steam laundry into a temporary 
morgue because there was no room available to keep the bodies. As hospital officials 
said,  
 There is no place to keep the bodies; the steam laundry is a very big area so 
we kept the bodies there. By 6 oclock 750 bodies were received. 
 
There is one big hall in our hospital which was created for steam laundry, which 
was under construction, the building was vacant so we kept all the bodies there. 
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 Due to shortage of space, the staff laid out bodies temporarily in the general 
pathways inside the hospital, in offices, and outside the residence of the hospital 
Superintendent. The General Hospital handed over unidentified bodies to the municipal 
authorities, a procedure that appeared emergent in Nagapattinam. This procedure is 
discussed next. 
Handing over bodies 
 Routinely, the General Hospital hands over bodies to relatives, once the cause of 
death is identified, or to the police in the event of any foul play. On the day of impact, 
however, the hospital handed over identified bodies to the relatives when they declared 
the person dead due to natural disaster. The hospital handed over unidentified bodies to 
the municipality (sanitary workers handled bodies). Figure 9 below, illustrates to who and 
how the hospital hands over bodies during normal and disaster times. 
 
Hospital Level Handing Over of Bodies 
Normal Times Disaster Times 
Relatives  once cause of 
death is identified 
Relatives  once bodies are 
identified and declared dead 
due to natural disaster 
Police  If post mortems 
reveal foul play 
Municipal authorities  if 
unidentified 
 
 Next, I will discuss emergence at the Municipal level. I will provide an 
introduction and then discuss emergent structures and tasks that appeared. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Hospital Level  Handing over of bodies 
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Municipal Level Emergence 
This section begins with an introduction of emergence at the Municipal level. The 
emergent structures will be discussed, followed by emergent tasks experienced by 
municipal officials in terms of body handling and disposal.  
Introduction 
As stated before, the Municipal Commissioner conveyed the message to the 
District Collector that a tsunami had struck the coast. The municipal authorities then 
received reports that the number of bodies at the Nagapattinam General Hospital had 
exceeded the capacity of the hospital to accommodate.  So municipal authorities activated 
sanitary workers present in the area to help with body disposal. For the municipal 
officials, body disposal appeared to be the primary emergent disaster-generated task. 
Therefore, along with emergent tasks, emergent structures also appeared. Next, I describe 
the emergent structure that appeared at the Municipal level in Nagapattinam. 
Emergent Structure 
Each district usually has its fair share of sanitary workers for removal of bodies in 
normal situations. But the tsunami disaster brought about an unprecedented need to 
mobilize sanitary workers from neighboring districts. The municipal authorities requested 
that the neighboring districts send sanitary workers and lorries to assist with recovery, 
disposal, and transportation of bodies because the resources within the state proved 
insufficient. Therefore, the district appeared to be overwhelmed by the situation which 
led to emergence. As a result, the influx of sanitary workers from neighboring districts 
placed the Municipal Commissioner in charge of workers with whom he may never have 
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had prior contact. Therefore, emergent relationships developed at the Municipal level. 
Next, I describe the emergent tasks handled at the Municipal level. 
Emergent Tasks 
Municipal officials are usually not concerned with the operations of the local 
General Hospital, other than in relation to policy issues of the district that may pertain to 
the hospital. However, in this situation, municipality officials received unidentified 
bodies from the General Hospital, photographed the unidentified bodies, and instructed 
sanitary workers to bury them in mass graves. These tasks appeared emergent as they are 
not consistent with the daily functioning of municipal authorities.  
 
 
Cover Term Municipal Level Emergent Body Handling 
Included Terms Procure Sanitary Workers 
 
Procure Lorries for transportation 
 
Procure JCBs for digging of mass graves 
 
Procure chemicals for fast decomposition 
 
Identify bodies and hand over to relatives 
 
Bury unidentified bodies  
 
Record all burial locations 
 
  
Figure 10 describes the various steps that emerged to manage the task of body 
handling as performed by the municipality. The municipality procured sanitary workers, 
lorries to transport the bodies, and JCBs (excavators) to excavate bodies mangled in the 
Figure 10: Municipal Level Emergent Body Handling 
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debris. The municipality also procured chemicals to decompose bodies faster. Normally, 
municipal workers do not handle the process of turning bodies over to families, nor do 
they dig mass graves or record burial locations.  These tasks fell upon them in the 
aftermath of the tsunami and, therefore, spurred a new set of relationships and activities. 
To address these emergent tasks and to accomplish their new activities, the 
Municipality of Nagapattinam requested sanitary workers and earth moving equipment 
from the neighboring municipalities. Sanitary workers manually dug the graves once they 
entered the affected areas. They buried 270 bodies under municipal supervision on the 
first day; another emergent task undertaken by municipal officials who are rarely 
concerned with direct field action. By nightfall, municipal authorities realized that JCBs 
may expedite the digging of mass graves because manual digging appeared to be a slow 
process. Therefore, once again the municipal authorities alerted the neighboring districts 
and asked them to send in excavators. Even though the municipality activated its own 
trucks and lorries for transportation of bodies to mass graves, they requested lorries from 
neighboring districts to supplement the effort.  
 The primary emergent task for municipal authorities appeared to be handling and 
disposing of dead bodies. Therefore, to accomplish this primary task municipal officials 
procured equipment from neighboring districts and managed the influx of sanitary 
workers. A secondary task involved debris clearance (see figure 10, p. 113, for emergent 
municipal level tasks).  
 On December 29, the third day since the disaster, the State level IAS teams 
reached the affected area. The IAS teams then took charge of all operations at the 
Municipal level. Hence, emergence in the form of designated structures changed as 
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Figure 11: Emergent Body Handling Tasks
municipal officials reported to the IAS Team Leaders, members, and specifically the 
Incident Commander (see figure 2, p. 86).  
 Through taxonomic analyses, a summary of the District and Municipal levels 
primary emergent task of body handling in terms of division of labor can be delineated 
below: 
 
 
Emergent Body Handling Tasks 
Task Emergent Division of Labor 
1. Locate the bodies Sanitary workers and Local 
officials 
2. Use earth movers to extricate the bodies Local officials 
3. Physically remove the bodies Sanitary Workers 
• Bury in situ Sanitary workers and Locals 
• Hand over to relatives Hospital Staff or Municipal 
officials 
         a. Identify Relatives 
         b. Bury/Cremate Sanitary workers of 
Relatives 
• Transport to the hospital Truck drivers from 
neighboring municipalities 
              a. Lorries Drivers 
              b. Mortuary Vans Drivers 
              c. Ambulances Hospital Staff 
4. Lay out bodies at the hospital for identification Sanitary workers and 
Hospital Staff 
5. Post mortem if there are appearances or injuries Doctors 
6. Declare the person dead Doctors 
7. Hand over the body to the municipal authorities Hospital Staff 
 
Given the above taxonomic analysis of emergent body handling tasks managed by 
the District and Municipal levels, I will now discuss emergence at the Local level. 
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Local Level Emergence 
  In all villages where I gathered data, it appeared that locals did almost all the 
rescue and relief work for the first three days after the tsunami. The fishing community 
and local volunteers began instantaneous search and rescue and body recovery activities 
within the first few hours after impact. Local volunteers consisting primarily of local 
fishermen, vendors, and community folk undertook the primary tasks of body recovery, 
removal, and disposal. During the first 3 days, specifically, in the villages of Akkrapettai 
and Keechankuppam, it appeared impossible for the administration to gain access to the 
area because huge boats weighing 10 to 15 tons blocked all access. In many instances it 
has been stated that,  
fishing communities work close, hand in hand with each other and in many 
districts they came forward in spite of having lost their houses, their belongings, 
their dear ones, they really came forward to help find out where the people were, 
to rescue any marooned people, to clear debris 
  
villagers at least realized that it would be impossible for the District 
Administration to individually attend to each dead bodythey decided that, we 
just have to start doing the burials ourselves in the first 48 hours whatever 
burials actually took place85-90% were private initiative.  
 
I think the awesomeness of the tragedy was so much that people were just 
allowed to take care of their dead themselves. 
  
 I will now discuss the structure and cultural context of local fishing communities 
in India. It is perhaps this structure, based on cultural ideals and friendship networks, that 
formed the basis of the local response at Nagapattinam.  
Introduction 
 Local fishing communities in India are highly structured with authority delineated 
at all levels. As one interviewee said, 
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one thing which is very strong about the fishermen community is that they 
exist as a community; they have a strong organization which is both federate, they 
have a local village committee, they call Panchayats. They have some financial 
resources also.  
 
Pre-existing social networks are the backbone of Indian society. People that are a 
part of these social networks respond to the call for help even on a daily basis. An 
extension of this network appeared in the villages at Nagapattinam as the scale of the 
disaster warranted group cohesion and community altruism. The villages of Akkarapettai 
and Keechankuppam are located to the south of Nagapattinam and are connected to the 
northern part of the district by a single bridge. This single bridge suffered intense damage 
by the tsunami which deterred all access into villages to the south of the district. 
The next section will discuss how local elders and Panchayat leaders led the 
emergent structure, with specific examples from the three hardest hit villages in terms of 
the number of dead. This section will discuss how emergent groups formed under the 
leadership of local elders and handled emergent body handling tasks. This section will 
also discuss the role of the church and the local merchant sector in body handling tasks. 
This section will be followed by a section that describes the emergent body handling and 
recovery tasks performed by the locals in the three hardest hit villages. 
Emergent Structures - Selected Examples 
Role of Local Elders and Panchayat Leaders 
 During normal times fishing communities are highly structured, as stated earlier, 
with a distinct hierarchy. Fishermen are very organized with village committees called 
Panchayats who report to area committees. Area committees in turn report to a central 
committee. Leaders of village committees along with the local village elders emerged as 
overall leaders of the emergent activities in the villages.  
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After the tsunami waves hit the villages, initially people ran away and hardly 
anyone stayed to do anything. However, after a few hours, locals started getting 
organized. With instructions from local elders and the heads of the local fishing 
Panchayats, the local males recovered bodies. The local males recovered bodies from 
streets, transported them to temporary locations, allowed relatives to identify and remove 
bodies, and buried the unidentified in mass graves. As an official said,  
The very initial disposal of the dead which took place was by the people, of the 
people themselves. The actual physical act of burial was done a) by the villagers 
which is of course all 100% fisher people. 
 
Another interviewee remarked, 
and of course when there is a major calamity of this nature lot of support 
comes from within the community like collecting the bodies and the burials. 
 
 The locals in this area had no prior search and rescue training and undertook the 
task of body recovery, removal, and disposal for the first time ever. As one respondent 
stated, in the last 60 years he has never seen any such training The local people 
organized a mass team effort among themselves because they realized that it appeared 
impossible for the District Administration to reach their villages. As one official stated, 
villagers at least realized that it would be impossible for the District Administration to 
individually attend to each dead body. Therefore, with advice from the village elders 
and fishing Panchayat leaders the locals coordinated and handled body recovery and 
disposal. As another official stated,  
They have elected fishermen Panchayat leaders who control their affairs so the 
organization of immediate relief and restoring some kind of normalcy in the 
villages has been quite fast 
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Role of the Parish and Youth Section 
Parishes in India generally organize the youth sections of their parishioners into 
groups for church related work on a daily basis. Church related work involves social 
work in villages, visits to the old age homes, and volunteering to feed the poor among a 
few. After the water receded in Velankanni, bodies lay strewn around on the streets. The 
youth sections of the diocese soon acted and recovered and collected bodies. Forty-five 
youths from the diocese used local tractors and church vehicles to collect bodies and 
brought them back to the temporary morgue, established in pandals (large structures built 
of bamboo and brightly colored cloth used as a venue of worship during festival times in 
India. Pandals are usually built on busy streets or thoroughfares). On December 27, a day 
after the disaster, this local assistance proved inadequate as volunteers felt tired and 
began fainting. The Rector of the local church, who had led the response of volunteers 
until this time, requested help from the neighboring dioceses. Youth sections of the 
neighboring dioceses then came forward to assist with emergent body handling tasks on 
December 27 and supplemented the efforts at Velankanni.  
Role of the Merchant Sector 
Local merchants in Velankanni consist of sea-shell vendors, vendors selling 
religious items, and small eatery owners. As soon as the water receded after the tsunami, 
local sea shell vendors and shop owners began rescue work. Rescuers used vendor carts 
(a type of two-wheeler push cart usually to display goods or serve food) to transport 
bodies from the sea shore to a temporary resting place further inland. A local sea shell 
vendor organized his team of friends and rescued bodies from the shore. This local sea 
shell vendor has been a life guard along the shore for 12 or 13 years. His livelihood along 
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the coast makes him and his friends automatically respond to the need of the hour, even 
during normal times.  His team retrieved 18 bodies from the water and placed them at a 
distance from the shore. A second wave consumed the bodies. Once again they retrieved 
bodies from the shore, but this time they transported them (on vendor carts) to the nearby 
pandal designated as a temporary morgue. They continued their search for friends and 
family tirelessly until the District Administration arrived. 
I will now focus the analysis of the Local level of emergence specifically on the 3 
hardest hit villages in terms of the number of dead. The villages of Akkarapettai, 
Keechankuppam and Velankanni are discussed next. 
Emergent Tasks 
Akkarapettai and Keechankuppam 
In the villages of Akkarapettai and Keechankuppam emergent tasks of search and 
rescue and body handling occurred in the first few days after impact. The local villagers 
realized that the District Administration could not reach them and, therefore, coordinated 
body recovery and disposal activities among themselves. As one interviewee said,  
Villagers at least realized that it would be impossible for the District 
Administration to individually attend to each dead body, they decided that we just 
have to start doing the burials ourselves. 
 
After impact, the local males, under the advice of their local elders, retrieved 
bodies from the streets. They also recovered bodies that lay mangled in debris and took 
them to temporary locations. Local elders designated the nearby petrol pump (gas station) 
and the nearby bridge as temporary locations. Rescuers used bare hands, in some cases, 
to remove bodies and transport them to temporary locations. While some local rescuers 
used bare hands, simultaneously, some other local rescuers made stretchers out of sacks 
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and wooden poles. Rescuers used these makeshift stretchers to transport bodies from the 
place where they had been recovered to the designated temporary location, and then to 
final resting places. Local people also dug mass graves and buried bodies as well during 
the initial days after impact, without identifying or meeting any sanitation requirements. 
As one official put it,  
The initial disposal of the dead which took place, the very initial disposal of the 
dead which took place was by the people, of the people themselves push 
carts were being used to carry dead bodies, carts which are otherwise used for 
vending vegetables and fruitsand a man pushing what could probably be his 
mother and two children, he is just carrying them on the street 
  
Velankanni 
In Velankanni, immediately after the tsunami on December 26, bodies of mostly 
women and children lay strewn along the streets. Local shops near the church had washed 
away with the waves and bodies lay mangled in the debris. The youth section of the 
diocese used local tractors and church vans to locate bodies. They temporarily kept the 
bodies in pandals where locals then identified the bodies. The youth teams then 
photographed the bodies for documentation purposes and issued certificates for those 
declared dead. The youth then dug mass graves across the main road, and buried bodies 
on the first day. On the second day, due to putrification, the youth teams buried bodies in 
situ. However, around the second day of the local response, volunteers felt tired and 
began fainting. Then the Rector of the local church called for help from the neighboring 
parishes.   
Rescuers used a number of ad hoc resources to recover and transport the bodies. 
In the next section, I discuss the resources used by local rescuers in handling emergent 
tasks that arose from the disaster. 
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Resource Acquisition to Manage Emergent Tasks 
Locals used their bare hands in some cases or makeshift stretchers in some other 
instances to handle body recovery, removal, and transportation. Locals used vendor carts 
(usually used for the sale of vegetables and fruits), tricycles, and 4 wheelers or whatever 
was available, to transport the dead and injured. Local rescuers conducted individual 
cremations (based on Hindu customs) in situ on putrefied bodies, because the bodies 
could not be removed from the debris. They used old tires as a substitute for firewood 
because most of the firewood remained soaked with water.  
 The emergent tasks at the Local level, primarily body handling tasks, are 
taxonomized in Figure 12 below. As one interviewee stated,  
 The actual physical act of burial was done a) by the villagers which is of course 
 all 100% fisher people and b) which was done by NGOs. 
 
  
Cover Term Village Level Emergent Body Handling 
Included Terms 
Body Recovery 
• From streets 
• Mangled in debris 
• Lodged in boats 
Body Removal 
Transportation of Bodies 
• Bare hands 
• Ad Hoc Stretchers (wooden poles & 
sacks) 
• Auto Rickshaws 
• 4 Wheelers 
• Hand carts/Vendor carts 
• Tricycles 
Assemble bodies at temporary locations 
• Petrol Pump 
• Bridge (under construction) 
Figure 12: Village Level emergent body handling 
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Body Identification 
Burial and Cremation 
• Mass graves/cremations 
• Near the coastline 
• In the village 
• In situ 
• Individual graves/cremations 
• Near the coastline 
• In the village 
• In situ 
  
Following the Local level of analysis, I will now discuss emergence at the Non-
Government Organization level in Nagapattinam. I will provide an introduction and then 
discuss the emergent tasks that NGOs handled after the tsunami. 
Non-Governmental Organizational (NGO) Level Emergence 
 NGOs play a significant role in developmental, educational, and gender issues in 
India to name a few. Given this context, it is not surprising to note that NGOs played a 
major role in the Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster as well. This section of the chapter will 
provide an introduction of NGOs in the aftermath of the tsunami, followed by a 
description of the emergent tasks they performed. I will also summarize the emergent 
relationships that developed between NGOs and the IAS teams. 
Introduction 
The enormity of the situation at hand had overwhelmed both the District and the 
State Administration. The State required NGO assistance to supplement the efforts of 
IAS teams because the States material resources proved equally insufficient to handle 
the emerging needs at hand. Therefore, NGOs are described here as the primary resource 
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mobilizing agents because they provided the IAS teams with material in the field. As 
another interviewee stated,  
lot of NGOs came in to help with lot of aid from within the country and from 
outside the country so we formed coordination centers at the state and the district 
level to ensure proper distribution of relief material coming from different 
sources. 
 
The convergence of NGOs on the affected area initially posed a problem as everyone 
appeared to want to help with the rescue efforts. As one interviewee stated, NGOs came 
with this notion that the government is not doing anything  Gradually, from the third 
day onwards, once the State assumed proper coordination of NGOs and as the formal 
system of response began to evolve, NGOs became one of the governments greatest 
strengths. As another interviewee said, our greatest support strengths that we got was 
from NGOs. NGOs were a great help.  The next section describes the emergent tasks 
handled by NGOs in the field and as an agent for resource acquisition. 
Emergent Tasks 
In the immediate post-impact phase of the disaster, local officials, local people, 
and NGOs present in the field immediately began body recovery and burial. They began 
body recovery and disposal because blocked roads and bridges limited the extent of state 
intervention in the affected area. As one interviewee stated, in disposal of bodies also 
several NGOs were there. Another interviewee stated,  
The actual physical act of burial was done a) by the villagers which is of course 
all 100% fisher people and b) by NGOs. 
 
As stated earlier, NGOs primarily mobilized material resources into the field and 
met requests made by IAS teams. For instance, teams asked for earth movers to assist 
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with debris clearance. NGOs met the teams requests by getting donors (private firms) to 
provide the necessary material.  As interviewees said, 
In the very early stages there was the need for earth movers as there was 
nothing available  we had a contract with TTC and you know, its a big company here 
and they immediately sent us their earth movers. 
 
Teams asked for white cloth to wrap the bodies and cellrich for quick 
decomposition of bodies. As interviewees said, reports from the field were, for a lot 
of requests for white cloth to wrap the bodies. NGOs also brought their prior knowledge 
(quick body decomposition methods) and experience to the field. One respondent stated 
that NGOs who had direct experience with the earthquake in Bhuj, Gujarat in 2001, 
brought their expertise to the field in Tamil Nadu as well. NGOs suggested the use of 
Cellrich in Tamil Nadu. Cellrich is a chemical that they used after the Gujarat earthquake 
to decompose bodies faster in mass graves. As an NGO interviewee said, the stuff we 
got from Gujarat to decompose the bodies, we got this component called cellrich 
 Based on semantic relationships of analysis and using the strict inclusion method, 
the following tasks, outlined in figure 13, appeared emergent for NGOs after the disaster. 
 
Cover Term NGO Level Emergent Body Related Tasks 
Included Terms Recover and Bury bodies 
Procure material requested in the field by IAS 
Teams for dead body disposal 
• Earth movers 
• White Cloth 
• Cellrich 
Bring prior knowledge to the field 
Attend daily debriefings for material requests 
 
Figure 13: NGO Level emergent body related tasks 
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Emergent Relationships 
 
 
 An NGO coordination center established at the District Collectorate from the day 
of impact, coordinated converging NGOs to the disaster area (see photo 4). Emergent 
relationships developed once the IAS teams entered the field from the third day onwards. 
For example, NGOs attended daily briefings every evening where IAS teams requested 
material needed in the field. NGOs assisted the teams by meeting these requests. This 
process led to emergent relationships between the Incident Commander, IAS Team 
Leaders, and NGO representatives in the field.  
Summary and Conclusion 
 This descriptive analysis reveals emergence at all levels of government, State, 
District, Municipal, Local as well as NGO levels. Emergence occurred in structures and 
tasks in the aftermath of the tsunami and was necessitated by the magnitude of the event. 
Emergent structures led to emergent forms of communication, emergent processes of 
Photo 4: NGO Coordination Center in an ad hoc hut in Nagapattinam 
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involvement of officials, as well as emergent relationships between and among officials, 
locals and NGOs. Emergent tasks occurred in the form of new processes required to meet 
and manage the massive disaster-generated needs.  
 The Indian Ocean Tsunami warranted an unprecedented need for emergent 
behavior among all people involved and affected. This disaster was severe and unknown 
to this part of India and brought about a number of instant deaths in a short period of 
time. The lessons that may be learned from this disaster are numerous and should be 
accounted for when creating new disaster management plans.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Overview 
 This chapter provides a summary of the thesis and discusses characteristics and 
conditions of emergence. The chapter begins with a discussion of characteristics and 
conditions that are explained in the literature review. The chapter will then discuss the 
characteristics and conditions revealed through the research conducted on the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami. Similarities and differences between literature review and thesis findings 
will be highlighted and recommendations will be added at the end of the chapter. 
What is a Characteristic? 
 According to the Dynes (1970) typology, emergence is described as new tasks 
and structures that emerge to deal with the disaster situation. A Type I organization is 
characterized by regular tasks and an old structure. A Type II organization is 
characterized by regular tasks and a new structure. A Type III organization is 
characterized by non-regular tasks and an old structure. A Type IV group is characterized 
by entirely non-regular tasks and new structures. A Type IV group emerges to meet the 
needs of the community and may dissolve soon after the emergency period is over. 
Given the Dynes (1970) typology, characteristics of emergence are new tasks and 
structures (i.e. division of labor).  Composition of emergent groups and duration of their 
existence are also key characteristics. This study is limited to studying emergence only in
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the emergency period of the tsunami disaster. The study is also limited to the emergent 
tasks that appeared to be priorities of response teams in the field. I have discussed the 
Dynes (1970) typology in order to illustrate a difference in the Indian context. 
What is a Condition? 
 A condition of emergence is a pre-requisite for emergence to occur, a situation 
required to generate emergence without which emergence is somewhat unlikely. 
Conditions emanate from and reflect local context (Phillips, 2002). For example, a 
community that is isolated from responding agencies will develop methods to assist each 
other. 
 The literature suggests the following as major conditions that cause emergence, a) 
unmet needs, b) the magnitude of the disaster, c) proximity to the disaster, and d) pre-
existing social networks. Therefore, the literature suggests that in order for emergence to 
take place the above-mentioned criteria must be evident. Next, I examine each one 
individually. 
 a) Unmet needs occur when disasters create needs that surpass the capability of 
responding organizations (Form & Nosow, 1958; Barton & Merton, 1963; Barton, 1969; 
Dynes, 1970; Parr, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989; Drabek & 
McEntire, 2002). According to the literature, when people are isolated from traditional 
responding organizations emergent groups tend to fill the gaps (Dynes, 1970, p. 146; 
Stallings, 1978; Drabek, 1986, pp. 157-172). Therefore, we can infer that blocked access 
to the affected area leaves people isolated and spurs emergent group formation. Some 
disasters cause entire communities to be blocked off for a while until the proper 
equipment arrives to clear the debris. Debris may block access roads and bridges and 
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prevent responding agencies from entering the affected area. This inaccessibility creates a 
situation where locals are compelled to respond to their own immediate tasks. Immediate 
tasks could range from search and rescue for victims to handling the dead (Form & 
Nosow, 1958; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; Dynes, 1970). According to the literature, 
unmet needs are also generated when there is a break down in organizational response. 
Organizational breakdown occurs due to lack of prior planning, lack or collapse of 
authority, and challenging tasks (Parr, 1970; Drabek, 1968; 1981, p. 17; 1986; Mileti, 
Drabek & Haas, 1975; Stallings, 1978; Mileti, 1999, p. 222; Drabek & McEntire, 2002). 
When organizational breakdown takes place emergence is facilitated. 
 b) When the magnitude of a disaster is far beyond the scope of local responding 
agencies, emergence takes place (Barton & Merton, 1963, pp. 5, 125; Barton, 1969; 
Wenger & Parr, 1969; Dynes, 1970, pp. 81-82; Roth, 1970; Drabek, 1981; Wenger & 
James, 1994; Tierney & Goltz, 1997; Tierney, 2003). Established organizations are 
unable to handle the response when the magnitude of a disaster is considerably large. In 
these situations, the social system adapts to the altered social setting and emergent groups 
perform disaster-relevant tasks (Kreps, 1978, p. 78-80). Therefore, the magnitude of a 
disaster spurs emergent groups. 
 c) The greater the proximity to the affected area, the more the likelihood of 
emergent groups forming to handle disaster-relevant activities (Kreps, 1978, pp. 80-81). 
According to the literature, distance from the impacted area may demand that local 
citizens get involved in the response (Wenger & Parr, 1969; Roth, 1970; Forrest, 1974, 
1978). They get involved because they have resources and manpower available (Roth, 
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1970; Forrest 1974, pp. 54-58, 1978; Mileti, 1999, p. 222).  Proximity to the impact area 
is, therefore, a condition spurring emergence. 
 d) Pre-existing social networks are the other primary condition that assists the 
formation of emergent groups in a locally affected area (Form & Nosow, 1958; Barton & 
Merton, 1963; Dynes, 1970, 1978, 2005; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; Forrest, 1974; 
Quarantelli, 1983; Drabek, 1968, 1986; Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989; Aguirre et 
al., 1995; Neal & Phillips, 1995; Mileti, 1999). Prior contact, liaisons, and familiarity 
with one another in the neighborhood may foster emergence. Communities that are 
dominated by personalized relationships tend to cope with disasters with their pre-
existing structures (Dynes, 1970, p. 103; Forrest, 1974, p. 84; Tierney, 2001, pp. 113-
114, 174-177). In disaster situations, individuals tend to seek out those that they are 
familiar with to determine a course of action. These individuals in turn seek out others to 
join the collective effort (Forrest, 1974, p. 98, 1978). Social networks that have inherent 
leadership within the community continue with the same leadership during disaster times 
(Forrest, 1974, p. 27, 1978). Thus, pre-existing networks spur emergent behavior. 
Characteristics of Emergence 
 In this section I will discuss characteristics of emergence within and outside the 
U.S. that agree or disagree with the Indian tsunami situation. I will highlight 
characteristics based on emergent tasks, structures, composition, and duration of 
emergent groups in Nagapattinam. 
 
 
 
 132
Compare and Contrast 
Emergent Tasks and Structures 
 According to the literature, emergent groups form within and outside the U.S. to 
deal with disaster-generated tasks (Form & Nosow, 1958, Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; 
Prince, 1920; Kennedy, 1971; Drabek, 1981; Quarantelli, 1984; Dynes, Quarantelli & 
Wenger, 1988, Aguirre et al., 1995). In the Indian situation, emergent groups formed at 
the State level to handle disaster-generated tasks. Similarly, at the Local level volunteer 
teams handled body recovery and disposal. 
 According to the literature, emergent tasks and emergent structures seem to 
appear in close conjunction with one another. To handle emergent tasks, responding 
agencies resort to emergent structural changes (Form & Nosow, 1958; Barton & Merton, 
1963; Barton, 1969; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Wenger, 1978; Ireland, 
1984, Neal, 1985; Quarantelli, 1983, 1994; Aguirre et al., 1995; Wenger, Quarantelli & 
Dynes, 1989). Priority tasks after the tsunami appeared to be body recovery, disposal, and 
debris clearance. The State, District, Municipal, Local and NGO personnel handled all 
emergent priority tasks. In addition, NGO coordination appeared to be an important task 
for the State level authorities, while mass burials appeared to be the most important task 
for municipal officials. In order to handle emergent tasks, the State created IAS teams 
that constituted members from the District and Municipal levels as well. At the Local 
level, teams formed and handled emergent tasks based on culturally defined structures, 
i.e. seniors and village elders led the teams. Therefore, emergent tasks did appear with 
emergent structures after the tsunami. 
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The literature suggests that divisions of labor are based on leadership positions 
and authority (Forrest, 1974; Wenger, 1978; Neal & Phillips, 1995). In India, the State 
named an IAS officer the Incident Commander due to rank and seniority in the services. 
Likewise, IAS officers acted as Team Leaders due to their leadership capabilities and 
their authority.  Similarly, the District Collector led the District and Municipal response 
due to leadership potential. At the Local level, village elders used their seniority and 
leadership position from normal times, in the emergency time period, to lead the 
response. The entire response at the State level and the formation of the IAS teams 
reflected a new structure with emergent divisions of labor (see figure 2, p. 86). 
According to the literature, organizations that respond to an emergency have 
interactions with the community from the pre-impact phase (Wenger, 1978). Also, 
leaders of emergent groups are chosen due to their skills and relevant knowledge of the 
social system in question. Leaders possess knowledge of the social system because of 
prior involvement or previous socialization in the area (Forrest, 1974). The Indian IAS 
emergent groups testify to this fact. IAS Team Leaders had, in the past, been District 
Collectors in the area. Therefore, because they possessed knowledge of the local area and 
the people, the State government made them Team Leaders.    
Also according to the literature, emergent groups have relatively little hierarchy, 
roles are not specialized, and there is no formal element of organization (Stallings & 
Quarantelli, 1985). In the Indian situation, although no formal organization existed in the 
Local level response, yet hierarchy appeared based on respect for seniority. Emergent 
groups of local citizens performed disaster-relevant tasks based on the advice of their 
local Panchayat leaders and village elders.  
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The literature suggests that tasks and structures of police departments may 
change. Officers may exercise personal discretion in the field, but for the most part they 
find themselves taking directives from local emergency managers (Wenger, Quarantelli 
& Dynes, 1989). In the Indian situation, police officials constituted emergent IAS teams 
and reported to their Superintendents or Team leaders in the field. Therefore, police 
officials experienced new tasks and new structures in the field. 
The literature also suggests that communication lines change after a disaster 
(Ireland, 1984; Neal, 1985; Quarantelli, 1983, 1994). The channel of communication did 
appear emergent in Nagapattinam as well. Emergent relationships that developed 
between officers of the State, District, Municipality and NGOs led to emergent 
communication networks (see figure 3, p. 92). 
Composition 
 According to the literature, local citizens are the first to respond (Form & Nosow, 
1958; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970).  Prince (1920) described how volunteers from the 
local area initiated the response effort after the explosion in Halifax, Canada. In India too, 
volunteers at the Local level appeared to be local citizens and survivors. In addition, 
emergent groups may also consist of public officials (Mileti, Drabek & Haas, 1975). 
Public officials (IAS officers) did constitute emergent groups created by the State to 
handle the entire response effort. The literature also suggests that visitors to the area may 
form emergent groups as well (Prince, 1920; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; McLuckie, 
1977; Quarantelli, 1984). Visitors did not appear to form emergent groups in the Indian 
context. This may be attributed to the fact that boats weighing 10 -15 tons blocked all 
access to some villages.  
 135
Duration 
 The literature suggests that emergent groups are short-lived and dissolve when the 
emergency period is over (Dynes, 1970, p. 46; Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; Forrest, 
1974; Mileti, Drabek & Haas, 1975, p. 75; Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Tierney, 2001). 
In India, local citizens, that formed emergent groups, handled body recovery and disposal 
tasks and then dissolved. Similarly, the IAS teams created at the State level dissolved 
after handling emergent tasks. Therefore, in terms of duration of emergent groups, the 
Indian situation concurs with the literature. 
Indian Emergence  
 At this stage I would like to offer a new model of emergence that may serve to 
understand the Indian context of emergence better. Emergence is based on what I have 
observed in India with the body handling and response effort. An explanation of the 
diagram follows Figure 14. 
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 The literature suggests that established organizations (Type I) are not likely to 
change their structure or their tasks. The literature also suggests that in the event 
established organizations perform new tasks, they will revert to their traditional tasks as 
soon as possible (Dynes, 1970). In India, the Indian Administrative Services is the right 
arm of the executive government and can be compared to an established organization. It 
is a highly structured and delineated organization with clear lines of authority. This 
organization of bureaucratic officers experienced changes in its tasks and structure in the 
aftermath of the tsunami. IAS officers generally make independent decisions about policy 
issues. However, in the field they made decisions pertaining to body handling and 
disposal and reported to the Incident Commander. Therefore, even established 
organizations, like the IAS, engaged in task and structural changes. Even established 
organizations like the police department experienced a new structure and new tasks. 
Police officials reported to their IAS Team Leaders in the field and performed emergent 
body recovery tasks. Therefore, it is suggested that established organizations experienced 
a phase of emergence in their tasks and structures. The new structure of the IAS dissolved 
soon after the crisis period ended. 
 According to the literature, expanding organizations (Type II) witness a new 
structure, but perform regular tasks (Dynes, 1970). In this case, NGOs are considered 
expanding organizations. NGOs experienced a new structure when they expanded their 
ranks and brought in volunteers. But NGOs also assisted locals with dead body recovery 
and disposal, a task unknown to them. NGOs in India are usually concerned with 
development and education issues. Therefore, this example of an expanding organization 
 137
testifies to a new structure and non-regular tasks. It is also suggested here that expanding 
organizations engage in non-regular tasks for a brief period, in disaster times. 
 According to the literature, extending organizations (Type III) perform new tasks, 
but their structure remains the same (Dynes, 1970). In India, extending organizations 
reported to the IAS Team Leaders instead of their company managers. Therefore, an 
emergent relationship is observed. Type III organizations, experienced new structures and 
performed new tasks as well. For example, cement companies brought earth movers into 
the field for debris clearance and body removal. 
 According to the literature, emergent organizations (Type IV) are based on 
entirely new structures and tasks (Dynes, 1970). In this instance, on the advice of village 
elders, locals performed emergent tasks of body handling and recovery. Their pre-disaster 
loose structure strengthened after the tsunami, as elderly advice formed the leadership 
authority structure. Therefore, emergent tasks and structures are apparent. Hence, Type 
IV remains an emergent group with elements of new tasks and new structures embodied 
within it. The Venn diagram (see figure 14, p. 135) serves to illustrate emergence, in 
terms of new tasks and structures that appeared in India in Established, Expanding, 
Extending, and Emergent Organizations. 
Conditions of Emergence 
I will now examine each condition of emergence from the literature review and 
relate them to the tsunami context. This contrast and comparison will help to establish 
similarities or differences that arose from the data.  
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Compare and Contrast 
a) Unmet Needs 
 The literature suggests unmet needs spur emergence (Form & Nosow, 1958; 
Barton & Merton, 1963; Dynes, 1970; Parr, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Wenger, Quarantelli & 
Dynes, 1989; Drabek & McEntire, 2002). Unmet needs occur when people are isolated 
from traditional responding agencies (Dynes, 1970, p. 146; Stallings, 1978; Drabek, 
1986, pp. 157-172). In the emergency period of the tsunami disaster, huge boats had 
lodged on the main roads that connect the villages to the District Administration. This 
inaccessibility isolated the villagers from traditional responding agencies. Therefore, 
emergent groups appeared to handle body recovery and disposal tasks.  
 The literature suggests that a breakdown in organizational capability to respond to 
the disaster generates unmet needs (Form & Nosow, 1958; Barton & Merton, 1963; 
Dynes, 1970; Parr, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989; Drabek & 
McEntire, 2002). Organizational breakdown occurs due to lack of planning, lack of prior 
experience, lack of authority, collapse of authority, and challenging tasks (Parr, 1970; 
Drabek, 1968, 1981, p.17, 1986; Stallings, 1978; Mileti, 1999, p. 222; Drabek & 
McEntire, 2002). In India, the District Administrations resources fell short of their 
capability to adequately respond to disaster-generated needs, thus, generating emergence. 
Also due to lack of prior planning, lack of prior experience, and challenging tasks at the 
District and Municipal levels, the State government intervened. Therefore, the tsunami 
context parallels the research findings in the literature. 
  On the other hand, the presence of authority, leadership capabilities, and the need 
for quick and independent decision makers also spurred emergence at the State level. As 
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a result IAS teams formed. The need for quick and independent decisions makers that 
spurred emergence in Nagapattinam is a condition not parallel to the findings in the U.S. 
and abroad. In addition, the State government seemed to centralize authority with one 
Incident Commander, yet decentralized authority to 11 people in the field. Decentralizing 
authority made the IAS teams answerable to the Incident Commander, and kept the 
authority structure somewhere in between a command and control and emergent one. The 
response effort in Nagapattinam appeared centralized and decentralized. Thus, this 
finding is specific to the Indian Ocean Tsunami context. 
An example in the literature describes how emergent groups appeared after the 
earthquake in Chile in 1965, but their influence was restricted as officials solely handled 
the earthquake (Kennedy, 1971; Quarantelli, 1984). However, in India, the local people 
performed most of the body recovery and disposal tasks before any administrative units 
could access the area. Therefore, it may be suggested that officials did not discount the 
capabilities of the local citizenry. 
b) Magnitude of the Disaster 
 The literature suggests that when the scope of a disaster is great, emergence is 
more likely to be observed (Barton & Merton, 1963, pp. 5, 125; Barton, 1969; Dynes, 
1970, pp. 81-82; Roth, 1970; Kreps, 1978; Wenger & James, 1994; Tierney & Goltz, 
1997; Tierney, 2003). The Indian Ocean Tsunami was an unprecedented set of events to 
take place in this part of the country. A tsunami was unknown to people in this area. In a 
matter of a few minutes, waves washed ashore and left thousands dead and many more 
injured. Locals realized the need to perform body recovery and disposal tasks because 
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bodies lay on the streets. Thus, emergence occurred at the Local level to handle emergent 
tasks due to the magnitude of the disaster. 
Also because of the magnitude, district resources proved insufficient to handle 
bodies or clear debris. Thus, resources of the State became imperative. The State 
government possessed resources that could regain access to the affected areas, in terms of 
material and personnel. In addition, the State Government received air reconnaissance 
reports, district reports, and damage assessments by senior IAS officers. Therefore, the 
State realized that the magnitude of the event warranted State intervention. IAS teams 
had the power to mobilize far more earth movers and excavators than the district. The 
magnitude of the event also required quick and independent decision makers in the field 
to handle disaster-generated tasks. Thus, the magnitude of the event spurred emergence at 
the State level.  
c) Proximity to the Impact Area 
 The literature suggests that proximity to the impact area generates emergence 
(Wenger & Parr, 1969; Roth, 1970; Forrest, 1974, 1978; Kreps, 1978). In the Indian 
situation, local citizens performed the initial tasks of body recovery and disposal until the 
State regained access to their villages. In this disaster, people either died or survived, 
relatively few people appeared injured. Therefore, body handling appeared to be the main 
task for local citizens. Local citizens and NGOs present in the impact area began body 
recovery and disposal tasks before responding agencies entered the field.  
d) Pre-existing social networks 
 Pre-existing social networks are the backbone of Indian society. These networks 
serve to empirically ground the theory that pre-existing ties are key conditions that 
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provoke emergence (Form & Nosow, 1958; Barton & Merton, 1963; Dynes, 1970; 
Taylor, Zurcher & Key, 1970; Forrest, 1974; Drabek, 1986; Wenger, Quarantelli & 
Dynes, 1989; Aguirre et al., 1995). At the State level, the officers familiarity with 
Nagapattinam provoked emergence at this level of government. IAS officers had 
previously been District Collectors in the area and knew the local geography and people 
very well. Also, the prior professional affiliations of IAS officers with one another 
provided the condition for team selection.  
Emergent groups form where kinship and community values dominate life (Roth, 
1970). In India, villagers knew one another by name and by the number of family 
members that existed in each family. They also knew where to search for victims. Prior 
social networks also existed in Velankanni, where local merchants knew one another 
from the sea shore (where they sold goods together). Therefore, they banded together to 
help find family and friends and recover and dispose of dead bodies.   
e) Community Altruism 
 The literature also suggests community altruism as a condition which spurs 
emergence (Prince, 1920; Barton, 1969; Roth, 1970; Dynes & Quarantelli, 1968; 
Kennedy, 1971; Aguirre et al., 1995; Tierney & Goltz, 1997). Altruism was certainly 
visible after the Indian Ocean Tsunami as local people got together and searched for 
victims and friends. In India, on a daily basis in small time crises, community cohesion 
and altruism are the key life savers sometimes. The inaccessibility to the affected area, 
coupled with the cohesive nature of the fishing community, and pre-existing social 
networks, triggered emergence at the Local level in Nagapattinam.  
 
 142
Discussion of Conditions 
 The main conditions that triggered emergence in Nagapattinam can be summed 
up as the magnitude of the event, disaster-generated unmet needs, and pre-existing social 
networks at all levels of government. 
 The scale of the disaster encouraged the District Administration to test a new 
authority structure. In doing so, the District Administration placed the police, fire, health, 
rescue, and other departments under the command of the District Collector. However, 
when they finally realized the full scale of the tragedy by December 29, the need for on-
the-spot decision makers became apparent. In addition, the resources at the District level 
in terms of manpower and resources proved insufficient to handle the scope of the 
disaster. Therefore, the district requested the state for help. This in turn led to the 
formation of IAS teams under the supervision of a senior IAS officer in the service, the 
Incident Commander. IAS teams brought in resources and independent decisions makers 
to handle the response. The magnitude of the event proved far more than what the District 
Administration could handle alone and spurred emergence at the State level. At the Local 
level, villagers experienced the magnitude in terms of the number of dead that lay in the 
streets. The dead included their own family members. As a result, the locals banded 
together, formed teams, and organized body recovery and disposal.  
 Resources of the municipality also fell short on account of the magnitude of the 
disaster. Therefore, under the supervision of the Municipal Commissioner, the 
Municipality of Nagapattinam requested sanitary workers and earth movers from 
neighboring districts. At the local General Hospital, the number of bodies reflected the 
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magnitude of the event. Therefore, the hospital resorted to emergent processes of post 
mortem, temporary morgue development, and triage systems to handle the bodies. 
 As stated by Roth (1970), magnitude of impact and available manpower may 
demand that local citizens get involved in the response. This was apparent in the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami context. Local villagers initiated body recovery and disposal tasks due to 
the fact that bodies lay strewn about on streets from the sheer magnitude of the tsunami. 
The stench from rotting bodies as well as perceived health issues further initiated 
emergent behavior. In the village of Velankanni, local merchants had the manpower 
available and, therefore, began search and rescue and body disposal tasks.  
 The locals also realized that their needs were left unmet due to huge accessibility 
issues.  The fact also remained that the primary roads, that linked the villages to the 
District Administration, appeared completely blocked. Thus, unmet needs spurred 
emergence at the Local level.  
 The literature suggests a lack of coordination during the emergency generally 
spurs emergence at the local community level (Barton & Merton, 1963; Parr, 1970; 
Dynes, 1970; Drabek, 1986; Wenger, Quarantelli & Dynes, 1986; Drabek & McEntire, 
2002). However, this was not the case in India. Locals organized themselves into groups 
because their access was cut off from the main roads that lead out of the village, and not 
due to a lack of coordination at the administrative level. Likewise, emergence at the State 
level occurred due to the need to make spot decisions in the field, a condition that is 
dissimilar to prior studies in the U.S. and abroad.  
 Pre-existing social networks definitely played a part in the organization of all 
emergent teams at the State, District and Local levels. At the State level, IAS officers 
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familiarity with one another (from prior professional affiliations in school, training, and 
in their jobs) and their interactions with the people of the area prior to impact, triggered 
their selection as team leaders. At the Municipal level, pre-existing social networks with 
neighboring municipalities enabled the large inflow of sanitary workers that managed the 
dead body disposal and sanitation needs generated by the disaster. Even at the General 
Hospital on account of pre-existing networks, the Nagapattinam General Hospital 
officials could request help from neighboring districts to send in their doctors. Similarly, 
emergence at the Local level occurred due to pre-existing social networks between the 
villagers (prior affiliations are based on friendship networks). Local elders and fishing 
Panchayats leaders, discussed in the analysis, had predetermined relations with the 
community. Therefore, formation of groups and division of labor occurred smoothly, 
even though it was emergent. In Velankanni, the Parish priest had pre-existing social ties 
with the neighboring diocese and parishes. Therefore, the priest called upon their youth 
sections to assist with disaster-generated needs. Similarly, in Velankanni the merchant 
sectors organized themselves based on pre-existing friendships and carried out dead body 
recovery tasks. In the Taylor, Zurcher and Key (1970) study, pre-existing social networks 
led to the formation of the first response group among local people. Similarly, in the 
study by Forrest (1974) pre-existing social networks and former ties in the community 
led to emergence at the local level, providing ample similarities with the Indian context. 
Aguirre et al. (1995) in his study in Guadalajara, Mexico, also offered evidence that pre-
existing social networks led to emergent behavior among locals when search and rescue 
parties formed to locate victims. 
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 After the Flint Beecher, Michigan, tornado, Form and Nosow (1958) discuss how 
the local residents performed search and rescue in the first few hours. Community 
altruism provides a similarity between the Flint Beecher, Michigan, case study and the 
Nagapattinam, India, example. The only difference in this instance can be observed in 
terms of the tasks being performed. While in Flint Beecher, Michigan, residents searched 
for survivors and victims, in India, locals searched and recovered primarily dead bodies.  
Conclusion 
 A summary of the key points of this study indicate that pre-existing social 
networks triggered emergence at all levels of government in India. Therefore, the Indian 
tsunami context concurs with the literature. Emergence appeared to generate from the 
fact that people knew each other. State level officials had worked in the area, district 
officials knew the local area, municipal officials had prior contact with neighboring 
municipalities, and local people knew one another. Thus, prior social contacts generated 
emergence. 
The magnitude of the event, in accordance with the literature, spurred emergence 
at all levels as well. The tsunami was new to the area that it affected and in a few 
minutes, the sea that is normally a provider became a destroyer and killed thousands. 
The magnitude of the event, therefore, led to emergent behavior as locals organized 
themselves into groups to remove the vast number of bodies lying strewn on local streets.  
 The division of labor achieved at the State level within and among the IAS teams 
occurred due to the need to centralize authority with an Incident Commander to avoid 
duplication of efforts in the field. The division of labor at this level is highly interesting. 
Even though authority appeared centralized with the Incident Commander, yet IAS Team 
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Leaders enjoyed a certain level of freedom in the field. They enjoyed this freedom on 
account of their capability to make independent and intelligent decisions as the need 
arose. Therefore, the set of conditions that led to this level of emergence and division of 
labor was the knowledge, managerial skill, independent decision making power, 
familiarity with the area, and spontaneity of the IAS Team Leaders. 
The division of labor at the Local level reflects the Indian cultural context of 
respect for the advice of elders in all situations, including when disaster strikes. In India, 
the advice of elders is held in high esteem and tremendous respect is given to them. Their 
age and wisdom is revered by the young and even middle-aged folk. Given this cultural 
context, respect for elders, their advice, and wisdom appeared as the key conditions that 
triggered emergence at the Local level. 
The Dynes typology also discusses emergent groups forming last, after 
established, expanding, and extending organizations fail to meet the needs of the local 
community. However, this is not the case in India, as emergent groups formed at the local 
level primarily due to inaccessibility to the District Administration. Emergent groups also 
formed because bodies lay strewn across the street and something had to be done. 
The Indian culture is one in which, due to the teeming millions, even in a small 
crisis in a neighborhood like a house fire, hundreds will gather as either onlookers or will 
pitch in along with the responding police and fire services. Given this context, therefore it 
is not a mystery that emergent groups formed, met the disaster-generated needs, and 
dissolved back into the cultural realm after the tsunami, only to reappear again as and 
when the needs arises.  
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The State governments involvement stemmed from the fact that each and every 
individual has to receive compensation in disasters. Therefore, the government sent in 
high level teams who could make quick and spontaneous decisions in order to ensure that 
every family received compensation. The IAS teams helped to centralize authority and 
decentralize efforts efficiently.  
Recommendations for future research 
 Future research should be geared toward more cross comparative studies on 
emergence. The literature on emergence is insufficient to enable substantial typologizing 
across cultural and international borders. Research on disasters in India is extremely 
sparse and the current available research remains inadequately cataloged. Disasters are 
becoming an extremely common occurrence across the globe. In developing countries, 
the loss of lives is the greatest, as the pressure of population of land continues to increase. 
With this increasing pressure comes a tendency for the less fortunate to settle for land 
that is at high risk from natural calamities. It is practically impossible to prevent the less 
fortunate from occupying lands that are at risk from natural hazards. Therefore, we need 
to educate or train local people on search and rescue, disaster preparedness and response 
issues. Therefore, research needs to continually document evidence, wherever it may 
exist, on how communities can help one another in disasters.  
Recommendations for Disaster Management Practice 
 The practice of disaster management needs to focus on the existing research on 
varying issues pertaining to response and, thereby, increase preparedness levels of 
communities. The fact that emergence is most likely to take place among local people in 
countries where kinship has a high value, needs to be accounted for and incorporated into 
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disaster management plans of local communities. Emergence at the Local and NGO 
levels can be harnessed as a useful resource if carefully considered. Manpower and 
resources are in abundance in countries with a high populace. Therefore, harnessing 
manpower and resources requires adequate planning to be able to meld it into the 
response of official organizations. A formal response procedure to meet and manage 
massive disasters needs is recommended at all levels of government in countries like 
India. In developing countries, where a great number of people live in highly vulnerable 
areas, the loss of life is directly proportional to the magnitude of the disaster. Thus, 
disaster management plans need to be adequately defined. The knowledge of local people 
and their search and rescue capabilities should not be underestimated, but rather used as a 
tool by formal response agencies. 
Recommendations for Policy 
 Government investment in warning systems is recommended. Officials should be 
appointed to act as point-of-contact people in the event that other countries may learn of 
impending danger. The government should put policy in place to make people more 
aware of the dangers of natural disasters and the vulnerabilities of the areas that they may 
live in. Training programs on disaster preparedness and response need to be delivered to 
the local audience. 
A top down approach used in Tamil Nadu at the State level met with bottom-up 
local efforts and facilitated efforts from NGOs. This appeared to meet and manage the 
disaster-generated needs in Nagapattinam. This response needs to be formalized for the 
future. 
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APPENDIX I 
Interview Questions 
 
Search and Rescue Interview Guide 
 
 
Name:  _____________________________   Date__________________ 
 
Location: ____________________________  Interview #   ___________ 
 
1. Were you involved in any search and rescue activities as a result of the tsunami? 
 
   If Yes: Go to question 2 
   If No: Thank you for your time. 
 
2. Where did you begin your participation in the search and rescue efforts? 
 
3. How were you involved in the search and rescue efforts? Probe: individual level 
of participation, challenges and how they met those challenges. 
 
4. How long did you participate? 
 
5. Why did you become involved?  Probe:  sources of motivation. 
 
6. Did you work with others?  If yes, please describe how you worked with others.  If 
no, describe your own activities.  Probe:  division of labor in relationship to 
others. 
 
7. What resources did you use/have?  Probe:  location, source, use of resources 
including tangible, intangible or others as they emerge during the respondents 
interview. 
 
8. Did you observe any other individuals involved in other search and rescue 
activities that day?  Any other groups?  Any governmental officials?  Any non-
governmental officials?   
• Probe:  describe what they saw of each unit of analysis including division 
of labor, activities, time span.   
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• Probe: who were the main people performing Search and Rescue? What 
were they doing? 
 
9. Have you done Search and Rescue in the past? Please describe your activities.  
Probe: Prior training in first aid, search and rescue, swimming: 
 
10. Anything else you would like me to know about what you did or observed on that 
day regarding Search and Rescue? 
 
 
 
 
Demographics: 
 
Age:  
Religion: 
Income: 
No. of family members: 
No. of children: 
Occupation: 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time. Please accept this food packet as a token of our 
appreciation.  We thank you for your participation in the study. The results will be 
used to help improve response in future events. 
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APPENDIX II 
Document List 
1. Video clips from hospital:  1) damage to video with final segment short clip of 
morgue; 2) water at the hospital, outflow; 3) same as first clip it seems; 4) water 
at the hospital, debris moving equipment.  Video provided by high level hospital 
administrator.   
2. NGO report, GIS data on excel file and searchable government ready reckoner 
file of all government orders made to handle the tsunami.  Note:  the NGO report 
contains village by village reports of impact including deaths, demographics of 
bodies recovered and more.  Provided by the NGO Coordination Center in 
Nagapattinam.   
3. Report from the Velankanni Rectors office, Our Lady of Health Basilica, on the 
tsunami and immediate aftermath.  Includes information on Catholic Youth 
engaged in mass burials and some religious events surrounding the burials.   
4. Copies of CD-ROM purchased in Velankanni commercial district of the tsunami. 
5. Series of documents provided by the Nag Fire Dept.: 
• Report, Post tsunami operations by Fire Service. 
• List of private voluntary organization and staff provided including doctors, 
para-medical staff, students, volunteers, and vehicles. 
• Action Plan, Disaster Relief Medical Team, Nag District. 
• List, temporary shelters, location and numbers. 
• Map of Nagapattinam District. 
• Set of photographs, fire service and new boat and what appears to be putting 
out a fire or perhaps at a mass cremation? 
• Tsunami Relief Report, Nagapattinam (spiral bound, lots of data) from DC 
• Fire Chief Assessment Document 
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APPENDIX III 
Visual List 
S.NO NUMBER TITLE LOCATION DESCRIPTION REMARKS
      
Thursday May 5th 2005 
1 0050 Research 
and Rehab 
Department 
Chennai CRA Office, 
Revenue 
Building.  
The 
Buckeye 
Guy! 
2 0051 Disaster 
Management 
and 
Mitigation 
Department 
Chennai Revenue 
Building 
 
3 0052 Offices  Chennai Offices in the 
Revenue 
Building. 
 
4 0053 Revenue 
Building 
Chennai Outside view of 
the Revenue 
Building 
 
5 0054 Foundation 
stone  
Chennai Corporation Of 
Chennai-Ripon 
Buildings 
 
6 0055 Ripon 
Building 
Chennai Corporation of 
Chennai building 
 
7 0056 Ripon 
Building 
Lawn 
Chennai Corporation of 
Chennai building 
 
8 0057 Intervention 
Area 2 
Chennai Coordination 
chart at the 
Bhoomika Trust 
Office 
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9 0058 Intervention 
Area 3 
Chennai Permanent 
Shelter 
Construction 
chart at 
Bhoomika Trust 
Office. 
 
10 0059 Notice 
Board at 
Bhoomika 
Trust. 
Chennai District 
Collectors names 
and contact 
information are 
posted on this 
board. 
 
11 0060 IT 
Department,  
Chennai Outside the 
office of the 
Secretary of the 
IT Department. 
 
12. 0061 The guys 
who took us 
around. 
Chennai The driver and 
Public Relations 
Officer outside 
the IT 
Department 
 
Friday May 6th 2005 
13. 0064 Sleeping on 
the job. 
Chennai Waiting Room, 
Director of 
Fisheries,DMS 
Complex. 
 
14. 0065 Chronology 
of Directors. 
Chennai Interviewee 004 
listed on 39 & 
42. 
 
15 0066 Director of 
Fisheries 
Chennai Outside the 
office of the 
Director of 
Fisheries. 
 
16 0067 DMS 
Complex 
Chennai In the hallway of 
the DMS 
Complex. 
 
17. 0068 Fisheries 
Department 
Chennai A collage at the 
Fisheries 
Department. 
 
18. 0069 Fisheries 
Department 
Chennai The collage 
depicts 
fisherfolk 
activities. 
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19. 0070 Fisheries 
Department 
Chennai Depiction of 
technology in the 
fishing industry. 
 
20. 0071 Prohibition 
and Excise 
Department 
Chennai The office of the 
Flying Squad. 
Dr. Neal 
liked his 
name and 
title! 
21. 0072 CRA Office  Chennai View from the 
Revenue 
Building. 
 
22. 0073 CRA Office  Chennai View of Marina 
Beach from the 
Revenue 
Building. 
 
23. 0074 CRA Office  Chennai Close up of 
Marina Beach. 
 
24. 0075 CRA Office  Chennai View of the 
road. 
 
25. 0076 CRA Office  Chennai Dr Neal in the 
hallway. 
 
26. 0077 CRA Office  Chennai The Buckeye 
guy! 
 
27 0078 Control 
Room 
Chennai Control Room of 
the State Relief 
Commissioner in 
the CRA Office. 
 
28. 0079 Control 
Room 
Chennai Shireen outside 
the Control 
Room. 
 
29. 0081 Unicef Chennai Dr. Neal outside 
the Unicef 
office. 
 
30 0082 Unicef Chennai Shireen outside 
the Unicef 
office. 
 
Monday 9th May 2005 
31 0093 Chennai 
Highway 
Chennai View from the 
highway. 
 
32. 0094 Chennai 
Highway 
Chennai View of the sea 
from the 
highway. 
 
33. 0095 Temporary 
shelters 
Chennai Shelters seen 
along the 
Chennai 
highway. 
They were 
markedly in 
straight lines. 
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34 0096 Temporary 
shelters 
Chennai Same as above 
from a different 
angle. 
 
35 0097 Destroyed 
huts 
Chennai A destroyed 
village along the 
Chennai 
highway. 
 
36. 0098 Destroyed 
huts 
Chennai Closer view of 
the above. 
 
37. 0099 Destroyed 
huts 
Chennai Same as above 
but from a 
different angle. 
 
38. 0100 Damaged 
boats 
Chennai Damaged boats 
seen along the 
Chennai 
highway.  
It seems they 
were trying to 
salvage some 
parts. 
39 0101 Temporary 
Shelters 
Chennai Temporary 
shelters along 
the Chennai 
highway. 
Seemed to be 
made out of 
tin or steel 
with plastic 
roofing. 
40 0102 Damaged 
bridge 
Nagapattinam Bridge 
constructed by 
the Indian Army 
on the 29th of 
December 2004. 
Police were 
monitoring 
the flow of 
vehicles on 
the bridge. 
41 0103 Damaged 
boats 
Nagapattinam The two boats 
were brought 
inland by the 
waves. 
 
42 0104 Damaged 
boat 
Nagapattinam Closer view of 
the boat that was 
brought inland. 
It was lodged 
alongside the 
damaged 
bridge. 
43 0105 Channel  Nagapattinam Picture take to 
show the 
distance the 
boats were 
carried. 
Construction 
of a new 
bridge in 
progress.  
44 0106 Damaged 
Boats 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Damaged boats 
in the village of 
Akkrapettai. 
 
45 0107 Damaged 
Boats 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Damaged boats 
in the village of 
Akkrapettai. 
 
 165
46 0108 Destroyed 
homes 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Damaged 
housing in 
Akkrapettai 
 
47 0109 Destroyed 
boats. 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Damaged boats 
brought inland in 
Akkrapettai. 
 
48 0110 Destroyed 
boats. 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Damaged boats 
brought inland 
and packed 
together like 
sardines 
 
49 0111 Destroyed 
boats. 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Same as above-
Different angle 
 
50 0112 New boats Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
New boats on 
the other side of 
the channel. 
Most of the 
new boats 
were 
following the 
Indian flag 
color scheme 
(Saffron, 
White and 
Green). 
51 0113 Damaged 
housing 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Destroyed 
concrete houses 
and rubble. 
 
52 0114 Damaged 
structures 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Damaged 
structures in the 
village. 
 
53 0115 Damaged 
Houses 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
The foundation 
of the staircase 
in the 
background is 
destroyed. 
The staircase 
is still 
standing! 
54 0116 Akkrapettai 
village 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Destroyed view 
of the coastal 
village. 
The trucks in 
the 
background 
were coming 
to collect 
fish. 
55 0117 Saree Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
A mangled saree 
in the village. 
 
56 0118 The beach Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Rubble strewn 
along the beach. 
Fishermen 
selling fish in 
the 
background. 
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57 0119 Destroyed 
village 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Trucks coming 
in to collect fish. 
 
58 0120 Damaged 
house 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Different angle 
of the staircase 
without a 
foundation 
 
59 0121 Damaged 
walls 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Broken walls 
near the above 
staircase. 
 
60 0122 Damaged 
boats 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
A Boat lies in 
the foreground 
beyond repair. 
 
61 0123 Damaged 
boats 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Another boat 
brought inland, 
lies beyond 
repair. 
 
62 0124 Village Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Different view of 
the village 
 
63 0125 Temporary 
shelters 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Shelters donated 
by Global Uplift 
USA 
The shelters 
are made out 
of tin or steel 
64 0126 Temporary 
Shelters 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Same as above- 
Different view 
 
65 0127 Road Sign Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
The Tata Relief 
Committee 
Rehab Project 
 
66 0128 Damaged 
structures 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
A view of the 
coastal village 
further down the 
road. 
 
67 0129 Coastal view Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
A view of the 
ocean from the 
village. 
 
68 0130 Palm trees Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Another view of 
the village. 
 
69 0131 The coast Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
The coast is not 
filled with sand 
anymore. 
 
70 0132 Petroleum 
tanks 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Slippers were 
seen strewn in 
the village. 
 
71 0133 Shoreline Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
The village 
shoreline. The 
pier in the 
distance was 
being repaired. 
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72 0134 Lighthouse Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
A view of the 
village from the 
shoreline. 
 
73 0135 Fishing nets Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Boats and nets 
lying unattended 
in the village. 
 
74 0136 Damaged 
boat 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
A boat brought 
inland,beyond 
repair. 
 
75 0137 Temporary 
shelter 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Shelters donated 
by SIR,PSSS & 
SMSM 
Bleaching 
powder was 
scattered 
around the 
temporary 
shelters. 
76 0138 Temporary 
shelters 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Shelters donated 
by CARITAS-
India 
 
77 0139 Temporary 
shelters 
Nagapattinam-
Akkrapettai 
Another angle of 
the above. 
Note the 
bleaching 
powder. 
People were 
seen cooking 
on the 
outside. 
78 0140 District 
Collectorate 
Nagapattinam Offices inside 
the collectorate. 
 
79 0141 NGO 
Coordination 
Centre 
Nagapattinam A sign outside 
the elevator in 
the collectorate 
building 
 
80 0142 Womens 
Self 
Employment 
Nagapattinam Victims selling 
their wares in the 
collectorate 
building 
 
81 0143 Collectorate 
Building 
Nagapattinam Outside view of 
the collectorate  
 
82 0144 Hut Nagapattinam NGO 
Coordination hut 
on the 
collectorate 
grounds. 
 
83 0145 Collectorate 
Building 
Nagapattinam A larger view of 
the collectorate 
building. 
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84 0146 New boats Nagapattinam The only boats 
that were not 
following the 
Indian tricolor. 
 
Tuesday 10th May 2005 
85 0147 The Basilica Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
The church of 
the Virgin Mary. 
 
86 0148 The Basilica Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Different view of 
the church. 
 
87 0149 The Basilica 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
The church from 
a different angle. 
 
88 0150 The Basilica 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Frontal view of 
the church. 
 
89 0151 The Basilica 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
View of the 
church from 
higher ground. 
 
90 0152 Shrine 
Offices 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Shrine Priests 
Residence and 
Offices and 
Souvenir shops. 
 
91 0153 Coastal 
Velankani 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Towards the 
coast from the 
shrine. 
 
92 0154 The shrine 
from a 
distance 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
The shrine can 
be seen in the 
distance from the 
shoreline. 
A 
comparison 
of this picture 
can be made 
with slide 25 
on the 
Tsunami ppt. 
93 0155 The beach Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Tourists taking a 
dip after visiting 
the shrine. 
 
94 0156 The beach Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
View of the sea.  
95 0157 A local 
vendor 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
A local guy 
selling sea 
shells. 
He said two 
of his shops 
got washed 
away. 
96 0158 Western 
Shrine 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
One of the 
shrines at 
Velankani 
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97 0159 Shrine Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Another place of 
worship. 
 
98 0160 The Basilica 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
North facing side 
of the church. 
 
99 0161 Eastern 
shrine. 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
The northern end 
of the church 
leading to the 
eastern shrine. 
 
100 0162 Mass grave Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
One of the three 
mass graves. 
They appear 
30x30 ft in size 
and 11/2 ft 
above the 
ground. 
These graves 
were along a 
dirt track 
with a 
garbage 
dump behind 
them. The 
road was 
being paved. 
101 0163 Mass grave 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
The second of 
the three graves. 
Note the 
garbage 
dump in the 
background. 
102 0164 Crucifix Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Crucifix on the 
second grave. 
 
103 0165 Mass grave 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Fresh earth on 
the third grave. 
 
104 0166 Graves Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
These appear to 
be childrens 
graves. 
Graves were 
east facing 
and had five 
bricks each at 
the head. 
105 0167 Graves Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Area in and 
around the 
graves. 
 
106 0168 Grave Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Seemed like a 
grave with 
flowers hanging 
over it. 
 
107 0169 Mass grave 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
A mass grave in 
the distance and 
the road being 
paved behind it. 
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108 0170 Mass grave 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Different angle 
of the graves. 
 
109 0171 Mass grave 
 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Two of the mass 
graves. 
 
110 0172 Burial 
ground 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
Crucifix within a 
compound near 
the mass graves. 
 
111 0173 The crucifix Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
The crucifix 
reads May the 
victims of 
tsunami rest in 
peace, 26-12-
2004. 
3500 people 
are presumed 
buried here. 
112 0174 Dirt road Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
The dirt road to 
the graves, they 
are being paved. 
 
113 0175 The mass 
graves 
Nagapattinam- 
Velankani 
 
The site of the 
mass graves. 
 
114 0176 SEVAI Nagapattinam 
 
A Voluntary 
organization. 
 
115 0177 SEVAI Nagapattinam 
 
Building boats  
116 0178 SEVAI Nagapattinam 
 
Fishing boats 
project 
Signs of 
SEVAI were 
very 
prominent 
along the 
entire 
Nagapattinam 
road. 
117 0179 Destroyed 
bridge 
Nagapattinam 
 
Bridge from 
picture 0102 
taken from north 
Nagapattinam 
 
118 0180 Destroyed 
bridge 
Nagapattinam 
 
The same bridge 
above. 
Note the 
concrete 
block floating 
in the water. 
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